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Abstract 
Public organizations as anchors and quartermasters of innovation:  
The case of ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia, Canada. 
 
by Ryan T. MacNeil 
 
Because there is a lack of empirical research on public innovation in goods, the importance 
of public organizations for innovation may be underestimated. I show that public 
organizations engage in the development of important and novel ocean science 
instrumentalities—instruments and techniques—in Nova Scotia, Canada. I conducted 
structured first-person interviews to collect data on 27 public and private organizations and 
the 702 possible interactive learning relationships between them. I use quantitative network 
analysis methods to confirm the importance of public organizations within this innovation 
system and to also investigate the nature of interorganizational interactive learning. I find 
that public organizations have greater degree centrality than private companies and that the 
removal of public organizations would result in greater network fragmentation than the 
removal of private companies. I also find that both public and private organizations perform 
more complex roles than suggested by the limited prior research on scientific 
instrumentality innovation. The majority of learning interactions between public research 
organizations and private companies in this network are symbiotic—multiplex and 
bidirectional. The most important relationships in the network involve bidirectional 
learning partnerships. These findings contradict the oversimplified view of innovation as 
linear market transactions. My work reinforces calls for goods to be included in studies of 
public innovation, makes several methodological contributions that can be used to reveal 
dark innovation, and identifies the anchoring and quartermastering roles that appear present 
in this particular scientific instrumentalities innovation system. I also highlight a potentially 
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Preface: A Note on Style 
Before introducing this dissertation, I would like to answer some objections that might be 
raised about its style. Those approaching this work from certain disciplines such as 
economics will find my use of first-person pronouns problematic. They may feel that 
writing in the third-person keeps research objective and scientific. But, like the academic 
writing experts Gerald Graff and Cathy Birkenstein (2017), I disagree. Graff and 
Birkenstein (2017) argue that third-person pronouns do not directly reduce subjectivity, 
but first-person pronouns do directly improve the clarity of an author’s arguments. This is 
consistent with the latest style guides of the American Psychological Association (2010) 
and the Modern Languages Association (Gibaldi, 2008). Both guides encourage the use of 
first-person pronouns to avoid ambiguity around an author’s voice. The most important 
stylistic move in this dissertation is my use of first-person pronouns to signify my 
position and my voice.  
Readers approaching from other disciplines such as industrial and organizational 
psychology might be objecting to my writing style for another reason. They may be 
expecting a more formulaic and standardized style of presentation. They might be 
satisfied with the way that my results are presented in Chapter 6. However, the style, 
structure, and sequencing of other chapters might appear abnormal from their perspective. 
Some readers might immediately understand the term “analytical framework” that is used 
in Chapter 4. Or, like me, they might need time to consider why such a section is a 
meaningful and important bridge between theory and method. All readers will approach 
this work with expectations about the conventions of academic writing. Disciplinary 
conventions are increasingly evident in innovation studies. The irony is that this reduces 
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novelty across studies whose subject matter is innovation. Ben Martin has warned that 
important contributions to innovation studies are now experiencing a “rough ride” 
through peer review because of overly strict adherence to disciplinary conventions and 
the expectation of a “fairly standard form” of academic writing (B. Martin, 2016, p. 440).  
The challenge of writing in an interdisciplinary field like innovation studies is the 
presence of several competing stylistic conventions. It is difficult to hold an 
interdisciplinary dialogue about innovation when scholars from economics, geography, 
sociology, psychology, and management and organization studies all expect the 
conversation to take a different form. Leading thinkers in innovation studies have noticed 
this and warned that we must avoid the “disciplinary sclerosis” or rigidity that would 
come from standardizing and normalizing the field (Fagerberg, Martin, & Andersen, 
2013; B. Martin, 2013). Instead, we must risk the accusation that innovation research is 
less legitimate than established disciplines; we must accept that it looks like an 
interdisciplinary “mongrel” (Fagerberg et al., 2013, p. 11). As a result, we will be in a 
better position to achieve novelty and relevance (Fagerberg et al., 2013; B. Martin, 2013).  
This does not necessarily mean breaking all norms of academic writing. In fact, this 
dissertation follows the manuscript standards set out by the APA (2010), the writing 
patterns and templates developed by Graff and Birkenstein (2017), and the inspiration 
provided by my favourite writer in the field, Marianna Mazzucato (2013a). So, it is not 
that this dissertation lacks a consistent and legitimate style. Rather, the challenge is that 
this style sits at the intersection of several competing disciplinary conventions. Elements 
of my style will appear familiar to one reader but unfamiliar to another. Regardless of 
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stylistic preferences, I expect that all readers will find the substance of this work novel, 
provocative, and compelling. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this dissertation, I argue that the importance of public organizations for 
innovation is underestimated. There is a burgeoning literature on public innovation—i.e., 
innovation undertaken by public organizations (see a review in De Vries, Bekkers, & 
Tummers, 2016), but public innovation in goods remains remarkably underexplored. In 
this opening chapter, I discuss the lack of research on public innovation in goods and 
argue that it is related to neoliberal beliefs about the role public organizations should play 
in society. Neoliberalism is the philosophy that individual well-being is best achieved by 
a free market and that “state interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a 
bare minimum” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Recent discussions have highlighted problems 
arising from “neoliberal bias” (Cooke, 2016; Fløysand & Jakobsen, 2011), neoliberal 
“dogma,” “ideas,” and “strategies” (Lundvall, 2016), “neoliberal forces” (Archibugi & 
Filippetti, 2017), “neoliberal hegemony” (Cooke, 2016), and “market bias” (Cruz, 
Paulino, & Gallouj, 2015; Gallouj & Zanfei, 2013) in innovation studies and related 
public policies. I add to these discussions by challenging the neoliberal belief that public 
organizations do not produce novel and highly technical goods.  
However, I do not intend to either suggest or imply that there is a conscious and 
explicit neoliberal bias in innovation studies. On the contrary, in this opening chapter I 
acknowledge that research in innovation studies deals extensively with the importance of 
the public sector for innovation. There is a particularly strong and explicit focus on public 
policy for innovation (e.g., Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). My work extends research on 
public innovation by emphasizing the understudied phenomenon of public innovation in 
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goods. I argue that public innovation in goods is unconsciously concealed by latent 
neoliberal assumptions in our theoretical and analytical frameworks. 
Over the coming chapters, I will outline the theoretical, contextual, and analytical 
frameworks that allow me to examine the importance of public organizations for 
innovation in one field of novel and highly-technical goods. I thereby contribute to two of 
Ben Martin’s (2013, 2016) grand challenges in innovation studies: the entrepreneurial 
state challenge and the dark innovation challenge. By adjusting the ways that public 
innovation—or “the entrepreneurial state” (Mazzucato, 2013a)—is studied, I reveal 
public innovation in goods as a kind of “dark innovation” (B. Martin, 2013, 2016) that is 
often acknowledged but rarely studied.  
Achieving this goal will be difficult because neoliberal ideas are widely—but 
unconsciously—applied to large numbers of public organizations. These organizations are 
often subsumed under one label: “the state” or “government.” But to ensure clarity in this 
dissertation, I do not take an omnibus approach to the public sector. I follow OECD 
(2005) guidelines by defining organizations as standalone legal entities or a kind-of-
activity units (KAUs) (see further discussion in Chapter 4 and definitions in the Glossary 
at the end of the text). Furthermore, I use a theory-driven approach—from the work of 
James Perry and Hal Rainey (1988)—to distinguish between public and private 
organizations. Perry and Rainey (1988) identified three features that might make an 
organization “public”: public ownership, public funding, and polyarchal control—i.e., 
democratic rather than market-based control. These three markers—ownership, funding, 
and control—can be combined in a number of ways to create a typology of different 
public and private organizations. Alignment of any two or more criteria tips the balance 
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toward the public or private end of a continuum. An organization should therefore be 
considered “public” if it is “privately” incorporated but nonetheless publicly-funded and 
subject to democratic control (Perry & Rainey, 1988)1. Such definitions are required to 
avoid treating all public organizations as one homogenous—and passive—actor.  
Based on neoliberal ideas, the actions of public organizations are typically labelled 
as “interventions” in the marketplace (Breimyer, 1991; Mazzucato, 2016). Indeed, public 
organizations are thought to be at their best when they interact with the market minimally, 
and only when they are correcting market failures. Public organizations are seen as 
necessary for innovation because they provide regulatory frameworks, some knowledge 
inputs, and a rich customer-base for new capital goods. However, public organizations are 
not often seen as active innovators (Koch & Hauknes, 2005; Mazzucato, 2013a; Windrum 
& Koch, 2008). Indeed, it has been said that public organizations are “conspicuously 
missing” from analyses of new product and process development (Koch & Hauknes, 
2005). They do not appear in Joseph Schumpeter’s Mark I and Mark II innovation 
patterns, where creative destruction is achieved through the efforts of private 
entrepreneurs or large firms but not public organizations. They are also not found in Keith 
Pavitt’s (1984) famous taxonomy of innovation, or the subsequent adaptations (e.g., 
Archibugi, 2001; Castellacci, 2008). These frameworks only classify the innovation 
patterns of private firms or industries (MacNeil, 2014a). Pavitt (1984) did suggest that 
another category might be needed in his taxonomy “to cover purchases by government 
                                                 
1 See the glossary for detailed definitions of “organization,” “public organization,” 
“private organization” and other key concepts in this dissertation. 
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and utilities of expensive capital goods related to defense, energy, communications and 
transport” (p. 370). In other words, it was not important to include public organizations in 
the original taxonomy because they do not produce innovation; they merely purchase it 
from the private sector. Given the assumption that public organizations do not innovate, it 
is acceptable to exclude them from innovation classification schemes. Indeed, public 
organizations are often described as the opposite of innovative (Mazzucato, 2013a; 
Windrum & Koch, 2008). Active innovation by public organizations continues to be 
underexplored in innovation studies (De Vries et al., 2016; Fagerberg et al., 2013; 
Holbrook, 2010; Mazzucato, 2013a). Instead, private companies are seen as the central 
actors in innovation dynamics; this has been described as a “market bias” (Cruz et al., 
2015). 
The Public Innovation in Goods Gap 
Many studies have contradicted this bias by investigating innovation in public 
services and public policy (Altshuler & Behn, 2010; Bason, 2010; Fuglsang, 2010; 
Gallouj, Rubalcaba, & Windrum, 2013; Røste, 2005; R. M. Walker, 2014; R. M. Walker, 
Jeanes, & Rowlands, 2002; Windrum & Koch, 2008). However, a small piece of 
neoliberal myopia remains: there is very little research on public innovation in goods. 
Indeed, most studies of public innovation do not collect data on innovation in goods 
(Arundel & Huber, 2013). In the following paragraphs, I unpack this gap in the public 
innovation literature and identify several inconsistencies in discussions about public 
innovation in goods. I then return to the idea that this gap is related to neoliberal ideas 
about public versus private production of goods.  
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Many publications in this field acknowledge that public organizations produce 
innovative goods without empirically investigating this type of innovation (e.g., Bloch, 
2011; De Vries et al., 2016; Demircioglu & Audretsch, 2017; Gallouj et al., 2013; 
Halvorsen, Hauknes, Miles, & Røste, 2005; Hartley, 2005; Koch & Hauknes, 2005; 
Mazzucato, 2013a; R. M. Walker et al., 2002; Windrum & Koch, 2008). For example, a 
prominent book in the field begins with a chapter that mentions public innovation in 
medical technologies, instruments, and drugs (Windrum & Koch, 2008). The same book 
concludes with the surprisingly definitive counter-claim that “technological innovations, 
especially goods, are the exclusive domain of the private sector” (Windrum & Koch, 
2008, p. 239). Another prominent book on public innovation provides multiple examples 
of technological goods that were developed by public organizations in its opening two 
pages, but then focuses exclusively on services for the remainder of its length (Gallouj et 
al., 2013). In a similar vein, two different taxonomies of public innovation exclude goods 
after providing examples of public innovation in goods on a preceding page (Halvorsen et 
al., 2005; Koch & Hauknes, 2005). The decision to exclude goods is explicit in another 
paper where the argument is that “product innovation” is “problematic in the public 
sector, where many [emphasis added] innovations are service-based” (R. M. Walker et al., 
2002, p. 203). These examples all contain an interesting contradiction: goods are present 
in anecdotal discussions of public innovation but not in empirical analysis.  
Another interesting contradiction is found in research on “The Entrepreneurial 
State” (Lazonick & Mazzucato, 2013; Mazzucato, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2015, 2016; 
Mazzucato & Penna, 2016). Marianna Mazzucato is perhaps the most prominent critic of 
neoliberal ideas about public innovation. In her book, The Entrepreneurial State, she 
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describes the mythology around public innovation as a “discursive battle” (Mazzucato, 
2013, p. 2) about whether “the state” is capable of playing an entrepreneurial role in 
society. To demonstrate that the state is highly entrepreneurial, Mazzucato (2013) 
presents anecdotal examples of radical innovations—particularly goods—that emerged 
from mission-oriented public innovation projects. In Chapter 5 of her book, she argues 
that “there is not a single key technology behind the iPhone that has not been State-
funded [emphasis added]” (Mazzucato, 2013a, p. 11). I agree with the conclusion that all 
of the key iPhone technologies were developed using public funds. However, I worry that 
focusing on the state’s financial role may shift attention away from other active roles 
performed by public organizations.  
The broader entrepreneurial state research program is focused on financial 
mechanisms. Both before and after the publication of The Entrepreneurial State, this 
research has been focused on questions of financing and risk in innovation (Lazonick & 
Mazzucato, 2013; Mazzucato, 2013b, 2013c, 2017; Mazzucato & Penna, 2016; 
Mazzucato & Semmler, 2002; Mazzucato & Tancioni, 2008). This is important work; 
however, the examples provided in the iPhone chapter of The Entrepreneurial State 
(Mazzucato, 2013a) are not exclusively about public funds being spent to stimulate 
private innovation. These technological goods were not all the result of state-funding to 
private companies; some were the work of public organizations. Several examples are 
provided of iPhone elements that were invented within public organizations and then 
commercialized (Mazzucato, 2013a). There is also discussion of two prominent examples 
where technological goods were developed by public organizations initially for the 
exclusive use of other public organizations: the global position system (GPS) and the 
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speech interpretation and recognition interface (SIRI) virtual assistant (Mazzucato, 
2013a). GPS technology was developed within the American military in the 1970s and 
did not enter civilian use until the 1990s (Mazzucato, 2013a). SIRI was developed by 
publicly-paid university researchers for use by the CIA beginning in 20002 and not 
commercialized for civilian use until 2010 (Mazzucato, 2013a). Certainly, public funds 
were expended in these efforts. But because the focus of this research is on financial 
mechanisms, it is easy to miss the point that these anecdotes are about technologies that 
were developed by employees of public organizations. Overall, the entrepreneurial state 
research agenda is focused on certain public innovation roles; an individual public 
organization might act as: “a spender, facilitator, and regulator, but also as an investor 
and venture capitalist” (Mazzucato, 2016, p. 144). Like the taxonomies of public 
innovation discussed above, this list of roles does not leave room for the development of 
goods. The empirical focus on public finance for innovation suggests that, although 
public money is often involved, radical innovation in goods happens outside public 
organizations. Research on the entrepreneurial state has contributed greatly toward 
dispelling neoliberal dogma, and yet public innovation in goods remains underexplored.  
Several pieces of scholarship do attempt to incorporate goods into research on 
public innovation. The first two of these contributions—the taxonomies of public 
innovation developed by Jean Hartley (2005) and De Vries et al. (2016)—both make 
                                                 
2 Note that SIRI was developed by a research unit at Stanford University. Stanford is 
commonly referred to as a “private” university in the US system, but it should be treated 
as a “public” organization for research purposes according to the theoretical criteria 
developed by Perry and Rainey (1988). 
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allowances for public innovation in goods. De Vries et al. (2016) include goods in their 
taxonomy of public innovation but do not provide any specific examples in their 
discussion. Hartley (2005) includes goods in her taxonomy and provides the anecdotal 
example of public innovation in medical devices. Interestingly, however, both of these 
contributions turn their attention away from innovation in goods and toward innovation in 
services. De Vries et al. (2016) note that this is the normal thing to do. They say, “the 
dominant focus in the body of empirical knowledge on public sector innovation is on 
internal administrative, often technology driven processes” (De Vries et al., 2016, p. 152). 
This explanation confirms that public innovation research is focused on service and 
process innovations, but it does not explain the scant empirical research on public 
innovation in goods.  
Some attempts have been made to measure public innovation in goods (Arundel & 
Huber, 2013; Bloch, 2011; Bloch & Bugge, 2013; Bugge, Mortensen, & Bloch, 2011; 
Demircioglu & Audretsch, 2017). In three of these cases, researchers define product 
innovations as both goods and services but report only aggregate/combined product 
innovations (Bloch, 2011; Bloch & Bugge, 2013; Demircioglu & Audretsch, 2017). In 
two other cases, researchers report data on public innovation in goods but provide 
cautious interpretations (Arundel & Huber, 2013; Bugge et al., 2011). The first of these—
a large-scale study across various Nordic countries—found that 12%-34% of public 
organizations had introduced innovations in physical goods (Bugge et al., 2011). 
However, the authors suggest that these numbers are “rather high” and that the goods may 
be parts “of larger innovations in the public services” (Bugge et al., 2011, p. 31). The 
second—a study of innovation in Australian public organizations—found that one-third 
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of interviewees and 21.3% of survey respondents had introduced innovations involving a 
tangible good or software (Arundel & Huber, 2013). The authors of that study are quick 
to point out that none of their respondents described the goods innovations as “important” 
or “successful” and that the respondents tended to view goods “as a type of service” 
(Arundel & Huber, 2013, p. 156). In this way, both studies are somewhat dismissive of 
their data on public innovation in goods. Overall, there are some studies that measure 
public innovation in goods but there is no focused research agenda on the subject.  
The preceding paragraphs speak to a gap in the research on public innovation. 
Consistently, research on public innovation skims over the subject of public innovation in 
goods. In the examples provided above, public innovation in goods is either ignored, 
dismissed, minimized, or not seen as an important research focus. The public innovation 
literature includes anecdotes about novel inventions to convince readers that public 
organizations innovate, but then treats these anecdotes as extraordinary and abnormal. 
Many studies of public innovation notice public innovation in goods (e.g., Bloch, 2011; 
De Vries et al., 2016; Demircioglu & Audretsch, 2017; Gallouj et al., 2013; Halvorsen et 
al., 2005; Hartley, 2005; Koch & Hauknes, 2005; Mazzucato, 2013a; R. M. Walker et al., 
2002; Windrum & Koch, 2008), but very few engage in research about it (e.g., Arundel & 
Huber, 2013; Bugge et al., 2011). The literature is focused nearly entirely upon 
innovation in public services; and, it has been said this focus is an important response to 
the otherwise dominant focus on certain consumer technologies (e.g., computer 
electronics) in innovation studies (Osborne & Brown, 2011, 2013)—the “boys’ toys” bias 
(B. Martin, 2013, 2016). I agree that the boys’ toys bias is a problem across innovation 
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studies, but it appears that this bias has been inverted in research on public innovation. 
Subsequently, public innovation in goods in underexamined. 
It is possible that public innovation in goods is understudied because private 
companies are thought to be the only appropriate producers of goods (e.g., Windrum & 
Koch, 2008, p. 239). There are some hints at this in the literature. For example, it has 
been said that the “appropriate” way to understand product innovation in the public sector 
is by focusing on services (R. M. Walker, 2014, p. 23). This implies that goods are the 
inappropriate way to understand product innovation in the public sector. Adam Holbrook 
(2010) notices this norm and hints at the underlying neoliberal discourse. He says, “public 
discourse on the role of the state in the economy and society has, in many developed 
countries, demanded that the state withdraw from some service industries and virtually all 
goods producing industries” (Holbrook, 2010, p. 161). If public organizations have 
indeed withdrawn from the production of goods, then I might agree that it is appropriate 
not to study public innovation in goods. However, I agree with Anthony Arundel and 
Dorothea Huber (2013) that goods should be included in the measurement of public 
innovation. They suggest that the exclusion of goods is the result of widely held beliefs 
about public organizations: “data on product or goods innovations are not collected in 
most studies because of the belief that the public sector rarely develop and or implement 
new types of goods, with the focus primarily on services” (Arundel & Huber, 2013, p. 
149). Such beliefs mean that most innovation measurement methods and instruments are 
not designed to capture public innovation in goods. I therefore propose that public 
innovation in goods is what Ben Martin (2013, 2016) has called “dark innovation.” 
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The Dark Innovation Challenge 
Martin (2016) developed the concept of dark innovation using the analogy of dark 
matter. Astronomers are aware that dark matter exists, but they cannot directly observe it 
with current instruments. Extending the analogy to innovation studies allows us to speak 
about dark innovations, which Martin defines as “types of innovations [that] have been 
ignored or are essentially ‘invisible’ in terms of conventional indicators” (B. Martin, 
2016, p. 434). I propose that public innovation in goods is an area of dark innovation; I 
argued above that its existence is acknowledged in the literature, but it is often 
empirically ignored. In this section I will consider where and how public innovation in 
goods might be made visible. To further extend the dark matter analogy, this section is 
about adjusting my instruments so that this dark innovation can be observed.  
Where might public innovation in goods be observed? To observe public 
innovation in goods, I can focus on an innovation context—a region and/or sector—
where it might be particularly concentrated. Based on common beliefs about public 
innovation, it would be normal to assume that such a context would be extreme or unique 
and therefore unworthy of investigation. However, I have argued above that public 
innovation in goods is frequently noticed. Therefore, it is not necessarily rare. Conducting 
research in such a context could confirm the existence of this dark innovation and reveal 
some of its qualities. In his authoritative textbook on case study research, Robert Yin 
(2009) explains that such contexts are so valuable for social science that they warrant a 
single-case design. He explains that when researchers have access to a context in which it 
is possible to “uncover some prevalent phenomenon previously inaccessible to social 
scientists, such conditions justify the use of a single-case study on the grounds of its 
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revelatory nature” (Yin, 2009, p. 49). This dissertation therefore presents an in-depth 
investigation of a single case study situated within a field where I might expect to find 
public innovation in goods: the field of scientific instruments. 
There is a limited literature on scientific instrument innovation. Several important 
contributions in innovation studies have theoretically discussed scientific instruments 
without collecting empirical data (de Solla Price, 1984; Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 
1986; Rosenberg, 1992). Meanwhile, there have been very few empirical studies of 
scientific instrument innovation. In one such study, Nick Oliver and Michelle 
Blakeborough (1998) examine new product development networks in the private sector 
and aggregate their results across six types of products—including scientific instruments. 
They do not analyze scientific instruments separately from five other types of products. 
The only studies to focus empirically on scientific instrument innovation were conducted 
by Eric von Hippel and his colleagues (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von 
Hippel, 1976, 1988). Spread over nearly twenty years, their research consistently 
demonstrated that the users of scientific instruments—the scientists themselves—perform 
nearly all of the activities involved in developing scientific instruments. Based on these 
findings, von Hippel asserted that the “locus of innovation” (von Hippel, 1976) for 
scientific instruments is the scientist user, not the instrument manufacturer. Indeed, this 
line of research concluded that instrument manufacturing companies were only making 
incremental improvements to existing technologies (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 
1979).  
After publishing one article (von Hippel, 1976), incorporating that article into his 
first book (von Hippel, 1988), and supervising related work by a PhD student (Spital, 
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1979), von Hippel (1988) dismissed scientific instruments as a context not worthy of 
further investigation. Six years later he revisited this context in a fourth and final 
publication (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994). He otherwise shifted the focus of his career to 
what he called “other, more ‘normal’ fields” (von Hippel, 1988, p. 20).3 His early career 
focus on scientific instrument innovation provided evidence of a new phenomenon—user 
innovation—opening an important line of research (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 2010; von 
Hippel, 1986, 1988, 2005). I open another line of research by arguing that these studies 
by von Hippel and his colleagues also provide evidence of public innovation in goods: 
scientist-users are often employed within public organizations. 
I concede that not all scientists work for public organizations. But scientific norms, 
as much as they have changed in the past century (Gibbons, 1994, 2000; Helga Nowotny, 
Scott, & Gibbons, 2003; Helga  Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2013; Ziman, 1996), still 
mean that most scientists are employed by public research organizations (PROs)—public 
organizations that perform scientific research, such as universities and government 
laboratories (see also definition in the Glossary). Early studies of scientific instrument 
innovation do not use the words “public” or “government” (see Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 
1976, 1988). Only the most recent contribution of the set (i.e., Riggs & von Hippel, 1994) 
acknowledges that some of the scientist-users were public employees. Of the 24 user 
innovations sampled by Riggs and von Hippel (1994), 15 were developed at universities, 
                                                 
3 I concede that this context is different from those normally studied by innovation 
scholars. But it is the unusual and understudied nature of this context that holds the 
potential for novel observations. This is the advantage of revelatory case contexts (Yin, 
2009). 
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four at government laboratories, and nine at corporate research laboratories. The authors 
do not distinguish between public and private universities, but their data was collected in 
the United States where the differences between public and private universities have been 
extensively debated, particularly in the legal community (see O'Neil, 1969). In an 
extensive review of this distinction, legal scholar Robert O’Neil (1969) concludes that 
“most private colleges and universities are public to some degree” (p. 188). Perry and 
Rainey (1988) suggest differences between public and private universities, but O'Neil 
(1969) argued that the only thing truly private about private universities is their 
ownership structure. By the 1960s, most so-called “private universities” in the USA were 
subject to public control and were receiving public funds at a per student rate that was 
twice as high as so-called public universities (O'Neil, 1969). Under the criteria developed 
by Perry and Rainey (1988) and the legal arguments presented by O'Neil (1969), nearly 
all universities should be classified as public organizations4. This means that upwards of 
two-thirds of the cases studied by Riggs and von Hippel (1994) could have been instances 
of public organizations producing scientific instrument innovations.  
One study has linked the work of von Hippel and his colleagues with the subject of 
public innovation (i.e., Dalpé, 1994). However, the focus of that study is on the 
procurement activities of public organizations. This procurement focus it implies that 
public organizations purchase—or pays for—innovation from the private sector. This is 
                                                 
4 The public nature of universities is less contested in Canada where only a small number 
of higher education institutions have private ownership structures (see Holdaway, 
Newberry, Hickson, & Heron, 1975). Based on all three Perry and Rainey (1988) 
criteria, all ten universities in the Province of Nova Scotia are public. 
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similar to the limitation of Mazzucato’s focus on finance. When I further unpack the work 
of von Hippel and his colleagues in Chapter 2 it will become clear that they were not 
observing innovation-by-procurement. A careful read of their results points to the 
development of new technological goods, primarily inside public organizations. Their 
“scientist-users” were producing and disseminating multiple fully-functional scientific 
devices (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). Scientist users 
were more than customers of private manufacturers, they were producing scientific 
instruments. This suggests that public organizations could be the “locus of innovation” 
(von Hippel, 1976) for scientific instruments. However, this possibility is not considered 
in the existing studies of scientific instrument innovation. Studying public innovation in 
scientific instruments could therefore extend the limited research on scientific instrument 
innovation. Furthermore—and more germane to this dissertation—studying scientific 
instruments could address the gap in research on public innovation in goods.  
Scientific instruments or instrumentalities? Before proceeding any further, I must 
highlight a major risk of discussing innovation in scientific instruments. By focusing on 
instruments—which are physical goods—I would be treating goods and services as 
dichotomous categories of product innovation and then privileging goods. This would see 
me perpetuate the production bias that has been critiqued by leading scholars of public 
innovation (i.e., Osborne & Brown, 2011) and the “boys’ toys” bias that plagues 
innovation studies (see B. Martin, 2013; B. Martin, 2016). Fortunately, this problem can 
be resolved by following Derek de Solla Price’s (1984) shift from the narrow language of 
“scientific instruments” to his broader concept: “scientific instrumentalities.” As one of 
the past century’s preeminent scholars of science, de Solla Price (1984) argued that it is 
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not theoretically appropriate to narrowly focus on scientific instruments because the 
technologies of science take many forms. He defined an “instrumentality” as any 
“laboratory method” or scientific technique, including techniques that are embedded in 
physical instruments and those that are tacit. A scientific instrument is a piece of 
scientific know-how—a scientific instrumentality—that has been codified into a physical 
artifact. These scientific instrumentalities would be considered goods. Other pieces of 
scientific know-how might be codified in other ways—such as in scientific 
publications—or they might remain tacit. In this way, scientific know-how can be 
delivered as a service (de Solla Price, 1984; Hughes, 1976). New scientific instruments 
and techniques can be produced as goods or services; they can be product innovations. 
Ultimately, instrumentalities are defined by their application: they are the process 
innovations of science. 
 De Solla Price’s (1984) shift from “instruments” to “instrumentalities” is strikingly 
similar to the way that marketing scholars have overcome their production bias. One of 
the principles of the “service-dominant logic” in marketing is that goods should be 
thought of as services-embedded-in-objects (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008). For example, 
customers purchase dishwashers because these objects perform a cleaning service. The 
service-dominant logic tells us that all goods perform services (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 
2008). But there is no such service-dominant logic in innovation studies. Here, goods and 
services are commonly considered to be separate and discrete categories (Barras, 1986; 
OECD, 2005). I could conform to this norm, focus on the tangible technologies of 
science—the instruments—and use this context to investigate public innovation in goods. 
But a better option is to focus on instrumentalities: the techniques and methods of science 
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which are sometimes performed by scientific instruments. Use of this term avoids a 
production bias, while still focusing attention on a field that is likely to include public 
innovation in goods. I therefore refer to “scientific instrumentalities” and “ocean science 
instrumentalities” throughout this dissertation, except when referring to the work of von 
Hippel and his colleagues who spoke only of “instruments” (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; 
Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). 
How might public innovation in goods be observed? Based on the forgoing, one 
might reasonably expect to observe public innovation in goods and services in the field of 
scientific instrumentality innovation. Having identified this broad empirical context, I am 
now able to ask a very pointed research question: How important are public organizations 
for scientific instrumentality innovation? In posing this question, my objectives are to (1) 
confirm that public organizations produce technological goods, (2) investigate the relative 
importance of public and private organizations for scientific instrumentality innovation, 
and (3) understand the relationships between public and private organizations for 
scientific instrumentality innovation. Chapter 3 provides detailed discussion and a brief 
history of the specific empirical context in which I investigate my research question—the 
field of ocean science instrumentalities innovation in Nova Scotia, Canada. But as with 
other instances of dark innovation (see discussion in B. Martin, 2013, 2016), investigating 
this phenomenon first requires some adjustments to our social science instrumentalities. 
In this section, I discuss the ways that various theoretical and analytical mechanisms 
make public innovation in goods more or less visible. By doing so, I make important 
contributions to the dark innovation challenge (B. Martin, 2013, 2016). 
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My challenge begins with the linear innovation model that von Hippel and his 
colleagues used. Under this model, the development of scientific instruments is thought to 
follow a series of sequential steps from problem identification to commercialization. 
Innovation is theoretically framed as a linear product development process. This linear 
model and its many limitations will be discussed in Chapter 2. For now, let us focus on its 
market-orientation. Under different variations of this model, innovations are thought to be 
either pushed by knowledge suppliers or pulled by forces of market demand. Regardless 
of the direction—the push or pull—the market is seen as the final destination for new 
products. The key relationships in the process are market exchanges between users and 
producers. Users and producers can perform different product development functions—
different steps in the process—but they are ultimately related to one another through a 
market exchange. Theoretically tying innovation to the market obscures some forms of 
public innovation. Recent discussions (e.g., Bloch & Bugge, 2013; Gault, 2012, 2018), 
have suggested that it should be sufficient for innovations to be implemented in any 
way—e.g., “made available to potential users” (Gault, 2018, p. 619)—and not necessarily 
“introduced on the market” (OECD, 1992, 2005).5  
                                                 
5  Some readers might object to equal treatment of public goods and private goods—
those products that enter the market and those that do not. I grant that product 
innovations entering the market appear more valuable because they have exchange 
value, whereas common and public goods are, by their very nature, excluded from 
market exchange. However, this does not mean that such goods are without value. It 
simply means that they must be valued differently (see Lamont, 2012; Mazzucato, 
2017). I follow Gault (2012) and Bloch and Bugge (2013) in challenging the common 
statistical standard that innovations must be introduced “onto the market” (OECD, 
2005). 
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The shift away from linear models has been one of the most important 
advancements in innovation studies (B. Martin, 2013, 2016). This shift began with the 
introduction of the “chain-link” model in the late 1980s (Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 
1986). The chain-link model emphasized knowledge pathways rather than market 
transactions, but it nonetheless maintained that innovations are introduced onto the 
market. When I unpack this model in Chapter 2, I highlight interesting—if fleeting—
references to innovation in scientific instruments. I also discuss the problematic 
dichotomy between research and development that is found in the chain-linked model 
(Caraça, Lundvall, & Mendonça, 2009). Public organizations have tended to be 
positioned on the research side of the dichotomy while private firms have been given the 
leading role on the development side. In short, the shift away from linear models and 
toward a chain-link model has not been a departure from a market-orientation. 
However, there is potential to develop alternate perspectives using the innovation 
systems approach. Beginning in the 1990s, innovation studies began to shift away from 
the chain-link model and toward the innovation systems approach (C. W. Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). One of the originators of this approach, Christopher 
Freeman, defined an innovation system as a “network of institutions [i.e., organizations] 
in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify 
and diffuse new technologies” (C. W. Freeman, 1987, p. 1). His definition shows us that, 
from its earliest days, the innovation systems approach was amenable to equal treatment 
of public and private organizations. And it has certainly helped to overcome prior firm-
centric approaches to innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2013). This is partly because the 
innovation systems approach is not focused on market transactions. It does not 
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conceptualize innovation as a function of free markets; instead, it frames innovation as an 
“interactive learning” process (Lundvall, 1988) that takes place within nations (C. W. 
Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1993), regions (Asheim, Smith, & Oughton, 
2011), sectors (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002), and global networks 
(Chaminade & Vang, 2008; Ernst, 2006; Liu, Chaminade, & Asheim, 2013). Interactive 
learning comprises various interorganizational processes that (re)combine knowledge (see 
discussion in Chapter 2 and the Glossary). In the next chapter, I discuss the many kinds of 
interorganizational interactive learning discussed in the literature and note that many of 
these do not involve market transactions. In this way, the innovation systems approach 
has shifted academic focus away from exchange markets and toward learning systems. 
The innovation systems approach, then, is the basis upon which I can carefully design 
theoretical and analytical lenses for the study of public innovation in goods and services.  
The innovation systems approach must be used carefully in this dissertation because 
it is often combined with a focus on firms and markets. It has been used to observe 
several public innovation roles, but these have been passive ones (see discussion in 
Mazzucato, 2013a, 2016). Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding the ways 
public organizations can stimulate innovation in the market through policy (Edquist, 
2001; Edquist & Chaminade, 2006), procurement (Edquist, Hommen, & Tsipouri, 2000; 
Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012), and mission-oriented R&D (see Foray, Mowery, 
& Nelson, 2012). Across these studies, the innovation systems approach is used to 
identify “system failures” and then prescribe intervention by public organizations 
(Mazzucato, 2013a, 2016). Mazzucato criticizes the innovation systems approach for this 
because she believes it has “indirectly perpetuated the view of the public sector as a 
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passive force that can only facilitate change, rather than lead it” (Mazzucato, 2016, p. 
141). However, as I have shown, the innovation systems approach does not default 
toward a market orientation. 
To reveal dark innovation, I must adjust the instrumentalities that are normally used 
to study innovation, including those associated with the innovation systems approach. In 
the words of Martin, “the challenge to the next generation of [innovation studies] 
researchers is to conceptualize, define, and come up with improved methods for 
measuring, analysing and understanding ‘dark innovation’” (B. Martin, 2016, p. 434). 
Much of my discussion in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 is devoted to this challenge. Looking for 
innovation outside the market requires careful adjustments to theoretical frameworks (see 
Chapter 2), analytical frameworks (see Chapter 4), and research methods (see Chapter 5). 
The innovation systems approach provides a solid base with which I can offer an 
alternative perspective—one that is not grounded in a market-orientation. This 
dissertation therefore contains considerable discussion of the concepts, definitions, 
measurement methods, and analytic techniques I use to evaluate the importance of public 
organizations for innovation in scientific instrumentalities. As I argue in the final chapter, 
these adjustments are, in and of themselves, an important contribution to the 
instrumentalities used in innovation studies. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The purpose of this introductory chapter has been to understand a gap in the 
literature on public innovation—the public innovation in goods gap. I have argued that 
the existence of this gap is consistent with neoliberal ideas about the proper role for 
public organizations with respect to the production of goods in society. I have also argued 
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that it is a type of dark innovation: there are many indications that public organizations 
produce innovative goods, but this phenomenon has barely been empirically investigated. 
As with other forms of dark innovation, the limited empirical research may be the result 
of limitations in common theoretical and analytical frameworks. These frameworks do 
not prevent us from anecdotally noticing technological artifacts that have been developed 
within public organizations. But they do help us to either turn away from the phenomenon 
or to observe it and then classify it as something else, e.g., user-innovation, financing of 
innovation, procurement for innovation, public services innovation. This appears to have 
been the situation in the only four empirical studies focused directly on scientific 
instrument innovation; it is likely that public research organizations were the locus of 
innovation in these studies, but their employees were labelled as users—not producers—
of these innovations. The limited literature on scientific instrumentality innovation 
suggests that this context could provide a “revelatory” case (Yin, 2009) of public 
innovation in goods (and services). To investigate a context of scientific instrumentality 
innovation, I will need to develop theoretical and analytical frameworks that do not have 
a market-orientation. As argued in this chapter, I cannot presume that only private 
companies produce innovative goods, or that public organizations only produce service 
innovations. I have taken the first step in this direction already; I have argued for the 
importance of defining innovation as an interactive learning process and not merely a 
market outcome. Over the coming six chapters I will further refine my theoretical, 
conceptual, and analytical frameworks and make observations that address this important 
gap in the field.  
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Chapter 2 elaborates on several points already raised. It explores the current state of 
knowledge regarding scientific instrumentality innovation and simultaneously unpacks 
the theoretical models that were used to establish this knowledge. I have already noted 
that existing empirical work in this context has been limited to only a few contributions 
by von Hippel and his colleagues. Their work is therefore unpacked in some detail, as is 
the underlying linear model of innovation. Additional insights are then drawn from 
theoretical discussions about scientific instrumentalities that used the chain-link model 
and ones that used theory from the field of science and technology studies (STS)—a field 
where theory is not simplified into illustrated boxes. These strands of discussion help me 
to articulate three theoretical propositions about public innovation in scientific 
instrumentalities. 
Additionally, Chapter 2 will show that theoretical understandings of innovation 
grow in sophistication from the 1970s to present-day, while interest in scientific 
instrumentalities innovation disappears. The chapter concludes by developing an 
appropriate theoretical framework— an innovation systems approach—for studying 
public innovation in a field of scientific instrumentalities. The innovation systems 
approach has not been used to study scientific instrumentality innovation,6 but as I have 
argued above, its theoretical basis makes it suitable for examining public innovation in 
                                                 
6 A comprehensive database search for “‘scientific instrument*’ AND ‘innovation 
system*’” conducted in May 2017 returned many publications referencing von Hippel 
(1976), but no publications that applied an innovation systems approach to this field of 
technology. The search was conducted in Google Scholar, Business Source Premier 
(EBSCO), Science Direct, Sage Premier All-Access, and Taylor & Francis Journals 
Online. 
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goods. Chapter 2 will expand on the framing of innovation as interactive learning and 
capitalize on the flexibility of the innovation systems approach. I will adjust existing 
“channels of interaction” models (e.g., De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2012) so that it is 
theoretically possible for public and private organizations to be equally capable of 
interactive learning. 
Chapter 3 then describes the specific empirical context used in this dissertation: the 
field of ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia, Canada. It begins by defining 
ocean science and then positioning this dissertation within the present-day circumstances 
of ocean science and technology innovation in the province. I argue that my research is 
not only important for the advancement of innovation theory, but it is also important in 
light of recent cuts to public organizations that perform ocean science and simultaneous 
investments in ocean technology industrial development. After considering the recent 
discord between science policy and industrial policy, I examine the histories of four 
public research organizations that were central to the formation of this innovation system. 
I conclude the chapter by considering whether my historical data supports the theoretical 
propositions developed in Chapter 2. This appears to be the case, and this discussion leads 
me to add a fourth theoretical proposition that only becomes obvious once context and 
theory are combined.  
At the end of Chapter 3 I argue that limitations of the historical data make it 
insufficient to investigate my research question. Direct empirical observations are 
required. However, common analytical frameworks were not designed for observing 
public innovation in goods. Chapter 4 is therefore devoted to developing an appropriate 
analytical approach. The resulting analytical framework combines insights from 
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innovation systems theory with insights about network analysis methodology to establish 
the boundaries of this regional-sectoral innovation system. For my analysis, this system is 
operationalized as an interactive learning network. To complete my analytical framework, 
Chapter 4 also introduces key measurement concepts from network analysis and uses 
these to restate the four theoretical propositions as hypotheses. As Whetten (1989) 
explains, theoretical propositions involve concepts but testable hypotheses require 
measures. The overall purpose of my analytical framework is to bridge between theory 
and method. 
Chapter 5 then provides details of my research method. I collected data through 
face-to-face computer-assisted interviews with organizations involved in using and 
producing ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia, Canada. These organizations 
were identified through key informant interviews with the five individuals whose 
positions included a responsibility for understanding and supporting the region’s ocean 
science and technology sector. I carefully developed my data collection techniques to 
ensure consistent and equal treatment of public and private organizations, and constructed 
a network dataset so that the hypotheses from Chapter 4 could be evaluated using 
quantitative network analysis. 
Chapter 6 provides the results from this hypothesis testing and descriptive statistics 
that confirm the development of technological goods within the past 5 years by all of the 
private companies and nearly two-thirds of the public organizations that I interviewed. 
The results also provide valuable insights into the types of interactive learning 
relationships that are important within this innovation system.  
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Based on these results, Chapter 7 provides some discussion of my theoretical and 
methodological contributions, policy implications, research limitations, and future 
directions. The central contribution of this dissertation arises from my direct observation 
of public innovation in goods and services. Not only do I find that public organizations 
produce innovative goods, but in direct response to my research question I find that 
public organizations are more important than private organizations for this regional-
sectoral innovation system. These observations contradict the neoliberal ideas identified 
at the beginning of the dissertation. This observation also confirms the importance of my 
methodological contributions: the adjustments I make throughout this dissertation are 
effective in allowing me to observe this phenomenon. And finally, these adjustments to 
theoretical framework, analytical framework, and research methods combine to provide 
an additional theoretical contribution: they lead to the surprising finding that public 
organizations might play more than one active role in scientific instrumentality 
innovation. I describe three major organizational roles in this innovation system using the 
metaphors of “anchors” and two different kinds of “quartermasters”. After discussing the 
implications of my research for science policy and industrial policy, I conclude this 
dissertation by highlighting several opportunities for future research including further 
research into public innovation in goods and into scientific instrumentalities innovation, 
the need to revisit existing taxonomies of innovation, the opportunity for a services-
dominant logic in innovation studies, the effects of new public management on the 
entrepreneurial state, opportunities to employ my methodological contributions, and the 
potential for revealing additional dark innovation using a comprehensive “diverse 
economies” framework (Gibson-Graham, 2008). 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
In the opening chapter, I introduced a gap in the literature related to public 
innovation in goods, the challenge of observing this dark innovation, and the potential for 
studying it in scientific instrumentality contexts. In this chapter, I will review the current 
state of knowledge regarding scientific instrumentality innovation while also unpacking 
the theoretical models that were used to establish this knowledge. I have already 
introduced the challenge of market bias in linear innovation models. I also briefly 
discussed the pros and cons of the chain-linked model of innovation and then introduced 
the potential advantages of using an innovation systems approach. Having already 
presented these arguments in a general form, my purpose in this chapter is to develop a 
richer understanding of existing theory and articulate a theoretical framework for this 
dissertation. To this end, I will provide a comprehensive examination of the existing 
literature on scientific instrumentality innovation and critically discuss the theoretical 
models underpinning it.  
Over the course of this chapter, I will develop three theoretical propositions 
regarding the importance of public organizations to innovation in scientific 
instrumentalities. My discussion will follow the same chronology as the broader field of 
innovation studies—I begin with the aftermath of World War II and proceed through to 
recent research on innovation systems and university-industry interactive learning. The 
scientific instrument studies by von Hippel and his colleagues appear early on this 
timeline. They provide a basis for my first two theoretical propositions. Later in the 
chronology, the context of scientific instrumentalities disappears from the literature. 
Public research organizations (PROs) come to be positioned only as service providers—
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their role is reduced to one that serves the needs of private companies. Although scientific 
instrumentalities are absent and PROs’ roles are reduced to a market-orientation, I am 
able to draw insights from the more recent innovation systems literature and the related 
literature on university-industry/PRO-industry interaction. These insights provide the 
basis for my third proposition—a proposition that better connects scientific 
instrumentalities innovation with present-day innovation theory. But first, I must reach 
back and consider influential ideas from the 1940s because these laid the foundation for 
the early research on scientific instrumentalities. 
“Linear” Developments 
High-profile work of scientists during World War II—particularly the Manhattan 
Project—led to a “post-war paradigm” in innovation studies (Nemet, 2009). American 
engineer and science administrator Vannevar Bush articulated this paradigm in his 
argument that the knowledge created through public investments in science could 
radically advance the “frontiers” of medicine, industry, and national defense (1945a, 
1945b). The idea that advancements in basic science were the antecedents to 
technological progress “held sway for 20 years or so” (B. Martin, 2010, p. 3) in 
acacdemic research and in public policy. During this time, the American consulting firm 
Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. introduced similar thinking in its linear “new product 
development” process model (Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc., 1968; S. C. Johnson & Jones, 
1957). Samuel Johnson of Johnson & Johnson and Conrad Jones of Booz Allen & 
Hamilton published an early six-step version of the model in Harvard Business Review in 
1957 (S. C. Johnson & Jones, 1957).  Several researchers adapted the specific steps and 
labels in various ways, maintaining the linear and sequential nature of the model (e.g., 
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Cooper, 1994; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Morley, 1968; Myers & Marquis, 1969; 
Rothwell, 1994). Along the way, a debate emerged about the directionality of the model. 
Those who ascribed to the 1940’s post-war paradigm described an innovation process that 
was initiated and driven—or “pushed”—by advancements in applied scientific 
knowledge. In the 1950s and 1960s, an alternative hypothesis emerged suggesting that 
various forms of consumer and business demand served to “pull”—or determine the 
speed and direction of—innovation (Rosenberg, 1969; Schmookler, 1966). This demand-
pull, linear, sequential innovation model was at the heart of Eric von Hippel’s seminal 
work on scientific instrument innovation (von Hippel, 1976).  
Von Hippel’s paper “the dominant role of users in the scientific instrument 
innovation process” (1976) was his first academic publication and the starting point for 
his important concept of “user innovation” (Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; von Hippel, 
1986, 1988). Bogers et al. (2010) argue that this seminal work was the first to notice that 
users can be innovators, and that it subsequently “set off a substantial amount of research 
investigating users as the sources of innovation” (p. 859). The research findings were 
reprinted in von Hippel’s book, The Sources of Innovation (1988), which Fagerberg, 
Fosaas, and Sapprasert (2012) ranked as #13 on their list of top contributions to 
innovation studies. The 1976 and 1988 versions of this study are two of only four 
empirical studies that have focused on innovation in scientific instruments. Eric von 
Hippel was involved in all four publications (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; 
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von Hippel, 1976, 1988)7. Because von Hippel has been a leading innovation scholar, it is 
important to understand these studies in the context of his career. Also, because this 
context is so understudied, it is important to closely examine the theory, method, and 
results of these studies. For these reasons, I dedicate the next several pages to the 
research.  
We should begin with the first study (von Hippel, 1976, 1988). Here, von Hippel 
examined the development of 111 scientific instrument innovations in the United States, 
including four broad classes of scientific instruments: gas chromatographs, nuclear 
magnetic resonance spectrometers, ultraviolet spectrophotometers, and transmission 
electron microscopes.8 He used the Myers and Marquis (1969) version of the linear 
innovation process; that is, the new product development process. He mapped the steps 
undertaken by scientists—which he referred to as “users”—versus the steps undertaken 
by scientific instrument manufacturing firms—which he referred to as “producers.” He 
found that in nearly all cases scientist-users performed all steps of the innovation process 
up to and including the development and use of pre-commercial prototypes. Only after 
this pre-commercial testing did producers in the private-sector acquire and begin to both 
commercialize and incrementally improve these instruments (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
7 Although Spital (1979) does not discuss von Hippel’s involvement in his work, Spital is 
acknowledged as a research assistant in von Hippel’s (1975) draft working paper on 
scientific instruments and as an influential PhD student in von Hippel’s first (1988) 
book—the one that contained the final iteration of the original scientific instruments 
study. 
8  Note that von Hippel (1976) was studying instruments with broad applicability across 
scientific disciplines. All the instrument types he studied have applications in ocean 
science. 
OCEAN SCIENCE INSTRUMENTALITIES  31 
 
Figure 1. The primary actor in each innovation process stage in the scientific instrument 
innovation process (adapted from von Hippel, 1976). 
Frank Spital, one of the research assistants on von Hippel’s project (von Hippel, 
1975, 1988), later extended the research (Spital, 1979). He added some nuance to the 
original observations, determining that scientist-users were responsible for “major 
improvement innovations” and many “minor improvement innovations” except those that 
were initiated by manufacturers in response to their competitors. Nearly 20 years later, 
William Riggs worked with von Hippel to revisit user innovation in the context of 
scientific instruments. Riggs and von Hippel (1994) reconfirmed the dominant role of 
users in scientific instrument innovation. They further suggested that user-driven 
scientific instrument innovations are more radical than producer-driven innovations 
which are more incremental.  
To further develop his concept of user-innovation, von Hippel (1988) changed his 
research context from scientific instruments to “other, more ‘normal’ fields” (p. 20). I 
have previously suggested that this may have been subconscious blinkering—the context 
may have been seen as abnormal due to the “public” nature of scientific outputs and 
organizations. Over time, von Hippel’s research program helped to dispel the myth that 
the “locus of innovation activity” (von Hippel, 1976) rests within manufacturing firms. 
He established that the “locus” of this activity can also rest in “users.” To achieve this, 
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von Hippel explored a range of research contexts (Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; von 
Hippel, 1986, 1988, 2005; von Hippel & Krogh, 2003). The context of scientific 
instruments provided an important theoretical contribution: the concept of user 
innovation. My work picks up where von Hippel and his colleagues left off; I return to 
this context and make important contributions with respect to public innovation. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, it is likely that von Hippel and his colleagues 
were observing public innovation in goods. They noticed that scientists develop new 
scientific devices and, in Chapter 1, I noted that at the majority of their scientist users 
were likely employed by PROs. Remember that there is no mention of public 
organizations in the first three of these publications. There is only a passing reference to 
“universities” writ large (i.e., with no discussion of public/private distinctions) and 
“government laboratories” (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994, pp. 461-462). So, it is possible 
that I might be reading too much into this work. I have already conceded that not all 
scientists are publicly employed, but I have also drawn on the arguments of Perry and 
Rainey (1988) and O'Neil (1969) to show that most universities are public organizations. 
I argued that upwards of two-thirds of the organizations in the Riggs and von Hippel 
(1994) study may have been public. When I apply the Perry and Rainey (1988) distinction 
between public and private organizations to data on the organizations that employ 
scientist researchers in Nova Scotia, Canada (Statistics Canada, 2017), I find that 73% of 
scientists are employed by public organizations. And so, if von Hippel and his colleagues 
had been working in my regional context, a considerable portion of their scientist-users 
would have been employed by PROs. My point is that their conclusion regarding the 
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“locus of innovation” for scientific instruments may have implications for public 
innovation in goods. 
Because the evidence presented by von Hippel et al (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; 
Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988) is so compelling, I accept that scientist users are 
the locus of innovation in scientific instrumentalities. However, their analysis rests on the 
assumption that innovation is a linear process and research in innovation studies has 
demonstrated this is not the case; innovation studies and has moved away from this 
assumption (B. Martin, 2013, 2016). The “state of the art” in innovation studies is now 
the innovation systems approach (Lundvall, 2013) and, as noted in Chapter 1, this 
approach is appropriate for studying public innovation because it does not default toward 
a market-orientation. I therefore propose that the conclusions drawn by von Hippel and 
his colleagues regarding the importance of “scientist-users” will apply to organizations 
that employ scientists—PROs—within systems of scientific instrumentality innovation. I 
propose to investigate whether or not: 
Proposition 1: Public research organizations are the most important 
actors in a scientific instrumentality innovation system. 
 
 “Chain-Linked” Processes 
As I have noted, von Hippel (1988; 1976), Spital (1979), and Riggs (Riggs & von 
Hippel, 1994) provided the only empirical studies focused on scientific instrument 
innovation. While their work contributed in an important way to current research on user-
innovation (e.g., von Hippel, 2005), the linear model that they used was replaced by new 
theoretical models, beginning with the chain-link model of innovation (Kline, 1985; Kline 
& Rosenberg, 1986). 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the linear nature of innovation was mostly taken for 
granted. Debate focused on directionality: technology-push and demand-pull were seen as 
mutually exclusive hypotheses (Chidamber & Kon, 1994; Nemet, 2009). But by the 
1980s, it was widely accepted that “innovation is neither smooth nor linear, nor often 
well-behaved” (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986, p. 285). Von Hippel and his colleagues 
foreshadowed the decline is use of linear models in two ways. First, they directly 
observed that some two-way—bidirectional—interaction existed at the point where pre-
commercial instruments created by users were transformed into commercial instruments 
by producers (von Hippel, 1976). Second, they indirectly foreshadowed the fall of this 
model by selecting a context where scientists were operating at both ends of the linear 
flow: exerting both science-push and demand-pull. Von Hippel and his colleagues 
positioned their language on the “demand-pull” side of the debate. However, the “locus” 
of this demand rested in those individuals who were pushing the frontiers of science. This 
reality is evident, but not explicit, in their discussion. Later studies of scientific 
instrument innovation used different theoretical models and explicitly examined this 
“linked” nature of users and producers. 
 Stephen Kline and Nathan Rosenberg’s “chain-linked model” of innovation (Kline, 
1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986) triggered a widespread shift away from linear models 
(B. Martin, 2013). Based on his 30 years of consulting to industry, Kline (1985) proposed 
a “linked-chain” model of innovation as an improvement to the “oversimple and 
inadequate” linear model (Kline, 1985, p. 36). In his model, Kline separated research 
activities which he defined as the processes that produce knowledge from the product 
development process which he labelled as “the chain-of-innovation” (Kline, 1985). He 
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then argued that innovation involved not one sequential process, but five flows or 
pathways. These flows are illustrated in Figure 2, which is a simplified adaptation of 
several figures found in Kline (1985) and Kline and Rosenberg (1986).  
 The chain-linked model does not assume that innovation begins with research or 
with market demand. Instead, it highlights the ongoing interactions between research and 
development activities. The “chain-of-innovation” component of the model (paths 
labelled with a “1” in Figure 2) is like the linear product development model used by von 
Hippel (1976); it has has a market-orientation. However, feedback loops along this chain 
indicate that it is not one directional (paths labelled with a “2” in Figure 2). The addition 
of feedback loops alone makes the chain-linked model an improvement over linear 
models. But this is not the main point emphasized by Kline (1985) or Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986). In both papers, the authors emphasize the bi-directional linkages or 
pathways between research and development (paths 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. The chain-linked model of innovation (adapted from Kline, 1985; Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986). 
 The chain-linked model includes three types of pathways between research and 
development, with the greatest emphasis placed upon the first type of pathway (those 
paths labelled with a “3” in Figure 2). In these pathways, “knowledge” serves as an 
intermediary between research and development activities. To establish this intermediary 
function, Kline (1985) analytically separates “science” into (A) research processes or 
activities (the top layer in Figure 2) and (B) the cumulative stocks of scientific knowledge 
(the middle layer in Figure 2). In his model, research activities contribute to, and rest 
upon, stocks of knowledge. These stocks of knowledge are also used by those who 
develop products. When either science or development activities find the knowledge 
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stocks to be lacking, new research activities become triggered. Another way to explain 
the intermediary role of knowledge in this model is to think of it as “general information 
sources” (OECD, 2005): codified or tacit knowledge such as patent disclosures, journals, 
conference and meeting presentations, and informal networks or contacts. Kline (1985) 
and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) discuss these indirect pathways between research and 
development at length. 
 The chain-linked model also includes two types of direct pathways between 
research and development. Kline (1985) discusses these direct pathways at some depth in 
his original paper, but they receive “only brief discussion” in the more highly cited 
version of the model (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986, p. 293). Firstly, Kline (1985) identifies a 
direct and close-coupling between research and “invention.” He suggests that there are 
times when scientific research immediately stimulates invention, and times when nascent 
invention opportunities stimulate scientific research. He draws this direct linkage as a 
two-way arrow between research activities and invention activities (path “4” in Figure 2). 
Both papers note that this direct linkage relates to “invention” rather than “analytic 
design.” Kline uses the term “invention” in the same way as the U.S. Patent Office: “new 
design sufficiently different from prior art that it would not have been obvious beforehand 
to an individual skilled in the relevant art” (Kline, 1985, p. 37). Meanwhile, he describes 
“analytic design” as an engineering process that selects from, and improves upon, existing 
known designs. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) note that this distinction makes “invention” 
a “significant departure from past practice” (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, p. 292). They 
therefore explain that their first direct linkage between research and development results 
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in radical innovations, such as “semiconductors, lasers, atom bombs, and genetic 
engineering” (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, p. 293). 
 Kline and Rosenberg (1986) describe the second type of direct linkage between 
research and development as “the feedback from innovation, or more precisely from the 
products of innovations, to science” (p. 293). In his illustrations, Kline (1985) includes 
two one-way arrows pointing from the end of his innovation process to research activities 
(see the pathways labeled with a “5” in Figure 2). One of these arrows represents the way 
that new products initiate new science. For example, the introduction of combustion 
engines leading to research on engine performance problems illustrates this process. Kline 
(1985) calls the other arrow “support for science.” He uses de Solla Price’s (1984) 
scientific instrumentalities concept, and explains it in this way: “the production of new 
instruments, tools, and processes has in many instances made possible new forms of 
research” (Kline 1985, p. 41). Both papers anecdotally point to the development of the 
telescope and Galileo’s subsequent advancements in astronomy, as well as the 
development of the microscope and Pasteur’s subsequent advancements in micro-biology 
(Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). So, based on anecdote and extant theory, the 
chain-link model recognizes the important flow of new instruments and techniques into 
science.  
Kline’s (1985) direct pathways between research and development are theoretically 
grounded in Rosenberg’s earlier assertion that “science is not entirely exogenous” 
(Rosenberg, 1982). In other words, the chain link model does not consider science to be 
outside the market. Instead, it considers scientific research and technological development 
to be directly and indirectly linked. The direct links between research and development 
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are most relevant to this dissertation. To further understand the nature of these links, I 
turn to theory from science and technology studies (STS). STS generally uses a different 
approach to articulating theory. The boxes and lines discussed thus far in relation to the 
linear and chain-linked models will give way to concepts and metaphors. We will see that 
STS scholars describe the same “direct links” (Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986) 
between science and technology as “symbiotic” relations (de Solla Price, 1984; Gorm 
Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). 
“Symbiotic” Relations 
Derek de Solla Price was one of the world’s foremost historians and sociologists of 
science. Submitted only months before his sudden death, de Solla Price’s (1984) paper on 
“the science/technology relationship” provides a macro-level description of innovation in 
scientific instrumentalities. Drawing on examples from history, de Solla Price discusses 
the important relationships among those who perform science and those who craft 
scientific techniques. For him, it was important to separate the processes of science from 
the products of science. The products, or outputs, of science can be described as scientific 
know-what. The ancient Greeks called these products of science epistêmê, which means 
understandings and beliefs. As noted earlier, de Solla Price (1984) used the term 
“scientific instrumentalities” to describe the know-how of science: the processes, craft, or 
what the Greeks called technê. As I noted in Chapter 1, “instrumentalities” includes both 
instruments and techniques. An instrumentality can be any “laboratory method for doing 
something to nature or to the data at hand” (de Solla Price, 1984). De Solla Price (1984) 
asserts that instrumentalities “are clearly technology, an understanding of the way to do 
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things” (p. 13). However, this technological knowledge may or may not be embedded in 
scientific equipment or machinery.  
This theoretical approach signifies a departure from the “scientific instruments” 
studied by von Hippel and his colleagues (Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von 
Hippel, 1976; von Hippel, 1988); they only studied innovations that were embedded in 
scientific machinery and equipment. I have discussed the importance of considering all 
forms of product innovation: goods as well as services. And it is important to revisit this 
point now because it allows me to expand on the kinds of private companies that might be 
involved in scientific instrumentality innovation.  It is important to understand the 
different organizations involved in scientific instrument innovation versus scientific 
instrumentality innovation. 
Von Hippel and his colleagues did not consider the possibility that private 
companies might produce what they called “technique-only” (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994, 
p. 461) innovations—innovations that are not embedded in machinery or equipment. 
Riggs and von Hippel (1994) explained that they considered technique-only innovations 
to be the exclusive domain of scientists. They assumed that techniques had “low 
commercial importance” because they could not be manufactured (Riggs and von Hippel, 
1994, p. 461). However, this runs counter to insights from the innovation-in-services 
literature (Barras, 1986; Gallouj, 2002; Gallouj & Weinstein, 1997): technique-only 
innovations are regularly appropriated by private companies as “knowledge intensive 
business services” (Miles et al., 1995). Services can have high commercial importance. It 
would therefore be surprising not to find companies that deliver knowledge intensive 
research services. Because de Solla Price (1984) includes both equipment and techniques 
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in his concept of “scientific instrumentalities,” his research makes it possible to expand 
beyond scientific instrument manufacturing and also consider scientific service delivery.  
Note that despite his broader theoretical framework, de Solla Price comes to the 
same conclusion as von Hippel (1976): scientists are the “locus of instrumentality 
innovation” (de Solla Price, 1984). And like Riggs and von Hippel (1994), de Solla Price 
(1984) notes the radical nature of scientific instrumentality innovations. In fact, he claims 
that scientific instrumentalities are the most radical of all innovations (de Solla Price, 
1984). Using several historical examples, he explains that novelty is high because “the 
inventions of instrumentalities are precisely those that defy reasonable attempts to make a 
technology assessment” (de Solla Price 1984, p. 13). The novelty of scientific 
instrumentality innovations means that they not only drive scientific progress, but they 
also have disproportionate impact on innovation outside of science. This is because 
scientific instrumentality innovations are often “general purpose” or broadly applicable 
across fields. Stated differently, instrumentality innovations “move very often from being 
tools of the laboratory to a much wider commercial application” (de Solla Price, 1984, p. 
14). De Solla Price therefore develops an argument that, “the scientific instrument 
industry […] exercises a leverage on innovation and scientific advance out of all 
proportion to its relatively modest size in economics and manpower” (1984, pp. 19-20). 
This suggests that scientific instrumentalities are the most important innovation context. 
Rosenberg (1992) also notes the importance of scientific instrumentality innovation. 
He suggests that the primary product of basic science is knowledge about the nature of 
our universe. New instrumentation techniques are an important and overlooked by-
product of this work (Rosenberg, 1992) because they often provide “an ability to observe 
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or measure phenomena that were previously not observable or measurable at all” 
(Rosenberg 1992, p. 382). Like de Solla Price, Rosenberg (1992) draws upon histories of 
scientific instrument innovation, including computing, magnetic resonance imaging, 
electron microscopy, and lasers. He uses these examples to discuss the movement of 
instrument innovations across scientific disciplines and through various industries: 
Improved instrumentation has had consequences far beyond those that are 
indicated by thinking of them simply as an expanding class of devices that are 
useful for observation and measurement […] they have played much more 
pervasive, if less visible roles, which included a direct effect upon industrial 
capabilities, on the one hand, and the stimulation of more scientific research on 
the other. (Rosenberg, 1992, p. 388) 
 
Here Rosenberg has echoes the sentiment that scientific instrumentalities are a highly 
important innovation context due to their wide diffusion through society. This diffusion is 
at least partly thanks to the work of private industry. Like others (Riggs and von Hippel, 
1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976; von Hippel 1988), Rosenberg (1992) notes that 
private sector manufacturers make incremental improvements to scientific instruments. 
These improvements in performance, versatility, price, and usability for those with less 
training in the original applications of the technology, help to facilitate diffusion of the 
innovations. But further to collaboration with Kline (1986), Rosenberg (1992) reminds 
his readers that innovation is not linear. A new scientific instrumentality can stimulate 
follow-on research with respect to performance, materials, or ancillary technologies, as 
well as open new fields of research, be adapted to other fields of research, and be adapted 
to commercial applications (Rosenberg, 1992).  
De Solla Price (1984) and Rosenberg (1992) agree on the widespread importance of 
scientific process innovations as well as the nature of the relationships between scientists 
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and the scientific instrumentality industry. They both reject the idea that knowledge flows 
one-way from science to industry via instruments or any other means. It is appropriate to 
think of scientific instruments as the inputs or “capital goods of the scientific research 
industry” (Rosenberg 1992, p. 381), yet it is also important to recognize that, “scientific 
instrument firms are quite often spin-offs from great national facilities in experimental 
science […and…] the mechanism for the entrepreneuring and expansion of such crucial 
high technology laboratories has been government procurement” (de Solla Price, 1984 p. 
18). And so, the relationship between PROs and private instrumentality companies can be 
described as “interactive” (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 158), “dialectical” (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 
158), “complementary” (Rosenberg, 1992, p. 386), or “symbiotic” (Rosenberg, 1992, p. 
386). The PROs are primarily but not exclusively populated with scientists, while the 
private companies are primarily but not exclusively populated with engineers/technicians. 
Together, these constitute one community: 
Scientists and engineers seem to be bound together in their invisible colleges, not so 
much by any communality of their paradigms, ways of thought, and cognitive 
training, as by a guild-like communality of the tools and instruments that they use in 
their work. (de Solla Price, 1984, p. 15) 
 
In other words, communities of scientists and technicians are united by shared expertise 
in particular scientific instrumentalities. 
De Solla Price (1984) and Rosenberg (1992) both present scientific instrumentalities 
as  collaborations between science and industry. They describe the collaboration as 
complex, bidirectional, and focused on scientific know-how, “instrumentalities,” or 
technê, as discussed above. This collaboration remains unexplored in the linear studies of 
scientific instrument innovation (Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 
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1976; von Hippel, 1988). Riggs and von Hippel note that there is some two-way 
information transfer “and occasionally more substantial interaction between users and 
manufacturers” (1994 p. 468). But in their words, “our focus on ‘the’ source of 
innovation… has given short shrift to patterns of joint user-manufacturer involvement in 
the innovation process” (Riggs and von Hippel, 1994 p. 468). By stepping back and 
considering the long-history of innovation in scientific instrumentalities, de Solla Price 
(1984) and Rosenberg (1992) come to a different conclusion. According to Rosenberg, 
“the migration of scientific instruments to industry has been matched by a reverse flow of 
fabrication and design skills that have vastly expanded the capacity of university 
scientists to conduct research” (1992, 386). From this perspective, I would argue that 
PROs exist in a symbiotic relationship with private scientific instrumentality companies.  
Brigitte Gorm Hansen (2011) describes a similar symbiosis between a Danish 
university biology lab and a co-located biotech company. Gorm Hansen explains that the 
company is more than a simple linear commercialization or spin-off from the laboratory’s 
work, although this is part of the story. The company is also a partner in funding 
applications, a means of acquiring instrumentation that the university cannot afford, and a 
provider of knowledge-intensive research services for the lab. Gorm Hansen argues that 
the biotech company makes the PRO more competitive in its field by “sequestering” 
activities that might otherwise be “toxic” to highly productive science: 
By having an in-house biotech company, the academic scientists will not have to go 
through the laborious process of high-throughput screening, enzyme production, or 
other routine tasks. These tasks are not external to science, they are as necessary as 
breathing. (Gorm Hansen, 2011 p. 500) 
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In this way, Gorm Hansen describes a research laboratory and a biotech company that 
have co-evolved through a symbiotic relationship of mutual benefit: the PRO becomes 
better at producing science—epistêmê—and the company becomes better at producing 
technology, or technê. In general terms, this partnership consists of a private company 
that contributes scientific process innovations—instrumentality services—and a PRO that 
contributes scientific product innovations—scientific insights. Gorm Hansen speaks of 
these two organizations’ “mutual dependence” in the same ways that de Solla Price 
(1984) and Rosenberg (1992) speak of the broader interdependence between science and 
scientific instrumentalities. The symbiotic relationship noted by these STS scholars can 
be further understood in terms of “interactive learning” (Lundvall, 1988), thereby 
drawing upon insights from the innovation systems literature.  
Interactive Learning 
Pioneered by Christopher Freeman (1987), Bengt-Åke Lundvall (1988), and 
Richard Nelson (1993), the innovation systems approach focuses on the “interactive 
learning” (Lundvall, 1988) that occurs among many different actors withinin a particular 
institutional environment. Freeman (1987) published the first work in this area, 
explaining how unique institutional arrangements, such as industrial groups or keiretsu, 
developed into an effective “national innovation system” (NIS) for post-war Japan. At the 
same time, Lundvall was writing a book chapter (Lundvall 1988) that established the 
theoretical basis upon which to view innovation as “an interactive process involving 
many actors and extending over time” (Lundvall, 2013, p. 33). To further this nascent 
national innovation system approach, Richard Nelson then edited a volume comparing 
various national innovation systems (Nelson, 1993). These publications introduced the 
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concept of an innovation system which researchers describe as an important advancement 
over prior linear and chain-linked approaches to studying innovation (Caraça et al., 2009; 
Fagerberg et al., 2013). 
The innovation systems approach has since been adapted from a focus on national 
systems to sub-national or “regional innovation systems” (RIS) (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002; 
Asheim et al., 2011) and to “sectoral” systems (see Malerba, 2005). Some Canadian 
geographers might object to my use of the innovation systems approach—which is 
predominantly used by European scholars. Yes, the economic geography of Canada is 
different than many countries of Europe, however I would argue that the innovation 
systems approach has proven to be highly adaptable across geographic contexts. It has 
been amendable to research on innovation in such disparate contexts as Japan (C. W. 
Freeman, 1987), Mexico (De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2012; De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2016), 
and Canada (Doloreux, 2003; Niosi, 2000; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010). I agree with Holbrook 
and Wolfe (2000) that a regional innovation systems approach is most suitable to Canada, 
and that it is more suitable than a clusters approach—which presumes a greater degree of 
agglomeration than is found in many Canadian regions. Further, some innovation scholars 
might now ask why I have not used another competing approach: the triple helix 
framework (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997). Although scholars who use this approach 
sometimes recognize hybrid entities (Etzkowitz, 2002), they begin their work by 
theoretically framing government, academia, and industry as different elements of a 
system. To achieve the purposes of this dissertation, I must use a theoretical framework 
that does not presume differences between public and private organizations. 
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Charles Edquist (1997) argues that an innovation system can be defined as any 
collection of organizations and institutions—i.e., the rules that shape organizational 
interaction (see Glossary and further discussion of organizations and institutions in 
Chapter 4). He suggests that early research on innovation systems intentionally left the 
conceptual boundaries vague. This flexibility is part of what makes the innovation 
systems approach such a valuable theoretical tool. Many different overlapping boundaries 
can be drawn around a system: 
…innovation systems may be supranational, national or subnational (regional, 
local) – and at the same time they may be sectoral within any of these 
geographic demarcations. There are many possible permutations. Whether a 
system of innovation should be spatially or sectorally delimited depends on 
the object of study. (Edquist, 1997, p. 12) 
 
To use the innovation systems concept, one must be able to identify such boundaries, as 
porous as they may be. Only the most exceptional cases are closed off from the outside 
world (Edquist, 2001). In this way, the innovation systems approach imposes a system-
level theoretical framework but provides considerable flexibility in defining the system 
boundaries. 
Within the boundaries of an innovation system, the innovation systems approach 
focuses attention on a particular phenomenon. Lundvall (1992) describes the innovation 
systems approach as a “focusing device”—a kind of social scientific theory—that places 
our attention on processes of “interactive learning.” This emphasis arises from an 
underlying assumption that “the most fundamental resource in the modern economy is 
knowledge, and, accordingly, that the most important process is learning” (Lundvall, 
1992, p. 1). Note that Lundvall’s “focusing device” does not point toward the noun 
knowledge, or any a static outcome. Instead, Lundvall’s (1988; 1992) earliest contribution 
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to the innovation systems approach was to embed an understanding of innovation as a 
verb: an ongoing, ubiquitous, and cumulative learning process. Meeus and Oerlemans 
(2005b) explain that, in the context of the literature on innovation systems, learning is “a 
process in which all kinds of knowledge are (re-) combined to form something new” (p. 
159). The concept of interactive learning focuses on understanding the learning processes 
that take place between actors in an innovation system, not merely identifying the 
presence or absence of such interactions. 
The interactive learning concept was empirically grounded in Lundvall’s research 
on user-producer interactions (1988). Lundvall (1988) argues that innovations emerge 
from “organized markets” of user and producer relationships, as opposed to “free 
markets.” He argues that the producers of product innovations have several incentives to 
establish close relationships with their users, including: (1) the opportunity to appropriate 
further process innovations developed by users or to understand the competitive nature of 
these process innovations; (2) the ability to understand new user demands; (3) access to 
tacit knowledge developed through the use of their products; (4) an understanding of their 
products’ relationships with other products, referred to as “bottlenecks and 
interdependencies”; and (5) an understanding of users’ capabilities with respect to 
potential new products (Lundvall, 1988). Lundvall (1988) also argues that users have 
similar incentives to maintain close relationships with producers, including the value they 
gain from knowledge about the potential use-value of new products and knowledge about 
the competencies, reliability, and trustworthiness of different producers with whom they 
might cooperate to develop new products/uses. These various incentives are particularly 
strong for the development of “complex and specialized equipment” (Lundvall 1988) and 
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this encourages “direct cooperation” between users and producers (Lundvall, 1988). But 
even if users and producers are not cooperating directly, Lundvall suggests that they are 
subject to “systemic interdependence” (Lundvall, 1988, p. 350). In other words, the 
innovation actors in a “system” are always learning from other actors in a somewhat-
organized fashion. The degree of interdependence may be greater in contexts with 
stronger incentives for interactive learning. This is the way that de Solla Price (1984) and 
Rosenberg (1992) describe interactions in the field of scientific instrumentalities. Given 
the foregoing, I would argue that scientific instrumentalities likely involve a particularly 
strong form of interactive learning. 
Science-Industry Interaction 
In Chapter 1, I explained that the innovation systems approach has yet to be applied 
to the context of scientific instrumentalities. There is a large body of literature on 
interactive learning between science and industry, including university-industry (U-I) and 
PRO-industry (PRO-I) interaction. However, this literature spans many sectors of the 
economy and does not include a focus on scientific instrumentalities. An extensive review 
of this literature is provided by Perkmann et al. (2013). In this body of work, science is 
represented broadly by PROs, including universities and government laboratories. 
“Science” also takes place in private laboratories, but that is commonly referred to as 
R&D in this literature. Overall, the roles of PROs and private companies are sharply 
differentiated: PROs produce knowledge, and private companies produce innovation. As 
a result, the science-industry interaction literature has a limited view of PRO innovation 
roles; PROs are called upon to interact with private sector knowledge users and transfer 
technology to the market (Perkmann et al., 2013). I consider this view to be overly 
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restrictive since there are many other ways PROs might engage in interactive learning. In 
this section, I review the literature for ways that PROs engage in interactive learning and I 
then develop a channels of interactive learning framework for use in this dissertation. 
Most recent analyses of science-industry interaction investigate a single channel of 
interactive learning between science and industry, such as co-patenting or scientific co-
authorship (see Appendix A for a summary of 22 recent publications, 2017-2018). I join 
several scholars who have recently investigated science-industry interaction across 
multiple channels (e.g., Arza & Carattoli, 2017; Calignano & Fitjar, 2017; Calignano, 
Fitjar, & Kogler, 2018; Martin & Rypestøl, 2017) and some who have integrated multiple 
channels into a single analysis (e.g., Xu, Wu, Minshall, & Zhou, 2017). 
Interaction between PROs and private industry can take a variety of forms. Many 
different types of interactive learning are discussed in studies of U-I and PRO-I 
interaction. Indeed, two important subfields of study—academic entrepreneurship and 
academic engagement—differ in part because they emphasize different types of 
interactive learning. The literature on academic entrepreneurship focuses on three types of 
commercialization activities undertaken by universities: patenting and licensing, 
incubation of spin-off companies, and various kinds of university-industry research 
collaborations (Geuna & Muscio, 2009; Larsen, 2011; Rothaermel, Agung, & Jiang, 
2007). Closely related to academic entrepreneurship is the concept of academic 
engagement, which Perkmann et al. (2013) define as an informal type of technology 
transfer: “knowledge-related collaboration by academic researchers with non-academic 
organizations” (Perkmann et al., 2013, p. 424). Following this definition, Perkmann et al. 
(2013) identified and reviewed 36 publications on academic engagement. Twelve of these 
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studies included data on various types of academic-industry interaction, and this is 
summarized in Table 1. In order of frequency, the most commonly identified interactions 
appearing in at least six of the 12 studies were: consultancy, (co)patenting or patent 
assignment, movement of human resources—particularly students, co-
attendance/presentation at conferences, (co)publications, joint R&D, licensing of 
intellectual property, and the creation of spin-off companies (see Table 1). Missing from 
the analysis by Perkmann et al. (2013) is work by Claudia De Fuentes and Gabriela 
Dutrénit (2012) to identify the “best channels of academia-industry interaction” in 
Mexico. I have added De Fuentes and Détrunit’s (2012) paper to the list in Table 1 
because it adds important elements that the other research overlooks. First, it considers 
the “mutual benefits” that arise for both science and industry. Most studies focus only on 
benefits for the private sector. Furthermore, the De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) typology 
is the most comprehensive of all those identified in Table 1: it covers the widest range of 
interaction channels. 
De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) identify four primary “channels” of interactive 
learning that can be found between PROs and industry. They delineate an information and 
training channel, an R&D projects and consultancy channel, an intellectual property 
rights channel, and a human resources channel (De Fuentes and Dutrénit, 2012). Within 
these channels, they identify 10 forms of interaction (see Table 1). As a result of their 
empirical work in Mexico, they found that all channels of interaction produce benefits for 
academia and industry, but certain channels such as joint or contract R&D, property 
rights, and human resources, provide better long-term benefits to industry.  
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2  - - -   3 - - - 4  “Formal contact” 
De Fuentes and 
Dutrénit (2012)          - - -  -  
D’Este and 
Patel (2007) -  -     - - -  
5 - -  
Giuliani et al. 
(2010) -       - - -  - 
4 - “Mailing lists” 
Grimpe and 
Fier (2010) 
2 - - - -  - -  - - - -  




















































































































- - - - - -  -    - - -  
Haeussler and 
Colyvas (2011) - - - - - -  -  - 




- - -       7  - - - “Testing” 
Martinelli et al. 
(2008) - -  -    -   -  
4 -  
Nilsson et al. 
(2010)    - - - -   -   
8   
Walsh et al. 
(2008) 
2 - - - -     -   8  “Study group” 
Frequency  
(out of 13 
studies) 
7 8 6 4 6 7 12 7 10 5 7 4 8 3  
Notes. 1Includes two separate forms of HR interaction: students being hired by industry, and general employee mobility. 2Specifies 
“coauthored” publications and/or conference presentations. 3Also includes copyright. 4Specifies only student mobility. 5Specifies 
industry funding of PRO laboratories/equipment. 6Specifically studied whether or not an academic had “founded a company”. 7This 
category was labelled “sales” in the paper, but has been coded as “commercialization” in this table because of the description provided: 
“Commercial selling of products developed within the university” (Klofsten and Jones-Evans 2000). 8Includes a general category for 
employee mobility that does not explicitly include students.  
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Four types of interaction are identified elsewhere in the literature. Two of these 
types of interaction would help to expand the De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) model. 
First, donation or sponsorship-based R&D (D’Este & Patel, 2007; Martinelli, Meyer, & 
Von Tunzelmann, 2008; Nilsson, Rickne, & Bengtsson, 2010; Walsh, Baba, Goto, & 
Yasaki, 2008) can be included as a type of formal R&D interaction alongside contract 
R&D and joint R&D (see Table 1). Second, “shared personnel” is a type of human 
resource interaction where company founders or employees are concurrently employed by 
a PRO (Boardman & Ponomariov, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2008). There 
are two types of interaction mentioned elsewhere in the literature—“spin-offs” and 
“commercialization.” However, I do not see these as appropriate additions to the De 
Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) model. 
A “spin-off” is a commonly identified type of academic entrepreneurship / 
engagement (D’Este & Patel, 2007; Giuliani, Morrison, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti, 2010; 
Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005; Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011; Klofsten & Jones-Evans, 
2000; Nilsson et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2008). However, “spin-off” is more appropriately 
used to describe a type of company, or the process of creating a company from academic 
research. Spin-off is therefore short-hand for a combination of academia-industry 
interactions that take place when a company is founded. The idea of a spin-off can 
capture patenting, licensing, and the movement of human resources. Since those 
interactions are already accounted for in the De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) model, the 
addition of a spin-off channel is purely repetitive. Similarly, “commercialization” is a 
commonly identified type of academic entrepreneurship (Boardman, 2008; Grimpe & 
Fier, 2010; Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005; Klofsten & Jones-Evans, 2000; Martinelli et al., 
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2008); it is used to describe a collection of academia-industry interactions such as 
patenting, licensing, and joint or contract R&D. The types of interactions that are 
included under the label “commercialization” can vary (Boardman, 2008; Grimpe and 
Fier, 2010; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Klofsten and Jones-Evans, 2000; Martinelli et 
al., 2008), but all are included in the De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) typology. 
Given the discussion above, I present an expanded set of possible interactions in 
Figure 3 and Table 2. Notice that I have not labelled elements of Figure 3 with the terms 
“science” and “industry” (or PRO-I, or U-I). Instead, my adaptation allows for any type 
of interactive learning to occur between any types of organizations—public or private. 
This helps to avoid biasing the interactions in favour of private sector learning. The 
typology is adapted from De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012) and includes the addition of a 
fifth channel: the capital equipment and technical services channel. My adapted typology 
is represented as horizontal lines in Figure 3 and described in the rows of Table 2. Where 
their original framework identified seven types of interaction within four channels, my 
adaptation includes seven types across five channels (See Table 2). I achieved parsimony 
by only dividing a channel of interaction into multiple sub-categories where absolutely 
necessary—to differentiate between the movement versus sharing of human resources and 
between formal versus informal information exchanges. The result is a simple yet 
comprehensive channels of interactive learning framework that does not assume PROs 
are outside the market, or that they do not drive their own benefits from interactive 
learning. 
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Table 2 
 




Types of Relationships Knowledge 
Flows 
R&D Projects & 
Consultancy 
Channel 
Formal research or development contracts, 





Licensing or transfer of intellectual property Directed 
Human Resources 
Channel 
Mobility of human resources (i.e., hiring 
employees from another organization -- incl. 
education/training organizations -- or losing 
employees to another organization). 
Directed 
 Sharing employees or decision-makers (i.e., key 
shareholders / directors) with another 





Formal sharing of information (e.g. through 
joint training, co-authorship, etc.) 
Bidirectional 







Provision/acquisition of capital equipment or 
technical services—may be a financial or in-
kind transaction. 
Directed 
Note. Adapted from De Fuentes and Dutrénit (2012). 
 
Although interactive learning is the theoretical focus for this dissertation, I should 
note that the literature on science-industry interaction discusses several other innovation 
factors. There is particular emphasis on the absorptive capacities of learning partners 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; De Fuentes, 2009; Gilsing, Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, 
Duysters, & van den Oord, 2008; Giuliani, 2005), and debate about the role of geographic 
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proximity/distance in interorganizational learning (De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2016; R. 
Martin & Moodysson, 2011a). To maintain my theoretical focus, I treat distance and 
absorptive capacity as control variables when I develop my analytical approach in 
Chapter 4. 
Now that I have developed an interactive learning framework, I can use it to 
consider the nature of interactive learning for scientific instrumentalities. In the previous 
section, I reviewed theory from STS which points to “symbiosis” between PROs and the 
scientific instrumentality industry (i.e., de Solla Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; 
Rosenberg, 1992). Like “commercialization” and “spin-off,” I treat “symbiosis” as a label 
for particular combination of interactive learning channels. Symbiosis implies mutual 
interdependence; in terms of interactive learning it implies a relationship involving 
multiple types of interaction with learning benefits for both parties. Thus, if relationships 
between PROs and scientific instrumentality companies are likely to be symbiotic, then 
they are likely to involve multiple simultaneous channels of interactive learning with 
knowledge flowing in both directions. I therefore propose that: 
Proposition 2: The interactive learning between PROs and scientific 
instrumentality companies involves multiple channels and is bidirectional. 
 
In other words, the relationships between PROs and scientific instrumentality companies 
are not one-way and one-dimensional. They should not be reduced to a linear push or 
pull. Instead, these relationships include multiple types of interaction with knowledge 
flows in both directions.  
The particular mix of interaction types may vary from one scientific instrumentality 
relationship to the next. However, the literature has provided several clues to the channels 
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that are likely the most important and I can use these to develop a third proposition. The 
work of von Hippel and his colleagues (Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von 
Hippel, 1976; von Hippel, 1988) suggests that flows of formal intellectual property from 
PROs to scientific instrumentality companies —including explicit designs or prototypes 
of scientific process innovations—should be important to this context. These intellectual 
property flows might include co-patenting or licensing, but as noted in those studies, IP 
flows would tend to occur infrequently—only as the last step in a linear process for some 
new scientific instruments. de Solla Price (1984) notes that the norms of open scientific 
publication conflict with the choice to apply for patent protection on a new scientific 
instrumentality. Furthermore, the work of Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and Rosenberg 
(1992) does not discuss formal IP flows but is focused on interactions involving capital 
equipment. The work of Gorm Hansen (2011) adds that some private companies provide 
scientific technical services as part of their symbiotic relations with PROs. The capital 
equipment and technical services channel is therefore particularly important for 
interactive learning in scientific instrumentalities. 
Note that customer-supplier relations do not appear in any of the 13 academia-
industry interaction typologies in Table 1. PROs are not seen as customers in these 
typologies because they are outside of the market. However, flows of capital equipment 
are normally included in discussions of interactive learning (Lundvall, 1988): product 
innovations in one industry become process innovations in another. Increasingly, the 
flows of knowledge-intensive business services are also emphasized (Doloreux, Freel, & 
Shearmur, 2010; Miles et al., 1995). Even though these types of interaction might not 
normally be important to studies of academia-industry interaction, the technical 
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knowledge transferred from industry to PROs appears to be an important interaction in 
the field of scientific instrumentalities; it is explicitly identified in the chain-linked model 
(Kline, 1985; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) and it is central to the work of de Solla Price 
(1984) and Rosenberg (1992). I therefore propose that: 
Proposition 3: The most important interactive learning channels for scientific 
instrumentality innovation involve the provision and acquisition of capital 
equipment and technical services. 
 
In other words, the theory suggests that customer-supplier relationships are central to 
interactive learning processes in a scientific instrumentalities innovation system. 
Summary of the Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine existing theory with respect to scientific 
instrumentality innovation and, at the same time, develop a theoretical framework that 
does not default toward a market-orientation. I present the existing literature as a 
chronology:9 beginning with the post-war linear model and progressing to present-day 
discussions of science-industry interaction. Near the beginning of this chronology I 
review empirical studies focused on scientific instrument innovation. These use an 
inappropriate linear model but still provide rich empirical observations. In the middle of 
the chronology, I present the work of several scholars who did not make direct empirical 
observations, but nonetheless developed rich theory from anecdotal and historiographic 
discussion of scientific instrumentalities. These mid-points along my chronology 
                                                 
9 There is a potential drawback to plotting this chapter along a timeline. I have written a 
progressive and teleological account, but my intent is not to suggest that “old” ideas 
have disappeared. Readers should not assume that ideas falling early on my timeline are 
now gone. For example, the linear model is still evident today (Godin, 2006, 2017). 
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theoretically frame the science-technology relationship as “linked” or “symbiotic.” Then, 
near the end of the chronology, I present the flexible theory that is used to study 
innovation today—the innovation systems approach and channels of interaction 
frameworks. I emphasize the benefits of focusing on innovation as an interactive learning 
process. I also emphasize the need to consider mutual benefits from science-industry 
interactive learning, not only benefits for the private market. This led me to develop a 
channels of interactive learning framework that allows PROs to fully engage in 
interactive learning.  
My resulting theoretical framework is composed of three parts which serve as the 
theoretical basis for my work in the coming chapters. First, I have framed innovation as 
an interactive learning process. Working from this concept, I follow an innovation 
systems approach that does not privilege the free market. I further develop the innovation 
systems approach as part of my analytical framework in Chapter 4—where I engage with 
questions about how to define innovation system boundaries and how to observe 
interactive learning processes. For now, I have focused on the epistêmê—the know-
what—of the innovation systems approach. I have used the concept of interactive learning 
to build a channels of interaction typology that does not presume one-way flows from 
PROs to private companies. This is the second element of my framework. The first two 
elements work together to provide this dissertation with a theoretical lens that focuses my 
work on a particular conceptualization of innovation. The third element of my framework 
is the set of propositions developed in this chapter. These are my own ideas about the 
importance of public organizations for scientific instrumentality innovation. They are 
based on prior research but are yet to be empirically tested. I will use the theoretical lens 
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as I proceed to empirically investigate these propositions later in the dissertation. This 
theoretical framing also provides the basis for a fourth proposition that will emerge from 
a discussion of research context in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Research Context 
Thus far, I have identified scientific instrumentalities as a field where one might 
reasonably expect to observe public innovation in goods and services. I have also 
reviewed prior research regarding scientific instrumentality innovation and developed a 
theoretical framework that focuses on innovation as an interactive learning process 
involving all kinds of organizations—public and private. In this chapter I will use this 
theoretical framework to describe the specific empirical context used in this dissertation: 
the field of ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia, Canada.  
I begin the chapter by introducing ocean science. I then highlight a disconnect 
between science policy and industrial policy that occurred in Nova Scotia 5 years ago. 
There are often “overlaps and blurred boundaries” (Dodgson, 2000, p. 230) between 
public policies that promote science in universities and PROs—i.e., science policies10, 
public policies that promote further development of key technologies—i.e., technology 
policies10, and public policies that aim to promote the effectiveness of innovation 
systems—i.e., innovation policies10 (Dodgson, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). In 
Canada, these science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies are orchestrated by 
regional networks that involve federal, provincial, and local policy actors (Salazar & 
Holbrook, 2007). However, the smaller provinces—including Nova Scotia—are not 
active in science policy—it is left to the federal government (Sá, 2010; Salazar & 
                                                 
10  See also the definitions in the glossary. 
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Holbrook, 2007)11. Meanwhile, technology and innovation policies are defined under the 
umbrella of industrial policy (Edquist & Chaminade, 2006; Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). 
Although the provinces are active in industrial policy, it is a realm of economic policy 
and therefore a federal responsibility under the Canadian constitution (Salazar & 
Holbrook, 2007). Within this complex policy environment, it is essential that regional 
policy networks function effectively (Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). But several years ago, 
there was a clear disconnect in Nova Scotia between federal policies regarding ocean 
science and provincial/local policies regarding ocean technologies and ocean industries. 
In 2012, ocean science was deprioritized alongside other environmental sciences 
under federal science policy (Bailey et al., 2016; Turner, 2013). At the same time, ocean 
technologies became the top priority under provincial and municipal industrial policy 
(Government of Nova Scotia, 2012; Greater Halifax Partnership, 2012). Ocean 
technologies had been identified as a federal industrial policy priority several years earlier 
(Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee, 2006). These policy directives 
led to less ocean science activities in the region but greater attempts to build ocean 
technology industry. Similar divergences in STI policy have been observed during major 
government transitions in Ghana (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016) and in the present-day STI 
                                                 
11  Under the Canadian constitution, provincial governments have full authority over 
education. This shapes a separation of responsibilities with respect to key elements of 
science policy; the provinces govern universities and fund their operating budgets 
while the federal government provides project-based funding for university research 
(Sá, 2010; Sá & Litwin, 2011; Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). The federal government 
also operates many of its own PROs across the country, but only certain provinces—
i.e., Quebec and Alberta—have extensive science policy programs that include both 
provincially-funded university research programs and provincially-governed PROs 
(Sá, 2010; Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). 
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policies of France and Italy (Bianchini & Llerena, 2016). I argue that the disconnect in 
Nova Scotia was a policy gap—a gap in understandings about the relationships between 
science policy and industrial policy. This gap underscores the importance of studying this 
context. The importance of this gap will be further emphasized after I discuss the history 
of interactions between four ocean science PROs and several private scientific 
instrumentality companies in the province. At the end of the chapter I consider the 
implications of this history for the three propositions developed in Chapter 2, and I 
develop a fourth proposition that combines theory with what I have learned about the 
history of ocean science instrumentality innovation in this region. 
Ocean Science 
The province of Nova Scotia on Canada’s Atlantic coast has long been recognized 
as a world-leader in ocean science and related technologies (Trenbirth, 1960; Watkins, 
1980). Indeed, in 1980, Canadian Geographic magazine heralded the provincial capital 
region as “one of the three biggest marine science centres in the Western Hemisphere […] 
outnumbered in the Americas only by the Boston-Woods Hole area in Massachusetts and 
perhaps the Scripps Institution in California” (Watkins, 1980, p. 12). This reputation 
emerged during and shortly after World War II when the Government of Canada 
established substantial defense and civilian ocean science operations in the provincial 
capital of Halifax. The success of three federally-funded research organizations — the 
Naval Research Establishment (NRE), Dalhousie University’s Oceanography Institute, 
and the Bedford Institute of Oceanography (BIO) — encouraged the provincial 
government’s Nova Scotia Research Foundation (NSRF) to increasingly focus its efforts 
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on ocean science and technology. Later in this chapter, I investigate the history of these 
four PROs. But first, it is helpful to understand the evolution and nature of their research. 
In his autobiographical history of oceanography, ocean scientist and engineer 
William Bascom credits four factors with the rapid growth of ocean science after World 
War II: a “doubling” in submarine warfare, a “tripling” of the global fish catch, the shift 
to offshore oil production, and a new public interest in marine conservation & 
archaeology (Bascom, 1988, p. xiv). Dalhousie University Professor Emeritus Eric Mills 
uses a slightly longer list in his history of the field (Mills, 2011). He writes that due to 
demand from “fisheries, shipping, sewage disposal, ocean mineral exploitation, and 
submarine warfare, the field had expanded too rapidly for the supply of personnel from 
the pure sciences to keep pace” (Mills, 2011, p. 254). These two lists provide examples of 
the many ways in which humans relate to the ocean. The ocean is enacted in so many 
ways, that it is difficult to establish a single definition of ocean science. 
Benson and Rehbock (1993) claim that “oceanography is a hybrid, a mixed science 
[that] cannot be said to be a single scientific discipline” (p. ix). Bascom (1988) claims 
that “oceanography is not so much a science as a collection of scientists” (p. xiii). Within 
the broad realm of oceanography, there are groups of oceanographers who are focused 
more or less on physical, biological, or chemical processes. For example, Mills (1994) 
compares the mix of scientists during the earliest days of oceanography at Dalhousie 
University and the University of British Columbia (UBC). At UBC, oceanography was 
primarily a physical science; it was grounded in physics. By contrast, oceanography was 
primarily a biological science at Dalhousie; and early oceanography leaders at Dalhousie 
were focused on marine biology and microbiology. Dalhousie’s present-day 
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oceanography department studies a broad range of biological, chemical, and physical 
processes in the ocean. But oceanography is also not the only department at Dalhousie 
that houses ocean scientists. For example, among the many members of the biology 
department are several scholars of marine biology. Interestingly, many “marine 
biologists” appear not to accept the label “oceanographer,” which they reserve primarily 
for “physical oceanographers” (not “biological oceanographers”).12 Because these labels 
have the potential to cause some difficulty, I use a broad and inclusive definition of ocean 
science. I follow the lead of the Council of Canadian Academies (Expert Panel on 
Canadian Ocean Science, 2013) in using the term “ocean science” to capture the full 
range of chemical, biological and physical scientific investigations of the ocean and its 
contents.  
Ocean science is not framed by traditional scientific disciplines. Instead, it is framed 
by its research context—the ocean—and the problems found therein. In other words, 
ocean science is oriented toward “missions,” such as tracking the migration of particular 
species (e.g., S. J. Cooke et al., 2011; O’Dor & Stokesbury, 2009), considering the 
potential impacts of industrial activity on marine life (e.g., Stokesbury et al., 2016), 
identifying and protecting sensitive marine areas and coastal zones (e.g., Greenlaw, Roff, 
Redden, & Allard, 2011), or assembling a “Census of Marine Life” (Vermeulen, 2013). 
Michael Gibbons and his colleagues have labelled this kind of science “Mode 2” (1994, 
2000; Helga Nowotny et al., 2003; Helga  Nowotny et al., 2013); and John Ziman has 
                                                 
12 This point is thanks to two anonymous participants in a separate study (MacNeil, 
2014b). 
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called it “post-academic science” (1996). Both labels refer to a shift in norms away from 
isolated individual specializations and toward interdisciplinary team-based scientific 
investigations with clear societal application, such as environmental protection. 
Interestingly, Olle Edqvist (2003) has argued that this is not a new set of scientific norms 
but rather a return to the traditional mode of scientific practice. 
The ocean is critical to our climate and our economies, and so ocean science has 
important societal applications (Florizone & Cullen, 2014). But only 7 years ago, 
scientists knew “more about the backside of the moon than about our deep oceans” 
(Alexander, Miloslavich, & Yarincik, 2011, p. 545). Seventy percent of the Earth lies 
beneath the ocean, and yet at the turn of the 21st century, “oceanographers estimated that 
only 5 percent of the ocean had been systematically explored for life” (Ausubel, Trew 
Crist, & Waggoner, 2010, p. 6). Ocean science can be motivated by specific societal 
applications (Florizone & Cullen, 2014) and by curiosity regarding the unexplored parts 
of our planet (Ausubel, Trew Crist, & Waggoner, 2010).  
The Policy Environment 
Ocean science policy. Unfortunately, ocean science can also be undermined by the 
application of neoliberal ideas to public policy. Over the past decade in Canada, 
neoliberal ideology has fueled a “War on Science” (Turner, 2013). Chris Turner (2013) 
argues that in the early 2010s the Government of Canada exhibited “mounting disdain for 
the work of its scientists” (p. 17) and enacted “vicious cuts” (p. 26) to public research 
organizations, particularly those within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. He 
suggests that this “war” was punctuated by federal budget legislation, Bill C-38, “tabled” 
five years ago: 
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No scientist working on a federally funded project in the spring of 2012 could have 
been wholly complacent about their job security, especially if their field was in the 
environmental sciences. Bill C-38 had unleashed a broad frontal assault on the 
Canadian environmental science community. Tabled in the House of Commons six 
weeks earlier, the bill had triggered wave after wave of closures and “affected 
letters” (notices of potential or impending layoff) at research institutes, monitoring 
stations, and government labs across the country. (Turner, 2013, p. 8) 
 
Science journalist Hannah Hoag describes these cuts as a policy shift away from basic 
science and toward applied partnership with industry (Hoag, 2011, 2012, 2013). This is 
further to a global trend in science policy (Archibugi & Filippetti, 2017; Sá & Litwin, 
2011). Bailey et al. (2016) have also suggested that leadership in the Canadian 
government was attempting to “devolve” ocean science activities to universities and the 
private sector. They explain that these cuts have served to “eviscerate Canada’s federal 
aquatic science programs—staff reductions, closures of laboratories, closures of marine 
science libraries, and cessation of key research programs” (Bailey et al., 2016, p. 1). This, 
too, is further to a global trend in science policy—a shift of resources toward universities 
research labs and away from other types of PROs (Archibugi & Filippetti, 2017; Salazar 
& Holbrook, 2007). 
Turner argues that this shift in policy was grounded in the belief that “the purpose 
of research—of science generally—is to create economic opportunities for industry, and 
the purpose of government is to assist in that process in whatever way that it can” 
(Turner, 2013, p. 112). He describes movement away from “the open spirit of scientific 
inquiry” (p. 132) toward the view that “government’s job is to deliver innovations like 
theatre tickets to the front desk of a posh hotel” (p. 112). In other words, those in power 
came to believe that PROs exist to serve the market. This belief has been linked to new 
OCEAN SCIENCE INSTRUMENTALITIES  70 
public management (NPM)—a particular set of neoliberal strategies that were popular 
across OECD countries for decades.  
NPM is a label applied to a “set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which 
dominated the administrative reform agenda in many of the OECD group of countries 
from the late 1970s” (Hood, 1991, pp. 3-4). The NPM agenda has been studied and 
critiqued as a set of organizational innovations in the public sector (Hansen, 2011; 
Lorenz, 2012; Schubert, 2009). NPM has been directly linked with neoliberalism because 
NPM reforms were intended to make public organizations more business-like (Atkinson-
Grosjean, 2006; Lorenz, 2012). While the effectiveness of NPM is debateable (Hood, 
1991; Lorenz, 2012; Schubert, 2009), it is accepted that NPM reforms had a substantial 
effect on the management and organization of public science in Canada beginning in the 
1980s (Atkinson-Grosjean, 2006) and 1990s (Smith, 2004). In these previous waves of 
reform, public science was reorganized and increasingly aligned to private interests 
(Atkinson-Grosjean, 2002, 2006). The recent wave of reforms have resulted in 
substantive cuts to PROs across the country, and particularly to those PROs that were 
engaged in ocean science (Turner, 2013). Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti (2017) 
recently discussed these “neoliberal forces” (p. 98) and argued that the decline in public 
science globally will have “long term adverse consequences” (p. 12) for development. 
Ocean industry policy. The ocean science budget cuts are especially disconcerting 
in the province of Nova Scotia. As I have noted, Nova Scotia developed a global 
reputation as a leader in ocean science after decades of work by several key PROs. And, 
ironically, at the same time as public policy was leading to reduced activities in ocean 
science, public funds were increasingly invested in ocean technology development. In 
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2012, the Government of Nova Scotia identified “ocean technologies” as a priority sector 
for economic development (Government of Nova Scotia, 2012). During the period of cuts 
to ocean science, ocean technology also became a priority development sector for the 
capital city’s economic development agency (Greater Halifax Partnership, 2012) and it 
had already been a priority for the federal government’s Atlantic Canada Opportunities 
Agency (ACOA) (Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee, 2006). Science 
policy and industrial policy were moving in opposite directions. This is ironic because the 
province’s ocean technology industry evolved around the PROs.  
Nova Scotia’s present-day ocean technology companies are said to have high levels 
of R&D intensity and to maintain close connections with public research organizations 
(Government of Nova Scotia, 2012). This idea is in stark contrast to the “maritime 
clusters” that have been studied in numerous jurisdictions around the world, including 
Norway (Benito, Berger, de la Forest, & Shum, 2003), Malaysia (Othman, Bruce, & 
Hamid, 2011), Japan (Shinohara, 2010), Wales (Cooke, Porter, Cruz, & Pinto, 2011), the 
Southwest region of England (Chang, 2011), the Huelva and Basque regions of Spain (P. 
Cooke et al., 2011), the Border-Midland-Western region of Ireland (P. Cooke et al., 
2011), and the Norte and Algarve regions of Portugal (P. Cooke et al., 2011). These 
studies emphasize that “maritime clusters” are generally industrial districts (see Marshall, 
1890) with low R&D intensity and are built around shipbuilding or offshore oil & gas 
facilities. A rare few of these clusters are defined around other extractive industries, such 
as the fishery. These studies use a neo-Marshallian industrial clusters theoretical framing. 
The innovation systems approach has been used to study three ocean technology 
innovation systems in Canada. Regional ocean technology innovation systems have been 
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described as “low-innovation” in Quebec (Doloreux, 2008; Doloreux & Melançon, 2008), 
lacking in private-sector activity in British Columbia (Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009), and 
overly reliant on the offshore energy industry in Newfoundland (Doloreux & Shearmur, 
2009). Ocean science instrumentalities are not a consideration in these maritime clusters 
and ocean technology innovation systems studied in other parts of the world. As will 
become clear in this chapter, Nova Scotia is different from these other regions due to the 
presence of interactive learning around scientific instrumentalities. Without this 
specialization, it might be possible to justify a disconnection between the relevant science 
policies and industrial policies in Nova Scotia. However, my third theoretical 
proposition—about the symbiotic nature of scientific instrumentality innovation—
suggests that this disconnect may be a problem. There may be a gap in policy-makers’ 
understanding about the relationships between ocean science and ocean technologies. 
This policy gap is widened by the many possible ways of defining ocean 
technology. Defining Nova Scotia’s ocean technology sector has been a long-standing 
challenge for regional policy makers. A 1979 report by the Nova Scotia Research 
Foundation (NSRF) expressed frustration that 
ocean industry is not a well-defined industrial sector. There is no standard 
industrial classification (SIC) covering the ocean industry nor are there official 
statistics for the industry. (NSRFC, 1979, p. 2) 
 
Despite these problems, many different definitions of “ocean technology” are currently in 
use by public organizations and industry associations in North America. These 
organizations attempt, in their own ways, to define one coherent industry out of myriad 
different ocean technologies. In a 2012 policy statement, the Government of Nova Scotia 
defined its ocean technology sector as those private companies that operate in six 
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technological fields: “acoustics, sensors, and instrumentation; marine geomatics; marine 
biotechnology; marine unmanned surface and underwater vehicles; marine data, 
information, and communications systems; and naval architecture” (Government of Nova 
Scotia, 2012, p. 5). Different definitions are used by the Government of Canada’s Atlantic 
Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) (Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering 
Committee, 2006), the Ocean Technology Council of Nova Scotia (OTCNS) (Ocean 
Technology Council of Nova Scotia, 2014), the ocean technology industry association for 
the neighbouring Province of Newfoundland and Labrador (OceansAdvance, 2014), and 
the United States of America’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) (ERISS Corporation & The Maritime Alliance, 2014). All these definitions are 
exceedingly broad.  
This dissertation maintains a focus on one field of technological application: ocean 
science instrumentalities. I have argued that this field of technology is potentially 
revelatory with respect to public innovation in goods and services. In this section I have 
added another reason for studying this context: it is also revelatory with respect to the gap 
between science policy and industrial policy in this region. A brief review of the history 
of ocean science instrumentality innovation in Nova Scotia will further highlight the 
important connections between ocean science PROs and scientific instrumentality 
companies in the region. 
Regional History 
Before investigating Nova Scotia’s present-day ocean science instrumentalities 
innovation system, I wanted to understand the historical context. Research on regional 
innovation systems typically includes some discussion about the history of a context 
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before engaging with primary data. But readers are typically asked to take the authors’ 
expert knowledge of the historical context for granted. I disagree with this approach. 
Instead, I follow the historical turn in organization studies (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; 
Durepos & Mills, 2011) and specify my historiographic methods. My analysis of this data 
did not necessarily follow a linear or chronological approach, but my approach was 
systematic in terms of the identification of key discoveries or technological breakthroughs 
and in the identification of the organizations involved (see Appendix A). My theoretical 
framework was the focusing device, and my goal was to identify traces of interactive 
learning between organizations involved in scientific instrumentality innovation. My 
findings relate to the activities of four PROs: Naval Research Establishment, Nova Scotia 
Research Foundation, Dalhousie University, and Bedford Institute of Oceanography. 
Naval Research Establishment. The oldest PRO identified in the historic records 
was the Naval Research Establishment (NRE). The NRE was established during World 
War II when two Dalhousie University physics professors were seconded to the Navy by 
way of the National Research Council (DREA, c. 1985; Longard, 1993). Their work 
during WWII and the Cold War was not in the field of scientific instrumentalities. NRE 
was engaged in what is commonly referred to as security or defense R&D (see Mowery, 
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2009, 2012).13 However, in the limited records available14 there is one innovation that 
had clear applications as a scientific instrumentality: variable depth sonar (VDS). A VDS 
“towed-sonar” system was developed and tested by Defense Research Establishment 
Atlantic (DREA), the renamed NRE. Tests were also conducted in partnership with the 
Bedford Institute of Oceanography in the early 1970s (BIO, 1962-1992). Then, DREA 
began working with Cossor Canada Ltd., later known as Hermes Electronics and now 
Ultra Electronics Maritime Systems, to build commercial units. These units were 
primarily for defense customers, but were also sold to public research organizations. 
Gaede and Merklinger (2003) explain that DREA’s long-term relationship with Hermes 
was critical to the company’s development: “DREA work kept engineers challenged 
during otherwise slow business periods, and the leading-edge nature of the DREA work 
helped to develop capabilities and components that found their way into Hermes 
products” (p. 143).   
                                                 
13 Resulting in (1) a technique for degaussing the hulls of ships—now used worldwide, 
(2) improvements to ASDIC/SONAR detection of submarines, (3) the development of 
advanced sonobuoy systems for detection of submarines, (4) licensable patents for sea 
water battery and electroplating technologies, and (5) several functional prototypes of a 
hydrofoil craft (Longard, 1993). 
14 The nature of naval defense research means that official records are still not easily 
accessible. But after the cold war ended, an “unofficial” history that had been written in 
the early 1970s was published by Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (Longard 
1993). A second “informal” history was published in 2003 covering the period from 
1968 to 1995 (Gaede & Merklinger, 2003). The Nova Scotia Archives also house a 
short publicity document, circa 1985, which describes DREA inventions and industry 
partnerships (DREA, c. 1985). This booklet is undated, but includes a loose insert 
organizational chart dated 10 Sept 1985. These three documents provide a limited 
glimpse at decades of somewhat secretive ocean research. The WWII beginnings of 
naval research in Halifax are told in a very similar way by Mills (2011). 
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Under its various names, NRE, DREA, and now Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) 
Atlantic, also played important roles in supporting research at NSRF, BIO, and 
Dalhousie. The most important of these was the naval research vessels that were used for 
joint research missions (BIO, 1962-1992; NSRF, 1946-1995). Historians of science also 
credit this organization (Mills, 2011) and other naval research organizations—particularly 
in the USA (Benson & Rehbock, 1993; Hamblin, 2005; Weir, 2001)—with establishing 
physical oceanography as a scientific discipline. 
Nova Scotia Research Foundation. The three other PROs examined in this chapter 
also had their origins in the period following World War II. The Nova Scotia Research 
Foundation (NSRF),15 for example, was part of the provincial government’s post-war 
economic development programme (Campbell, 1950; Tory, 1944; Woods, 1946). The 
NSRF (1946-1995) was originally established to conduct applied research and improve 
productivity in primary industries. But in the 1960s, Dr. J.E. Blanchard joined NSRF 
from the Oceanography Institute at Dalhousie University. After his promotion to 
President of NSRF in 1968, focus began to shift toward the manufacturing of innovative 
ocean technologies (NSRFC, 1979). This work was organized into a Centre for Ocean 
Technology at NSRF, led by C.R. Tyner who had previously been employed as an 
engineer at Hermes Electronics, E.M.I. Cossor Canada, and the Canadian Marconi 
Corporation.  
                                                 
15The NSRF was replaced by the Nova Scotia Innovation Corporation (Innovacorp) in 
1995.  Innovacorp does not use or produce ocean science instrumentalities. 
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However, like the NRE, the NSRF did not have a mandate to produce ocean 
science: its role was to stimulate the economy through R&D. Ocean technologies were 
developed for a wide range of non-scientific applications in the fishery and offshore 
energy sectors.16 But NSRF’s annual reports (1946-1995) also discuss three inventions 
that were used as scientific instruments. The first of these was a device to measure ocean 
waves called the “Wavestaff.” In 1975, the intellectual property related to this device was 
licensed to local company Orion Electronics, a company that was later acquired by British 
defense company Cobham PLC. Second, an entire line of slip ring and rotary joint 
products was developed. These are important components for connecting ocean 
instrumentation to data and control cables. The patented technologies were licensed to 
Focal Technologies Inc. (which is now part of MOOG Components Group) in 1987/1988. 
Several NSRF employees also moved to Focal, where their first customer was the BIO. 
The third scientific instrumentality, a deep-towed system to profile the ocean floor, was 
originally developed for the offshore energy sector but also proved useful in scientific 
investigations. NSRF rented the original system, nicknamed “V-Fin,” to the offshore 
industry and to local PROs such as BIO and Dalhousie University. The prototype, spare 
parts, and intellectual property were transferred to an unnamed British company in 1991 
(NSRF, 1946-1995). Note that the development of NSRF’s three scientific instrumentality 
                                                 
16 NSRF’s many inventions included: a series of electrical slip rings and rotary unions 
(originally licensed to an unnamed local diving equipment manufacturer, which would 
later go bankrupt), an oil spill tracker, an HS2-in-water meter (licensed to K.W. Colwell 
Ent. Ltd.), a corrosive detector fuse, a dried-fish chip snack food, an x-ray fish bone 
detector, fibre optic rotary joints (licensed to Focal Technologies in 1983/1984), a 
survival suit test manikin, an electronic fish jigger (licensed to ABCO Industries Ltd.), 
and magnetic coupling drives (spun-off as the company Nova Magnetics). 
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innovations did not involve symbiotic relations: the three devices above were transferred 
to private companies via one-way flows of IP and equipment. However, NSRF did seem 
to maintain close symbiotic relations with the other three PROs in this study: they shared 
information, engaged in joint R&D, and shared capital equipment. 
Dalhousie University. A decade of negotiations between 1949 and 1959 resulted in 
funding to establish the Dalhousie University Oceanography Institute (Hayes, 1959). The 
announcement of this new institute appeared in the journal Nature and proudly 
proclaimed, 
All branches of marine science will come under investigation, and 
opportunities for work at sea will be provided by the Royal Canadian Navy, 
the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, and other agencies. (Hayes, 1959, 
p. 1161) 
 
Dr. Ron Hayes pulled together faculty from the departments of biology, chemistry, 
physics, and geology, including geologist Dr. J.E. Blanchard, who later became President 
of the NSRF. A decade later, the University began building a new life sciences building 
which would become home to the Oceanography Department and a large salt water 
research tank called the “Aquatron” (Waite, 1994). In its early years, the Oceanography 
Department interacted with industry primarily through the graduates of its programs. 
However, no specific student employment announcements can be found in the archival 
sources or published histories. Dalhousie had more symbiotic relations with NRE, NSRF, 
and BIO, which involved joint research projects, information exchanges, and the 
exchange or sharing of equipment and technical services.  
The university began engaging more closely with industry from the 1980s onward 
(see Department of Oceanography, 2011). Various instrumentality companies were 
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established by scientists in the oceanography department, including Pro-Oceanus Systems 
Inc., Nortek Scientific, and Satlantic LP, which was later acquired by American 
instrumentalities firm SeaBird Scientific. Meanwhile, marine biology Professor Ron 
O’Dor developed “radio-acoustic positioning and telemetry” technology (O'Dor et al., 
1998) to aid in his tracking of aquatic animals. This resulted in the establishment of 
Vemco, an operating division of AMIRIX Systems Inc., which itself was a joint creation 
of Dalhousie, the NSRF, and the Technical University of Nova Scotia, which was later 
integrated into four units of Dalhousie University. 
Bedford Institute of Oceanography. The fourth PRO that I identified in historical 
documents is the Bedford Institute of Oceanography (BIO). BIO was established in 1959 
to bring together various federal PROs engaged in oceans-related research for the 
purposes of “science, defence, commerce, and development of the country’s resources” 
("Canadian Institute of Oceanography," 1959). The establishment of BIO coincided with 
federal funding for Dalhousie University’s Oceanography Institute. While the elected 
officials encouraged cooperation between the two, the Deputy Minister publicly urged 
that a university scientist should remain “free to tackle any problem” [emphasis in 
original] (van Steenburgh, 1962, p. 10) based on its scientific merits. Meanwhile, he 
explained that BIO’s research programs would be aligned to politically-mandated 
agendas. Over the years, employees from over several different public organizations 
would be housed under the umbrella of BIO while maintaining their departmental/agency 
designations. At its height, nearly 700 employees were sharing the BIO facilities and 
research vessels, one of which was on loan from the Canadian Navy. Researchers from 
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NRE/DREA/DRDC, the NSRF, and Dalhousie University were also welcome aboard the 
research vessels.  
Aside from the research vessels, most instruments and equipment required by BIO 
scientists had not been invented in the 1950s. From the 1960s through the 1980s, a group 
of engineers and technicians operated within BIO to develop a variety of technologies 
that were required by BIO scientists. These included “an underwater rock-core drill, 
instrument mooring methods and materials, baseline acoustic positioning systems, 
oceanographic sensors, and seismic profilers” (BIO, 2002, p. 16). These engineers and 
technicians developed technologies for use within BIO, but they also had an interest in 
commercialization. Many projects developed in partnership with the private sector and 
then marketed internationally (BIO, 2002). One early invention, the Guideline 
Salinometer, was soon “found in every oceanographic laboratory in the world” (BIO, 
2002, p. 25). BATFISH, a towed variable-depth sensor package, was another early-years 
partnership with Guideline Instruments Ltd. of Smith’s Falls, Ontario (BIO, 1969-1970; 
Watkins, 1980).  
During the 1970s, major breakthroughs were developed with, or transferred to, local 
industry in Nova Scotia. These included a meteorological buoy with Hermes Electronics 
and an ocean bottom seismometer with the Canadian Marconi Company (BIO, 2002). 
John Brooke led instrument development at BIO and became BIO’s “Industrial Liaison 
Officer.” He also sat on an advisory board at NSRF. Upon his retirement in the early 
1980s, he founded the company Brooke Ocean Technologies which became a symbiotic 
partner for the BIO. Brooke Ocean Technologies was later acquired by the Norwegian 
ocean technology company Odim ASA, which was then acquired by Rolls Royce Naval. 
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Rolls Royce Naval reduced its ODIM Brooke Ocean operation to a small sales support 
team in 2015 (Brooks, 2015). However, during their time together, BIO and Brooke 
Ocean developed two key ocean science instruments: a “Moving Vessel Profiler System” 
that improved on BATFISH, and a wave-powered profiler called SeaHorse.17 Over the 
subsequent years, other local industry partners engaged in technology development 
partnerships with BIO including MetOcean Data Systems and Open Seas Instrumentation. 
But BIO’s purpose was to engage private sector resources in developing 
oceanographic tools, not necessarily to establish a local industry. Throughout the 1980s, 
partners and contractors outside of Nova Scotia were also involved in interactive learning 
related to new technologies, including a deep-towed seismic system that was developed 
with Huntec Ltd. of Scarborough, Ontario,18 advancements in marine GIS software with 
Universal Systems Ltd. (also known as CARIS) of Fredericton, NB, and the DOLPHIN 
and ARCS underwater autonomous vehicles developed with International Submarine 
Engineering Ltd. of Port Moody, BC. BIO’s interactive learning relationships extended 
well beyond the local region. 
Implications of this Chapter 
The historical records discussed above highlighted many instances of interactive 
learning between four PROs and various private companies. There were also many 
                                                 
17 This Government of Canada patent (US Patent No. 5644077) was licensed to Brooke 
Ocean. See http://www.bio.gc.ca/science/newtech-technouvelles/seahorse/index-
eng.php 
18 Although it looks like some of the Huntec knowledge returned “home” to Nova Scotia. 
The company collapsed sometime around 1985, prompting former employee Dr. Peter 
Simkin to found IKB Technologies, which moved to Nova Scotia in 1998 (see 
http://www.seistec.ca/images/Corporate%20Profile2007.pdf). 
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instances of interactive learning between the PROs themselves. For each PRO, I 
developed a list of the external partners involved in key discoveries or technological 
breakthroughs. The relevant channels of interaction between each PRO and its partner 
organizations were identified based on the way the interaction/relationship was described 
in the archival records. The interactive learning relationships were coded into the 
channels of interaction framework found in Table 2 above. The results of this coding are 
summarized in Table 3. The relational data in Table 3 was then assembled into Figure 4, 
which provides a network illustration of several organizations and relationships that 
contributed to the evolution of this innovation system.  This historical evidence provides 
preliminary support for the three theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 2. 
Support for propositions 1, 2, and 3. Further to proposition 1, the historical 
evidence suggests that PROs may have been the most important actors in a scientific 
instrumentality innovation system. The importance of these PROs is evident in the central 
positions the hold in Figure 4. Note, however, that the historical records reviewed in this 
chapter were primarily produced by the PROs; their importance in the innovation system 
may simply reflect the authorship of the course material. This evidence therefore provides 
only qualified support for proposition 1.  
The support for proposition 2 is stronger. I had proposed that the interactive 
learning between PROs and scientific instrumentality companies involves multiple 
channels and is bidirectional. In other words, the relationships are expected to be 
symbiotic. The final right-hand column of Table 3 lists the private companies that had 
multiple types of interactions with each PRO and where the interactions were 
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bidirectional. In total, I observed thirteen relationships between PROs and companies that 
were symbiotic and 5 that were not. This lends support to proposition 2.  
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Table 3 
Channels of Interactive Learning used by Four Public Research Organizations 
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Notes. (1) Dalhousie University is the only degree-granting PRO in the region and therefore has HR channel relationships (via student mobility) with 
other organizations. Evidence of student mobility to the private firms was not included in this study. Note that the HR channel also includes non-student 
employee mobility and shared human resources among organizations; (2) The secondary sources that were examined provided little evidence of informal 
information flows. However, formal information exchanges were evident among the 4 PROs and between Dal and Vemco (in the form of a co-authored 
publication); (3) Secondary sources for NRE were limited; (4) C.R. Tyner joined NSRF after work at Hermes Electronics. He had previously been 
employed at Cossor and Marconi. There may be other movement of human resources in this innovation system that is not captured in the published 
sources; (5) Scientific instruments invented by Dalhousie researchers were further developed by Vemco, Satlantic, ProOceanus and Nortek. However, at 
Dalhousie, IP owned by the researchers themselves and so the interaction is technically between companies and individual researchers (not the 
university as a corporate entity); (6) An academic journal article was coauthored between Dalhousie researchers and Vemco employees (O'Dor et al. 
1998). 
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Figure 4. Instances of interactive learning in ocean science instrumentalities identified 
from historical records for Nova Scotia, Canada. Author’s own work, rendered from 
secondary sources (see data in Table 3) using Gephi (Gephi Consortium, 2012) and the 
ForceAtlas 2 layout algorithm (Jacomy, Venturini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014). 
 
The historical evidence also lends support to proposition 3: the most important 
interactive learning channel does appear to be the provision and acquisition of capital 
equipment and technical services. I identified fourteen instances of PRO-industry 
interaction involving the provision or acquisition of capital equipment and technical 
services (see the bottom row of Table 3). This was the most frequently observed channel 
of interactive learning in the archival records. I also identified thirteen instances of formal 
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intellectual property flows, eight instances of R&D projects and consultancy, seven 
instances of human resource movement or sharing, and one instance of formal 
information and training interaction. It is likely that informal interactions—especially 
those related to information sharing and training—may be under-reported in formal 
archival and historical records. Formal interactions, such as capital equipment and 
technical services or transfers of intellectual property, may therefore be proportionately 
overrepresented in the overall mix of interactive learning channels. 
PROs as anchor tenants. Overall, the archival evidence suggests that PROs may 
have been the “locus of innovation” (von Hippel, 1976) for an ocean science 
instrumentalities innovation system in Nova Scotia. The PROs appear to be the central 
actors; the glue that held the system together. The four PROs were closely—and perhaps 
symbiotically—interacting with private companies and with each other as they each 
engaged in ocean science for different purposes. This overall characterization suggests 
that the PROs may have served as anchor tenants (Agrawal & Cockburn, 2003; Niosi & 
Zhegu, 2005; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010) in this innovation system. Anchor tenants are 
typically described as large private companies that are embedded in a regional innovation 
system and serve two functions: providing substantial knowledge spillovers and attracting 
other firms to the region (Agrawal & Cockburn, 2003; Feldman, 2003; Niosi & Zhegu, 
2005; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010). However, Feldman (2003) and Niosi and Zhegu (2010) 
suggest that universities can also be anchor tenants. The notion that PROs might be 
anchor tenants in this system arises from my discussion of context; the concept of anchor 
tenants is not considered in prior research about scientific instrumentality innovation. 
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PROs have recently been identified as key actors in a static sense—in terms of their 
dominant or important position various systems: European nanotech (Bergé, Scherngell, 
& Wanzenböck, 2017), a Spanish science and technology park (Latorre, Hermoso, & 
Rubio, 2017), Chinese pharmaceuticals (Perri, Scalera, & Mudambi, 2017), global 
alternative energy patenting (Popp, 2017), German biotech (Roesler & Broekel, 2017), 
and the Chinese 3D printing industry (Xu, Wu, Minshall, & Zhou, 2017)19. This 
theoretical conceptualization of anchor tenants—based on their static position relative to 
other actors—is similar to von Hippel’s (1976) “locus of innovation” concept and is 
captured in Proposition 1. However, the evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that 
this innovation system may be structurally dependent on PROs. This is a dynamic 
theoretical conceptualization of the anchor tenant role: the loss or reduction of a key PRO 
may have a greater negative impact across the whole innovation system than the loss of a 
private company. This possibility is highly relevant given my earlier discussion of drastic 
cuts to the region’s ocean science capacity and substantive investment in the region’s 
ocean technology industry. My theoretical and contextual discussions have both 
suggested that a scientific instrumentality innovation system may structurally dependent 
upon PROs, thus the cuts to ocean science may have important implications for ocean 
science instrumentality innovation. 
There has not been enough research into the ways that innovation systems might be 
structurally dependant upon certain types of actors. Based on qualitative evidence, 
                                                 
19 Of the recent articles cited here, only one uses the term “anchor” (i.e., Xu, Wu, 
Minshall, & Zhou, 2017). 
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Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) have suggested that Silicon Valley’s innovation system is 
highly susceptible to the loss of venture capital firms. Powell, Packalen, and Whittington 
(2012) have shown, also qualitatively, that at one point in time the removal of PROs 
would have collapsed Boston’s biotech innovation system. A key implication of the 
present chapter is to provide an opportunity for further research into the structural 
dependence of innovation systems. Given the research on scientific instrumentalities, and 
based on the historical evidence discussed in this chapter, I propose that 
Proposition 4: A scientific instrumentalities innovation system is more 
susceptible to the loss of public research organizations than to the loss of other 
types of organizations. 
 
In other words, a combination of theory and context tells me that PROs should anchor this 
innovation system—the downsizing or removal of a PRO likely has greater system-wide 
impact than the downsizing or removal of a private company.  
Companies as quartermasters. If PROs are indeed the anchor tenants in a 
scientific instrumentality innovation system, where does this leave private companies? In 
this chapter, I identified some instances where instrumentality innovations were produced 
within the PROs and then commercialized by industry, such as NSRF’s wavestaff. This is 
consistent with the observations of von Hippel and his colleagues (Riggs and von Hippel, 
1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976; von Hippel, 1988). I also identify instances where 
PROs and instrumentality companies worked in close symbiotic relations, as in BIO and 
Brooke Ocean or Dalhousie and Vemco. PRO-industry relations were only simple and 
linear in the case of the NSRF; that is, several technologies were transferred to industry 
through the IPR channel. NRE, BIO and Dalhousie all established multiple types of 
bidirectional relations with scientific instrumentality companies, further to Proposition 2.  
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Also, NRE, BIO and Dalhousie have all engaged with industry to acquire capital 
equipment and/or technical services. This evidence supports Proposition 3: the 
equipment/services channel appears to have been central to the interactive learning 
between PROs and instrumentality companies. And so, if PROs are to be labelled as 
“anchors” in the innovation system, private companies can be labelled as 
“quartermasters,” like the individuals responsible for providing supplies to units in an 
army. Several private companies provided important instrumentalities for these four 
PROs. However, theory and historical evidence suggest that this relationship is more 
nuanced than simple provision of equipment and services. Indeed, the term 
“quartermaster” is used differently by navies: naval quartermasters help to navigate their 
ships. The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and the historical records 
discussed in this chapter both suggest that the technical expertise provided by scientific 
instrument companies may help to set the course for science.  
Limitations of the archival evidence. I say that these records only “suggest” a 
certain interpretation of the past because they are only partial traces of a previous time 
(Durepos & Mills, 2011; Durepos & Mills, 2012). Historiographic methods are generally 
taken for granted in innovation studies; papers and dissertations in this field often present 
historical context as succinct and indisputable fact. I have disagreed with this approach. 
Instead, I have been explicit about the materials and methods I used to write this context 
chapter. This helps readers understand why definitive conclusions should not be drawn 
from this chapter. The archival sources I use in this chapter are focused on the work of 
these PROs, not on the private companies, and most of the sources were published by the 
PROs themselves. Indeed, the centrality of the PROs in Figure 4 may be a function of the 
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source material. This confirms how important it is to be explicit about the materials and 
methods used to produce contextual histories of innovation systems: it allows us to 
acknowledge limitations, as in any other research. For my research, the bias of historical 
records toward public organizations underscores the need for careful collection of 
primary data.  
In the next chapter, I introduce analytical concepts that allow me to restate my four 
theoretical propositions as hypotheses. I can then test these hypotheses using data from 
the present-day interactive learning network in this regional-sectoral innovation system. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a rich description of the empirical context 
that I use for the remainder of this dissertation. The context was shaped by the activities 
of four PROs over many decades. More recently, the context was shaped by critical shifts 
in public policy: the simultaneous prioritization of ocean technology industry and 
deprioritization of public ocean science. Following an analysis of the present-day 
innovation system, the final chapter of this dissertation returns to questions about the 
importance of PROs and the possible implications of a disconnect between science policy 
and industrial policy. 
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Chapter 4: Analytical Framework 
The preceding chapters have considered both theory and context, enabling me to 
develop an analytical framework in this chapter. My analytical framework acts as a bridge 
between theory and method; it provides the foundation for data collection and analysis 
throughout the remainder of the dissertation. In what follows, I also describe the ways 
that I avoid a narrow market-orientation in my analytical work. 
At its most basic level, the analytical framework developed here has become 
common place in innovation studies: I will use concepts and techniques from network 
science to analyze an innovation system. Like several other scholars, I treat a regional-
sectoral innovation system as an interactive learning network (e.g., Cantner & Graf, 2006; 
Kaufmann & Tödtling, 2001; R. Martin & Moodysson, 2011a, 2011b) in keeping with a 
general trend in the use of network analysis for innovation studies (Kastelle & Steen, 
2010; van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010). However, I make important adjustments to ensure 
that my analysis is capable of surfacing public innovation. In the first section of this 
chapter, I take great care to define and differentiate between institutions—the “rules of 
the game”(North, 1990, p. 4)—and organizations—i.e., the “players” (North, 1990, p. 4). 
Some innovation scholars use the term “institution” in an atheoretical sense, thereby 
pushing PROs into the background of innovation systems (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). 
Instead, I conceptualize an innovation system as an institutional field in which many 
kinds of organizations engage in interactive learning. IN the second section of this 
chapter, concepts from network science allow me to approach interactive learning as 
more than a linear and dichotomous PRO-industry, or user-producer relationship. Instead, 
I frame interactive learning as a network phenomenon: the sum of many dyadic relations, 
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allowing for key measurement concepts from network analysis to restate my earlier four 
theoretical propositions as hypotheses. In the final section, I conceptualize this innovation 
system as both an institutional field and a network, allowing me to address the problem of 
regional-sectoral boundary specification (Doloreux & Parto, 2005) by combining insights 
from innovation studies and network analysis. This third and final adjustment involves 
the careful definition of network/system boundaries. Together, these three adjustments 
provide an analytical framework that can investigate the importance of public 
organizations for scientific instrumentality innovation. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of this analytical framework. 
Institutions and Organizations 
In earlier chapters, I introduced core theoretical concepts related to innovation 
systems. I argued that this approach is appropriate for my work because it provides an 
alternative to the linear and firm-centric approaches that previously dominated the 
innovation studies literature (Fagerberg et al., 2013; Lundvall, 2013; B. Martin, 2013, 
2016). An innovation systems approach allows me to take a system-level perspective: my 
analysis can be focused on interactive learning processes that are socially-embedded in a 
particular context (Lundvall, 1992). Using an innovation systems analytical approach first 
requires a closer look at the components of an innovation system. Carefully defining these 
components will provide the first important piece of my analytical framework. 
Several innovation system scholars have pointed out that there are unfortunately 
two different uses of the term “institution” in the literature (Coriat & Weinstein, 2002; 
Edquist, 2001; Grønning, 2008). Some work uses the term in reference to a category of 
organizations (Edquist & Johnson, 1997; Grønning, 2008); it is frequently used as a 
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euphemism for PROs (Coriat and Weinstein 2002). Other work speaks of institutions as 
the formal and informal rules that shape organizational interaction (Edquist & Johnson, 
1997). For the purposes of clarity in this dissertation, I follow Charles Edquist and Bjorn 
Johnson (1997) in borrowing conceptual definitions from institution theory.  
Nobel laureate Douglass North (1990) argued for a distinction between manifest 
institutions—i.e., organizations—and abstract institutions—i.e., rules. He said, “what 
must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players” (North, 1990, p. 4) because 
any institutional theory must “begin with the individual” (North, 1990, p. 5) and focus on 
“groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives” (North, 
1990, p. 5).20 In short, his approach encourages the separation of organizations from the 
rules they follow. Edquist and Johnson (Edquist, 1997, 2004; Edquist & Johnson, 1997) 
argued that research on innovation systems should follow North’s institutional theory 
approach. Based on North’s work, Edquist and Johnson (1997) concluded that we should 
“deduct” legally constituted organizations from the organizing—the interactive 
learning—that occurs outside or between organizational entities. Similarly, Casper, 
Hollingsworth, and Whitley (2005) discuss a separation between institutions and “the 
interaction of individuals and groups within a particular institutional setting” (p. 197). If 
we fully deploy North’s (1990) sports metaphor to an innovation system we can think of 
                                                 
20  Note that focusing on “organizations” rather than “individuals” introduces a potential 
“cross-level fallacy” (Rousseau, 1985) in the innovation systems approach. Meeus and 
Oerlemans (2005a) explain the potential fallacy this way: “although learning is based 
on individuals in the workforce of the firm, it is assumed firms can learn” (p. 159). 
Theoretical grounds for this assumption can be found in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
(1995) “organizational knowledge creation process” which establishes links between 
individual-level and organizational-level learning behaviour. 
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organizations as the players, institutions as the rules, and interactive learning as the sport, 
or the play. I therefore define institutions as the rules of a particular playing field, and 
organizations as the teams of players (see also Glossary). Since the work of Edquist and 
Johnson (1997), there has been an “increasing consensus” within the innovation systems 
literature that institutions and organizations should be defined in this way (Grønning, 
2008).  
Positioning organizations as separable from institutions allows me to distinguish 
between types of organizations in an innovation system. The organizations in question 
often include public and private entities, but emphasis is placed on private firms (Edquist 
& Johnson, 1997). My analytical focus is on organizations broadly, and I allow the type 
of organization to be a variable rather than a predetermined filter. Further, I follow the 
OECD (2005) approach to identifying appropriate organizational units of analysis. This 
standard approach involves separating large heterogenous legal entities such as 
multinational corporations into their homogenous components (OECD, 2005). According 
to the third edition of the OECD’s “Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and 
Interpreting Innovation Data” (2005), innovation data should be collected at the “kind-of-
activity unit” (KAU) level, whenever possible. The KAU is  
…an enterprise or part of an enterprise which engages in one kind of economic 
activity without being restricted to the geographic area in which that activity is 
carried out. This means that the KAU may consist of one or more legal units, or a 
part of a legal unit (OECD, 2005, p. 66). 
 
Note, again, that the standard unit of analysis in innovation research is the private sector 
enterprise. Nonetheless, the KAU concept is applicable to all types of organizational 
entities. 
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In this section I have shown that it is theoretically appropriate to treat innovation 
systems as institutional fields. Although the innovation studies literature is focused on 
private firms, innovation systems may also include other types of organizations, such as 
public research organizations, universities, and sometimes rule-creating public and not-
for-profit organizations such as law-making bodies, and professional associations 
(Edquist & Johnson, 1997). Interaction between all of these types of organizations can be 
shaped by a wide range of formal institutions such as patent laws or technical standards, 
and informal institutions such as cultural practices or behavioural norms (Meeus & 
Oerlemans, 2005a). These formal and informal institutions vary across national, regional, 
and sectoral contexts (Meeus & Oerlemans, 2005b).  
Interactive Learning Networks 
I have described innovation systems as institutional fields in which organizations 
engage in interactive learning. In this section I will present my framework for analyzing 
an innovation system as an interorganizational network comprised of various 
organizations engaged in learning interactions (see also van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010). 
For the purposes of network analysis, the organizations are represented by nodes and the 
interactions are represented by edges. If organizations A and B interacted with one 
another, an edge is present between those two nodes. Interactive learning can thereby be 
presented as a network graph or as an adjacency matrix similar to Table 4 (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Scott, 2000). The Boolean values 
in the adjacency matrix indicate the presence or absence of a learning interaction between 
two organizations. For example, a relationship is present in cells A-C and C-A. Also, a 
relationship is present in cell D-B, but not in cell B-D. This means that the relationship 
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has a direction: D may have sold a piece of equipment to B, or a key employee may have 
left D for B. Each type of learning interaction is captured in a single matrix, but multiple 
matrices can be layered together in a single dataset. In this way, the multiple types of 
learning interactions that take place within an innovation system can be analyzed using a 
wide range of methods derived from graph theory. 
Table 4 
Sample Adjacency Matrix for Organizations A, B, C and D 
 A B C D 
A  1 1 0 
B 1  0 0 
C 1 0  0 
D 0 1 0  
 
Network analysis techniques hold tremendous potential for understanding the 
complexities of innovation systems (Kastelle & Steen, 2010). They are particularly well 
suited to examining patterns of interactive learning at a system level, rather than the 
organization/firm level. These techniques also promise to be powerful tools that policy 
makers can use for developing and evaluating innovation policy (van der Valk & 
Gijsbers, 2010). A network approach helps to overcome analytical limitations of linear 
and chain-link frameworks. Also, it has been argued that public innovation should be 
studied at the level of an organizational—or institutional—field (Hartley, 2005). 
However, network analysis methods have only begun to find their way into business 
(Bergenholtz & Waldstrøm, 2011) and innovation (van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010) 
journals in the past decade.  
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Most of the recent network analyses of science-industry interaction (summarized in 
Appendix A) focus on patent and/or co-publication networks (e.g., Bergé, Scherngell, & 
Wanzenböck, 2017; Perri, Scalera, & Mudambi, 2017; Popp, 2017), despite the well-
documented limitations of patent and publication data (see discussion in Ahuja, 2000; 
Katz & Martin, 1997; Moody, 2004). Furthermore, many of these recent studies employ 
only descriptive network analysis (e.g., Bergé, Scherngell, & Wanzenböck, 2017; Chang, 
2017; Rothgang et al., 2017). There are however, emerging trends toward the collection 
of longitudinal network data (e.g., Choi, 2017; Roesler & Broekel, 2017; Töpfer, Cantner, 
& Graf, 2017) and statistical modelling of network data (e.g., Arza & Carattoli, 2017; 
Broekel & Mueller, 2017; Roesler & Broekel, 2017). Overall, network analysis remains 
relatively underutilized and underdeveloped in innovation studies (Bergenholtz & 
Waldstrøm, 2011; Glückler & Doreian, 2016; van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010). 
There are a few applications of network analysis in innovation studies that are worth 
highlighting. Sophisticated applications of network analysis have been used to expand our 
understanding of regional industry dynamics (Cantner & Graf, 2006; Giuliani, 2005, 
2013; Giuliani & Bell, 2005), particularly university-industry interaction (Balconi, 
Breschi, & Lissoni, 2004; Breschi & Catalini, 2010; Giuliani et al., 2010; Kauffeld-Monz 
& Fritsch, 2013; van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010). In innovation studies, network analysis 
has been used to evaluate the relative position of network actors (e.g., Balconi et al., 
2004; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Gilsing et al., 2008; Salman & Saives, 2005; Takeda, 
Kajikawa, Sakata, & Matsushima, 2008), to identify the factors that influence a network’s 
structural composition (e.g., Cantner & Graf, 2006; R. Martin, 2013; R. Martin & 
Moodysson, 2011a; Sorenson, Rivkin, & Fleming, 2006), and to understand the 
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evolutionary dynamics of certain network structures (e.g., Ferrary & Granovetter, 2009; 
Giuliani, 2013; Giuliani & Bell, 2005). I address these three analytical approaches—
network position, network composition, and network dynamics—in the following 
sections. Each approach corresponds with different theoretical propositions from earlier 
chapters.  
Network position: Centrality. There are several ways to analyze an actor’s 
position, or centrality, in a network. Centrality is “a family of concepts” that refer to the 
way that a node contributes to the structure of a network (Borgatti et al., 2013, p. 164). 
Recent network analyses of science-industry interaction have found that the relative 
centrality of PROs varies across systems: PROs are important biotechnology actors in 
both Germany (Roesler & Broekel, 2017) and Taiwan (Chen & Liu, 2012), they are the 
key nanotech actors in Europe (Bergé, Scherngell, & Wanzenböck, 2017) but not in South 
Korea (Choi, 2017), and universities are the central organizations in a Spanish science 
park (Latorre, Hermoso, & Rubio, 2017) but firms are the central organizations in a 
Chinese science park (Lyu, Wu, Hu, & Huang, 2017). For the Chinese 3D printing 
industry, PROs were found to be the “anchor players” in a scientific co-authorship 
network and in a co-patenting network, whereas firms were the “anchor players” in a 
network of business relations (Xu, Wu, Minshall, & Zhou, 2017). 
For innovation networks, different measures of centrality have been used to assess 
the strategic importance of network actors. Two recent studies have developed different 
ways of calculating a centrality measure for innovation networks that uses the new 
theoretical concept of bridging centrality (see Bergé, Scherngell, & Wanzenböck, 2017; 
Broekel & Mueller, 2017). Bridging centrality might prove useful for future studies of 
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innovation networks if consensus develops around a common mathematical approach. At 
present however, the two commonly used measures are degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality. Degree centrality is a simple measure of how well a node is connected to a 
network. It is the total number of relations between the focal node and other nodes in the 
network (Borgatti et al., 2013). Nodes with high degree centrality can therefore be 
described as highly engaged in the network. Betweenness centrality is different in that it 
measures the number of times that one node falls along the shortest paths between all 
other pairs of nodes. Nodes with high betweenness centrality therefore occupy key 
positions as brokers in a network: they can facilitate or disrupt flows between other 
nodes. These two centrality concepts can be complimentary. For example, Salman and 
Saives (2005) showed that both were positively related to innovation performance (i.e., 
patenting) for 40 biotech firms in Quebec. Also, Balconi et al. (2004) found that academic 
inventors had higher degree centrality and higher betweenness centrality than non-
academic inventors in the Italian patent network. In other words, the academic inventors 
were more highly connected and more likely to hold brokerage positions. In this way, 
degree centrality and betweenness centrality sometimes appear to be interchangeable 
when they both correlate with an underlying third variable. 
These measures are conceptually different and it is therefore important to select the 
centrality concept that is most relevant to the phenomenon under investigation. For 
example, Gilsing et al. (2008) wanted to understand how a firm’s position in a biotech 
alliance network was related to its innovation performance. They chose to measure 
betweenness centrality and found that under the right network conditions, firms with high 
betweenness were in better positions to search for novel combinations of knowledge. This 
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is consistent with the typical interpretation of betweenness centrality: that it represents a 
node’s ability to control flows through a network—to act as a network broker (Borgatti et 
al., 2013). Meanwhile, degree centrality is typically interpreted as representing a node’s 
importance or influence in a network (Borgatti et al., 2013). In one example from 
innovation studies, Takeda et al. (2008) found that a multi-sector regional innovation 
system in Japan was characterised by several firms with high degree centrality that each 
served as hubs for geographic agglomerations of related firms. In another example, Gay 
and Dousset (2005) examined a network of biotechnology industry alliances and found 
that the most highly connected firms—those with high degree centrality—were the most 
likely to attract additional alliances over time. This well-studied “rich-get-richer” 
property of real world networks is called “preferential attachment” (Barabási & Albert, 
1999). However, Gay and Dousset (2005) argued that their results indicated something 
closer to a “fitter-get-richer” version of preferential attachment. They explained that 
central positions in their network were held by the “fittest” firms: the ones with the 
strongest stocks of technological capital. In this way, the value of a firm’s technological 
capital was the underlying mechanism driving its degree centrality. 
 As in the cases of Gay and Dousset (2005) and Takeda et al. (2008), degree 
centrality is more appropriate to this dissertation than betweenness centrality. In Chapter 
2, I discussed the work of von Hippel (1976, 1988) and his colleagues (Riggs & von 
Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979) who described publicly employed scientists as the “locus” of 
scientific instrument innovation. These authors used the term “locus” to imply that 
scientists were both the origin of new product ideas and the most important players in a 
linear product development process. The scientists were not described as playing a 
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brokerage role; instead, they were described as the “dominant” (Riggs & von Hippel, 
1994; von Hippel, 1976) and the most influential players in the innovation process. I 
therefore consider degree centrality to be the appropriate network measure. For analytical 
purposes, Proposition 1 can therefore be restated as a hypothesis: 
H1 Public research organizations have significantly greater average degree 
centrality than all other types of organizations in a scientific 
instrumentalities interactive learning network. 
 
Here, I suggest that the findings of von Hippel and colleagues can be used to predict 
the relative position of certain actors within a scientific instrumentalities network. In 
Chapter 6, this hypothesis will be evaluated using a relatively simple network-based t-
test.  
Network composition: Symbiosis. More sophisticated multivariate network 
analyses have been used to identify the factors that influence an innovation network’s 
structural composition. For example, Cantner and Graf (2006) performed network 
regressions on data about co-patenting in Jena, Germany. They found that two 
organizations were more likely to have cooperated on patents if those organizations 
conducted R&D in a common patent class and experienced some labour mobility, or 
movement of scientists, between them (Cantner & Graf, 2006). The results of Cantner and 
Graff’s (2006) multivariate network analysis contribute to a broader literature of non-
network multivariate studies. This literature has shown that certain interactive learning 
channels are more or less important for different types of organizations in different 
contexts (Arza, De Fuentes, Dutrénit, & Vazquez, 2015; Bekkers & Freitas, 2008; Cohen, 
Nelson, & Walsh, 2002; De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2012; Dutrénit & Arza, 2010; Narin, 
Hamilton, & Olivastro, 1997). Thus, institutional context shapes the structural 
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composition of an interactive learning network. Further, certain control variables are 
important for multivariate analyses of interactive learning, particularly organizational size 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Hanel & St-Pierre, 2006; Santoro & Chakrabarti, 2002), age (Eom & 
Lee, 2009; Giuliani & Arza, 2009), and absorptive capacities (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Fontana, Geuna, & Matt, 2006)—which are frequently measured as R&D intensity (Eom 
& Lee, 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2004; Torres, Dutrénit, Becerra, & Sampedro, 2011). A 
multivariate approach is needed to account for this range of factors that can influence 
network composition. 
In another prominent example of multivariate network analysis, Sorenson et al. 
(2006) examined a U.S. patent citation network. They found that social and geographic 
proximity had a significant impact on moderately complex knowledge transfers among 
patent holders (Sorenson et al., 2006). Proximity—especially geographic proximity—is 
an extremely important variable in studies of interactive learning (Bishop, D’Este, & 
Neely, 2011; Broström, 2010; De Fuentes & Dutrénit, 2012; Laursen, Reichstein, & 
Salter, 2011). Filippetti and Savona (2017) explained that “geographic proximity has 
traditionally been considered the main determinant of UI interactions” (p. 2). However, in 
their research, Roman Martin and Jerker Moodysson (R. Martin, 2013; R. Martin & 
Moodysson, 2011a) demonstrated that the importance of geographic proximity on the 
structure of an innovation network depends upon an industry’s underlying knowledge 
base. Distance is less important for “analytic” or science-based industries than it is for 
“synthetic” (i.e., engineering-based) or “symbolic” (i.e., art-based) ones (R. Martin, 2013; 
R. Martin & Moodysson, 2011a). Scholars continue to debate the importance of 
geographic proximity for certain innovation systems. Because scientific instrumentalities 
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develop at the intersection of analytic and synthetic knowledge bases, it is not entirely 
clear how important geographic proximity might be for ocean science instrumentality 
innovation in Nova Scotia. It is clear, however, that geographic proximity should be 
included as a variable in my analysis. 
For anyone familiar with multivariate analysis, the studies discussed above may 
appear to be very straight-forward. However, a distinct analytical approach is required 
when examining network structure/composition because network data violates two core 
assumptions of common statistical tests: network observations are not randomly sampled, 
nor are they independent of one another. Most network analysis techniques require data 
on a whole network rather than a network sample (Borgatti et al., 2013) because many 
network variables incorporate some measurement of the overall network composition. 
Such measures can vary considerably under different sampling conditions; so, network 
observations are not randomly sampled—they must be systematically collected. 
Furthermore, network analysis investigates sets of interdependent observations, and 
therefore cannot rely on standard statistical methods that assume independence of 
observations.  
A common solution to this problem is the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) 
(Hubert, 1987; Krackhardt, 1988; J. L. Martin, 1999). QAP is considered superior to 
ordinary linear regression for network analysis (Krackhardt, 1988). This re-sampling 
process takes observed data and randomly rearranges the rows and columns of a 
dependent variable matrix. The relational structure of the dependent matrix is preserved, 
but it is no longer related to the independent variable matrix because observations have 
been reassigned to different nodes. This approach can be used to create a collection of 
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observations that could have occurred at random. Properties of the observed data can then 
be compared against the properties of several thousand random permutations. The result 
of QAP is a permutation distribution that allows network analysis software to evaluate the 
statistical significance of observations: calculating the percent of permutations that yield 
values greater or less than the observed values. 
By adopting the QAP approach, it becomes possible to restate theoretical 
propositions 2 and 3 as hypotheses. Proposition 2 relates to the nature of interactive 
learning between PROs and private companies in a scientific instrumentalities innovation 
system. I proposed that PRO-company relations should involve multiple channels of 
interactive learning. In network terms, this means the relations should be multiplex—they 
should incorporate multiple types of edges. Only a few recent studies of science-industry 
networks have accounted for multiple channels (e.g., Arza & Carattoli, 2017; Calignano 
& Fitjar, 2017; Calignano, Fitjar, & Kogler, 2018; Martin & Rypestøl, 2017; Xu, Wu, 
Minshall, & Zhou, 2017). I also proposed that PRO-company interactions should involve 
bidirectional learning—two-way knowledge flows based on interactive learning channels 
operating in both directions. One recent study of science-industry interaction (Arza & 
Carattoli, 2017) explicitly investigated bidirectionality via an aggregate “bidirectional 
channel” and found that it provided positive knowledge benefits to PROs in Argentina.  
Using these concepts, I hypothesize that: 
H2  Within a scientific instrumentalities interactive learning network, 
relations between PROs and private companies are multiplex and 
bidirectional. 
 
Network composition: Channels of interaction. We know that composition of 
interaction channels in an innovation system will vary according to contextual and 
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organizational factors. In proposition 3, I argued that the most important channels of 
interactive learning for scientific instrumentality innovation involve the provision and 
acquisition of capital equipment and technical services. It is possible to identify the most 
important edges in a network using a measure of edge betweenness developed by Girvan 
and Newman (2002). This measure is similar to betweenness centrality, except that it 
applies to edges rather than nodes. It assesses the importance of an edge based on the 
number of times that edge lies on the shortest path between any two nodes in the network 
(Borgatti et al., 2013; L. C. Freeman, 1977; Girvan & Newman, 2002). Based on this 
measure of edge importance, I can restate Proposition 3 as the following hypothesis: 
H3 The presence of a capital equipment and technical services interaction 
significantly and positively predicts the edge betweenness of a relationship 
in a scientific instrumentalities interactive learning network. 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 can both be evaluated using QAP adaptations of common 
multivariate tests. These hypotheses address the factors that influence the relational 
composition of a scientific instrumentality innovation system. The following section 
develops one further hypothesis about the structure of the whole system. 
Network dynamics: Fragmentation. Glückler and Doreian (2016) have noted that 
in the field of economic geography—which intersects with innovation studies—network 
analysis has been used mostly to examine individual actors or dyads of actors, with very 
little attention to the evolution and composition of whole networks. This is the third 
way—the most sophisticated, yet underutilized way—that innovation scholars have used 
network analysis. In one prominent example, Giuliani (2013) applied stochastic actor-
oriented models to longitudinal data on a wine industry network in Chile. She found that 
over time new network ties were formed when actors reciprocated contact from other 
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actors and/or closed an open triad of relations. In graph theory, these network dynamics 
are referred to as reciprocity and transitive closure. Interestingly, Giuliani (2013) found 
that these network dynamics did not apply for firms with weak knowledge bases; those 
firms remained in the network periphery over time. 
In Chapter 3, I concluded with a proposition about the structural dynamics of a 
scientific instrumentalities innovation system such as the ocean science instrumentalities 
system in Nova Scotia. I suggested that such innovation systems may be structurally 
dependent upon PROs as anchor tenants. In graph theory, the structural dependence of a 
network on certain nodes is referred to as “robustness” (Barabási, 2013; Callaway, 
Newman, Strogatz, & Watts, 2000). A network’s robustness is a function of how well it 
remains connected when individual nodes or edges are removed (Borgatti et al., 2013). A 
network is said to be highly robust when a large number of nodes or edges need to be 
removed before the network begins to fragment into many small components (Borgatti et 
al., 2013). As I discussed in Chapter 3, robustness has only been qualitatively explored in 
innovation studies. Some have suggested that Silicon Valley’s present-day innovation 
system is highly susceptible—not robust—to the loss of venture capital firms (Ferrary & 
Granovetter, 2009). Others have suggested that Boston’s biotech innovation system was 
not robust to the removal of PROs in the late 1980s (Powell et al., 2012).  
The dynamic effect underlying network robustness is fragmentation. In a network 
with no fragmentation, all nodes are members of one component—no individual nodes 
are isolated from the group, and no small groups of nodes are disconnected from the main 
component. When there is no fragmentation present, any node in a network can reach any 
other node by working through its neighbours. Stephen Borgatti (2006) identified several 
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ways to measure network fragmentation. For all these measures, a network becomes fully 
fragmented (F = 1) when all nodes are disconnected from one another. Fragmentation 
measures differ in the ways that they account for degrees of fragmentation. The simplest 
approach is to count the number of components—or groups of nodes—in a network and 
then divide by the total number of nodes. But for the states where F is somewhere 
between 0 and 1, fragmentation measures should be adjusted to account for the structure 
of the network (Borgatti, 2006). Using this measurement technique, Calignano, Fitjar, and 
Kogler (2018) observed that the aerospace cluster in Apulia, Italy was highly fragmented 
in a static sense (i.e., the whole network’s degree of fragmentation was measured at two 
separate points in time, without modelling perturbations between time periods). 
Borgatti (2006) argues that we should go further than measuring the fragmentation 
as a static state. He suggests that we should account for the impact on network structure 
that occurs when nodes are lost: the loss of a well-positioned node, one with high degree 
or betweenness centrality, for example, can have greater implications for the functioning 
of a network than the loss of a peripheral node (Borgatti, 2006). To calculate the impact 
of node loss on network structure, Borgatti (2006) considers the reciprocal distance 
between nodes. In other words, he measures the degree to which any pair of nodes in a 
network can reach one another via connections with their neighbours. He calls this 
“distance weighted fragmentation” (DF) (Borgatti, 2006). In practical terms, reachability 
is the number of edges that a piece of knowledge must traverse to find its way from one 
organization to another in an interactive learning network. After incorporating 
reachability into a measure of fragmentation, Borgatti (2006) gives us this equation: 
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Here, i and j are nodes in a network, dij is the geodesic distance between those nodes, and 
n is the total number of nodes in the network. The numerator incorporates a reciprocal of 
the distance between nodes. For nodes that cannot reach one another—in other words, 
distance is infinite—the reciprocal distance is zero. Distance-weighted fragmentation has 
a lower limit of zero when every pair of nodes is adjacent to every other pair. It has an 
upper limit where every node is an isolate. For my purposes, distance-weighted 
fragmentation is useful because it can be a node-level measure: the change in DF of the 
network can be calculated after removal of any individual node. The concept of distance-
weighted fragmentation allows me to restate my fourth theoretical proposition as a 
hypothesis: 
H4 Removing individual PROs from a scientific instrumentalities interactive 
learning network results in significantly greater distance-weighted 
fragmentation than removing other types of organizations. 
 
Hypothesis 4 is relatively simple to test using readily available network analysis 
software. More sophisticated applications of robustness analysis could be used to 
compare different error and attack scenarios, including the cascading effects of successive 
node loss (Barabási, 2013). As Albert Barabasi explains, “in general, removing a fraction 
of nodes has limited impact on a network’s integrity. Once the number of removed nodes 
reaches a critical threshold, the network abruptly breaks into disconnected components” 
(Barabási, 2013, p. 8). In my final chapter I will discuss the opportunities to develop new 
tools for more sophisticated analysis of multi-node error and attack scenarios. Here, my 
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goal is to introduce a relatively simple approach to quantitative analysis of a theoretically 
and contextually important network dynamic.  
Above I have introduced key analytical concepts from network science and restated 
my four theoretical propositions as hypotheses. These hypotheses include measurement 
concepts from network analysis. The next step before an analysis an be conducted is to 
stipulate and clearly specify network boundaries. This is the purpose of the following 
section. 
Boundary Specification 
At the beginning of this chapter, I engaged with the concept of institutions within 
innovation systems. Now, having developed concepts from network science, I revisit the 
idea of an innovation system as an institutional field and develop the final piece of my 
analytical framework: the boundary specification. Boundary specification is an issue in 
studies of regional innovation systems—where the debate is about regional scale 
(Doloreux & Parto, 2005) and in the field of network analysis—where the debate is about 
network ontology (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1983). In this section, I use theory 
from innovation systems and network science to define the boundary around Nova 
Scotia’s ocean science instrumentality innovation system.  
Edquist and Johnson (1997) have suggested that the boundaries around an 
innovation system are “always” (p. 60) or at least “normally” (p. 40) defined in terms of 
institutions—i.e., the playing field is delineated by the rules of the game. In other words, 
an innovation system can be described as an institutional field or organizational 
environment in which interactive learning takes place. The boundaries of an innovation 
system typically correspond with national borders (Meeus & Oerlemans, 2005b), regional 
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economies (Gertler, 2010), or socio-technical regimes (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014). 
Some believe that socio-technical regimes correspond with product-based industry 
classifications—industries or sectors—but this can be a problematic oversimplification. 
Whether the context for an innovation system is geo-political, socio-economic, or socio-
technical, the institutional rules within the system—the cultural norms or laws and 
regulations (North, 1990)—are relatively homogenous. These rules differ from one 
institutional field to the next, but the institutional fields also intersect one-another 
(Castellacci, 2009; C. W. Freeman, 2002), particularly when conceived as a “regional, 
sectoral innovation system” (Cooke, 2002). Given the nested and overlapping nature of 
institutional fields, the boundaries of an innovation system are always open (Belussi, 
Sammarra, & Sedita, 2010), semi-coherent (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014), and fixed 
only for analytical purposes. David Doloreux and Saeed Parto (2005) have labelled 
boundary specification as the “unit of analysis” problem in studies of regional innovation 
systems. It is the problem of determining whether the innovation system boundaries align 
with a city, metropolitan region, local district, sub-national region, and so on. Doloreux 
and Parto (2005) considered this to be one of the major unresolved issues in the field. 
They proposed that proper deployment of institutions—the “key variable” in regional 
innovation systems (Doloreux & Parto, 2005)—helps resolve this issue while at the same 
time suggesting that “there is a danger of getting ‘lost in the woods’ while searching for 
the institutional component” (Doloreux & Parto, 2005, p. 146).  
I propose that network science can help guide the way. Just as boundary 
specification is a central issue in the study of innovation systems, it is also a central issue 
in network analysis (Laumann et al., 1983). Edward Lauman, Peter Marsden, and David 
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Prensky (1983) wrote about this problem and distinguished between realist and 
nominalist approaches to network boundary specification.21 The realist approach assumes 
that a network is a well-defined social entity that “exists as a collectively shared 
subjective awareness of all, or at least most, of the actors who are members” (Laumann et 
al., 1983, p. 21). From this perspective, researchers often ask network actors to define 
their own network boundary. The realist approach also often involves the use of analytical 
methods to identify network boundaries based on the contours of actors’ relations. 
Alternatively, under the nominalist approach, network boundaries do not need to be 
perceived by the actors because they are defined by the researcher. The researcher defines 
nominalist network boundaries “by imposing an a priori conceptual framework that 
serves an analytic or theoretical purpose for a particular project” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, 
p. 16). This nominalist approach is consistent with Edquist’s assertion that the boundary 
for an innovation system “depends on the object of study” (Edquist, 1997, p. 12). For this 
reason, I follow a nominalist approach to boundary specification. I specify a network 
boundary by imposing an innovation systems conceptual framework, allowing me to 
establish a set of inclusion rules that define the network boundary (Laumann et al., 1983). 
Laumann et al. (1983) outline four nominalist strategies for boundary specification. 
Two of these strategies align with the innovation systems conceptual framework. The first 
and most obvious way to specify the boundaries of an innovation system network is to 
use a “nodal attributes” strategy (Laumann et al., 1983) which restricts the network to 
                                                 
21  Note that Laumann et al. (1983) use the concepts “nominalist” and “realist” differently 
than other scholars (cf. Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
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certain kinds of nodes. Laumann et al. (1983) present the work of Galaskiewicz (1979a, 
1979b) as an exemplar of this strategy. Galaskiewicz (1979a, 1979b) used a combination 
of geographic and industry criterion to bound his study of inter-organizational networks 
in a small city (Galaskiewicz, 1979a, 1979b). On the surface, this boundary setting 
approach appears perfectly suited to the study of a regional-sectoral innovation system. 
However, the nodal attributes strategy is only appropriate for the geographic boundary of 
my system, not the “industry” boundary. It is quite simple to set inclusion criteria based 
on an organization’s geographic location. The next chapter will describe how my 
interviews with five ocean science and technology experts in Halifax confirmed that a 
provincial boundary—Nova Scotia—was more appropriate for this study than a sub-
provincial or ultra-provincial boundary22. A different strategy is needed to establish a 
sectoral boundary. 
In previous chapters I have outlined the sectoral context of this study as the field of 
ocean science instrumentalities which includes both scientific instruments and scientific 
techniques. Using the term “instrumentalities,” de Solla Price (1984) argued that 
communities of scientists and technicians that collaborate on scientific instrumentality 
innovation are “bound together in their invisible colleges” (p. 15). In this way, the 
scientific instrumentalities sector defies—or “crosses”—the boundary between science 
and industry (Kaufmann & Tödtling, 2001). The sector does not conform to any standard 
                                                 
22  Some readers might argue that the appropriate boundaries for any study of ocean 
science and technology should correspond with the geography of the ocean. For 
example, one might argue that my study should be focused on a North Atlantic 
geography. However, the ocean does not impose institutional rules the way that 
provincial or national governments do. 
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industry classification system. Above I suggest that the field of ocean science crosses 
traditional scientific boundaries because it encompasses the full range of chemical, 
biological and physical scientific investigations of the ocean and its contents. The field of 
ocean science instrumentalities is a subset of a scientific instruments sector and a subset 
of an ocean technologies sector. However, given the lack of coherence in defining ocean 
technologies (see Chapter 3), it is not possible to rely upon “a collectively shared 
subjective awareness” (Laumann et al., 1983, p. 21) of this sector. There are nominalist 
grounds by which to establish a sectoral network boundary, but not realist grounds by 
which the actors will naturally identify a boundary themselves. They may identify as 
being part of an ocean technology industry, not an ocean science instrumentality sector. 
 Above, I suggest that the term “sector” should not always be used interchangeably 
with the concept of a socio-technical regime (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014) when it 
comes to specifying an ocean science instrumentalities system boundary because the 
terms sector and industry both tend to be applied in a way that separates public and 
private sector organizations. Sectors are often defined based upon standard product or 
industry classifications (e.g., NAICS, SIC), which separate public organizations from 
goods producing firms. Indeed, the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) makes this separation at the first-digit level (Statistics Canada, 2012). However, 
a “socio-technical” or “technological” regime (Breschi, Malerba, & Orsenigo, 2000; 
Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982) is a broader concept that 
represents an institutional field (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 
2014) in which “a system of firms [emphasis added]” (Breschi & Malerba, 1997, p. 131) 
are connected  
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through processes of interaction and cooperation in artefact-technology 
development and through processes of competition and selection in innovative and 
market activities. (Breschi & Malerba, 1997, p. 131) 
 
A socio-technical regime can therefore be identified based on its formal institutional 
boundary, such as the unique regulatory environment found in financial services sectors, 
or based on the interactions that are shaped by a combination of formal and informal 
institutions. Since the ocean science instrumentalities sector does not have a readily 
identifiable formal institutional boundary, the best approach is to identify this institutional 
field by way of the activities that it shapes. Returning to North’s (1990) sports metaphor, 
my approach is like finding the limits of a football field by observing the players in 
action.  
Fixing the sectoral system boundary therefore requires a particular boundary 
specification strategy. The “event or activity” strategy from network science (Laumann et 
al., 1983) involves setting network inclusion rules based on participation in a certain kind 
of activity. Laumann et al. (1983) present the work of Crane (1972) and Burt (1978) on 
scientific invisible colleges as exemplars of this boundary specification strategy. In this 
research, members of an invisible college network were “identified on the basis of their 
interest in a particular field of research, irrespective of their disciplinary label” (p. 28). 
This boundary specification strategy can be applied to a scientific instrumentalities sector 
in a similar way. The boundary can be established on the basis of an organization’s 
engagement with a particular field of scientific instrumentalities, regardless of any other 
industry or disciplinary labels. In this dissertation, the sectoral boundary therefore 
includes organizations that have engaged in inter-organizational interactive learning for 
the purposes of using and/or producing ocean science instrumentalities. To ensure that the 
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network captures present-day context, a temporal filter of the past five years will also be 
applied to this activity-based inclusion rule. Gilsing et al. (2008) and Casper (2007) both 
provide rationale for a five-year research window when studying innovation networks. 
The preceding discussion has established rules by which a particular regional-
sectoral innovation system can be conceived as a network for analytical purposes. 
Participants in this network can be identified on the basis of their geographic presence—
the regional boundary—and their interactive learning activities in a particular 
technological regime during a particular period of time—the sectoral boundary. The 
interactive learning network that I examine therefore includes organizations that: 
(1)  operate in Nova Scotia; and  
(2)  (a) interacted with external organizations in some way,  
 (b) for the purposes of using and/or producing ocean science instrumentalities,  
 (c) in the past 5 years.  
 
This inclusion rule mixes together nodal attribute and activity-based boundary 
specification strategies indicating which organizations will be included as nodes in the 
network analysis of this innovation system. Note that the rule was carefully constructed 
so that neither public nor private organizations would be excluded.  
Laumann et al. (1983) suggest that mixing multiple boundary definitions can lead to 
“theoretically elegant definitions of membership” (p. 24), but researchers should be 
careful to ensure that they do not inadvertently fix the network features they intend to 
investigate—either the nodes or edges (Laumann et al., 1983). For my purposes, the types 
of organizations and the types of relations must both be “free to vary” (Laumann et al., 
1983, p. 20). The hypotheses developed earlier in this chapter position network relations 
and relational structures as dependent variables. Indeed, because interactive learning is at 
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the theoretical core of the innovation systems approach (Lundvall, 2013), the default 
focus of any innovation system network analysis should be on the learning interactions. 
The inclusion rule above allows for the identification of organizations based partly on 
their learning interactions. However, the network boundary must also be specified in a 
way that allows these interactions to vary empirically.  
One final boundary specification rule is therefore needed to specify the range of 
theoretically-appropriate relations that will be included in the network analysis of this 
innovation system. This may appear unusual to those who study innovation systems, but 
network analysis requires inclusion rules for both the actors in the network and the types 
of relations in the network (Laumann et al., 1983). Such rules are easily drawn from my 
earlier theoretical discussion of interactive learning. My typology of interactive learning 
relationships (Table 1) provides a comprehensive list of the seven kinds of relationships 
that should be included in this network. Any two nodes in the network could be 
interacting in one or more ways, or they might not be interacting in any of these ways at 
all. The network boundary does not include relationships that fall outside this channels of 
interactive learning framework. For example, two organizations might both belong to 
their local chamber of commerce, but this common membership would not be considered 
an interactive learning relationship.  
Summary of the Analytical Framework 
In this chapter, I built upon the theory and context introduced earlier in the 
dissertation to establish an analytical framework. The analytical framework uses 
constructs from network science to frame the analysis of an innovation system (see the 
Glossary of Terms that follows Chapter 7). In this chapter, I emphasized three important 
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analytical moves. These are illustrated in Figure 5. First, I differentiated between key 
components of an innovation system: organizations, learning interactions, and the 
institutional environment. Then I framed the contents of an innovation system—the 
organizations and their interactions—as a network (note that Figure 5 contains a 
simplified three-node network). Key methods and measures were introduced related to the 
analysis of network positions, network composition, and network dynamics. These 
concepts were used to reformulate Propositions 1 through 4 as hypotheses for testing in a 
network analysis (see Figure 5 and Table 5). Finally, I developed inclusion rules for the 
organizations and relations that fall within a theoretically-justified network boundary. The 
network boundary includes organizations that operate in Nova Scotia and interacted with 
external organizations through the five channels of interactive learning for the purposes of 
using or producing ocean science instruments or techniques in the past five years. The 
analytical framework developed in this chapter provides the necessary foundation for data 
collection in Chapter 5. 
 
OCEAN SCIENCE INSTRUMENTALITIES  119 
 
Figure 5. Analytical framework for understanding the importance of public organizations 
for ocean science instrumentality innovation in Nova Scotia, Canada. Author’s own work. 
 
  
OCEAN SCIENCE INSTRUMENTALITIES  120 
Table 5 
Restating Theoretical Propositions as Hypotheses for Network Analysis 
Theoretical Propositions Hypotheses 
P1 Public research organizations 
are the most important actors in 
a scientific instrumentality 
innovation system. 
H1 Public research organizations have 
significantly greater average degree 
centrality than all other types of 
organizations in a scientific 
instrumentalities interactive learning 
network. 
P2 The interactive learning 
between PROs and scientific 
instrumentality companies 
involves multiple channels and 
is bidirectional. 
H2 Within a scientific instrumentalities 
interactive learning network, relations 
between PROs and private companies are  
multiplex and bidirectional. 
P3 The most important interactive 
learning channels for scientific 
instrumentality innovation 
involve the provision and 
acquisition of capital equipment 
and technical services. 
H3 The presence of a capital equipment and 
technical services interaction significantly 
and positively predicts the edge 
betweenness of a relationship in a 
scientific instrumentalities interactive 
learning network. 
P4 A scientific instrumentalities 
innovation system is more 
susceptible to the loss of public 
research organizations than to 
the loss of other types of 
organizations. 
H4 Removing individual PROs from a 
scientific instrumentalities interactive 
learning network results in significantly 
greater distance-weighted fragmentation 
than removing other types of 
organizations. 
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Chapter 5: Method 
For this study, I collected data on interorganizational interactive learning in the field 
of ocean science instrumentalities in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada. This chapter 
describes the methods I used to collect a quality network dataset that includes both public 
and private organizations. I collected data from July 2016 to February 2017 using a “fixed 
list” approach (Doreian & Woodard, 1992) and a “personal-network research design” 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). Interviews with five system-level experts (see Appendix B) 
yielded a list of 27 organizations that met the boundary specification criteria. I 
interviewed key informants from public and private organizations using the same 
structured questionnaire (Appendix C). When all interviews were complete, I aggregated 
the responses into a whole network dataset containing the variables that are described 
near the end of this chapter. I conclude this chapter with a description of the steps that I 
took to ensure validity and reliability of the data.  
Research Design 
Fixed list approach. In Chapter 4, I developed a nominalist boundary specification 
(Laumann et al., 1983) for the ocean science instrumentalities interactive learning 
network in Nova Scotia (hereafter called, “the network”). Now I will describe the specific 
technique that I used to identify the nodes and edges that fall within this network 
boundary, a technique commonly referred to as a “fixed list” approach (Doreian & 
Woodard, 1992). For the purposes of this study, the fixed list approach is more 
appropriate than the alternative— an “expanding set” approach (Doreian & Woodard, 
1992). The expanding set approach is often simply referred to as snowball selection or 
snowball sampling (Doreian & Woodard, 1992). The fixed list approach has practical 
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advantages over the snowball approach; it is also the appropriate choice for research 
focused on the relations and relational structures of a network.  
A fixed list approach involves setting an a priori list of network nodes and then 
collecting data on the presence or absence of relations between those nodes. It means that 
the network nodes are fixed, but the relations between them are variable. This fixed list 
approach is consistent with the boundary specification rules developed in Chapter 4 
which were designed so that organizational legal forms can vary and, more importantly, 
the network can include a range of interactive learning relationships between dyads—or, 
for some dyads, no relations at all.  
Laumann et al. (1983) suggest that snowball sampling should not be used for 
research that investigates certain relational structures of networks, such as those 
investigated in this study. Indeed, a snowball selection approach would not allow the 
same focus on interactive learning relations and structures. Using snowball selection 
means following chains of relations to identify previously latent nodes. After the first 
wave of snowball sampling, the relations that have been sampled become fixed. These 
relations are then used to identify and sample additional nodes in subsequent snowball 
waves. This systematic error can culminate in tautological results; as Lauman et al. 
(1983) explain, “it is scarcely informative to learn that a network constructed by a 
snowball sampling procedure is well connected or ‘integrated’” (p. 22). Using snowball 
selection would have introduced such a tautology in this study because the robustness and 
fragmentation dynamics of a network depend upon its connectedness. Any network will 
appear more robust if constructed through snowball selection rather than a fixed list 
approach. 
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There are also practical advantages to using a fixed list approach. The fixed list 
approach avoids potential errors associated with the data cleaning stage of snowball 
selection (Doreian & Woodard, 1992). It allows for the use of a roster recall interview 
technique providing respondents with a pre-defined list of other organizations in the 
network which limits respondent biases (Borgatti et al., 2013; Doreian & Woodard, 
1992). Finally, the fixed list approach is much less resource intensive than the snowball 
selection approach (Doreian & Woodard, 1992) because it focuses data collection 
resources on sampling the core of a network.  
As Patrick Doreian and Katherine Woodard (1992) explain, “one of the advantages 
of the fixed sample design is that it concentrates on the core” (p. 224). Through their 
research on a regional network of mental health service organizations, Doreian and 
Woodard (1992) demonstrate that a fixed list approach captures the core of a network, but 
fails to capture its “context”—the periphery. A network can be said to have core-
periphery structure when it contains a core group of nodes that are densely interconnected 
and a peripheral set of nodes that are loosely connected to the core and relatively 
disconnected from one another. Core-periphery structures are common and well-
documented in research on innovation networks (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Giuliani, 
2013; Giuliani & Bell, 2005; Kudic, Ehrenfeld, & Pusch, 2015; Rank, Rank, & Wald, 
2006; G. Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). Some studies suggest that isolated or loosely 
connected nodes in a network periphery could be important for creativity and innovation 
(Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Kudic et al., 2015). Generally however, positions in the 
network core are seen as more valuable for innovation because they provide better access 
to knowledge in the network (Giuliani, 2013; Giuliani & Bell, 2005; Kudic et al., 2015; 
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Rank et al., 2006). The core of an innovation network includes “…key members of the 
community, including many who act as network coordinators and have developed dense 
connections between themselves” (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008, p. 826). This idea is 
consistent with research suggesting that organizations in the core of an innovation 
network have significantly greater absorptive capacities than those in the periphery 
(Giuliani & Bell, 2005). Furthermore, several studies have shown that innovation 
networks develop core-periphery structures over time and these structures then become 
stable and relatively fixed (Giuliani, 2013; Kudic et al., 2015; Rank et al., 2006; G. 
Walker et al., 1997). This research therefore suggests that the core of an innovation 
network may be the most dynamic site for interactive learning. 
Following on this research, my study focuses on the core network of ocean science 
instrumentality innovation in Nova Scotia. Because the core network is the most highly 
connected portion of a wider network, all the most highly connected nodes will be found 
within it. Remember, hypothesis 1 states that PROs are the most highly connected nodes. 
Also, because the core is densely connected, it is the most robust portion of any wider 
network. Hypothesis 4 states that the removal of PROs results in greater fragmentation 
than the removal of companies. In other words, the network will be more robust in the 
face of lost companies than lost PROs. The core network is therefore an appropriate 
context for investigating the hypotheses in this study.  
The disadvantage of focusing on the core network is that any peripheral nodes are 
excluded which may introduce bias in certain network measures. However, Doreian and 
Woodard (1992) found that even betweenness centrality, which measures a node’s 
position with respect to all other nodes in a network, was strongly correlated (R2 = 0.57 
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and 0.89) for two studies where they were able to compare a fixed list approach—a core 
network with no periphery—to a snowball selection approach—a core network plus 
periphery. They also found that a fixed list approach “underreports the extent to which the 
agencies in the fixed list belong to the core” (p. 225). In other words, focusing on a core 
network does have an effect on network measures, but the effect is an understatement 
rather than a misstatement of the core nodes’ centrality in the network. Overall, a fixed 
list approach is preferable to a snowball selection approach because it avoids a potential 
tautology, introduces fewer chances for error, is less resource intensive, and identifies a 
core network, which is the appropriate context for testing the hypotheses in this study.  
Construction of the fixed list. I used a “system-level informant free-list” technique 
(Borgatti et al., 2013) to identify the fixed list of organizations in the network. Based on 
media reports, attendance at sector events, and personal networks, I identified all 
individuals based in Halifax whose work responsibilities included understanding and 
supporting the ocean science and technology sector. These five individuals are hereafter 
called the system experts. Three of these individuals held industry policy roles—one in a 
federal organization and two in different provincial agencies—and two held sector 
support roles in separate not-for-profit organizations. I invited these individuals to 
participate in an interview and presented them with a research consent agreement (see 
Appendix D). I then conducted structured interviews with these individuals using a touch 
screen computer running the network data collection platform EgoWeb 2.0 . Screenshots 
of the full interview instrument can be found in Appendix B. At the outset of each 
interview, ocean science instrumentalities were defined on-screen and read aloud as: 
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- Scientific instruments (such as hydrophones that can be used for collecting data on 
marine life); and 
- Research techniques (such as methods for processing data from those hydrophones). 
- But this does not include new marketing or organizational techniques (such as the 
way hydrophones are packaged for sale or the way human resources are managed). 
The system experts were then asked to identify organizations involved in using and 
producing ocean science instrumentalities in this region. This was a free-recall task: the 
experts each independently named relevant organizations, except for one expert who 
engaged a colleague in helping to establish a complete list. Following on the best 
practices in network data collection, I used elicitation prompts to ensure that a range of 
organizations were identified (Brewer, 2000). The experts were prompted to include 
academic, private-sector, government23, and not-for-profit organizations. The concept of a 
kind-of-activity unit was described on screen and read aloud as follows: 
For the purposes of this study, an organization is not necessarily a standalone legal 
entity. In many cases, the parent organization (e.g., Saint Mary's University) is less 
relevant to this study than a particular department, unit, or division (e.g., the Sobey 
School of Business). An operating unit can be considered an “organization” if it 
engages in one kind of activity and has some decision-making autonomy (OECD, 
2005). 
 
It can be challenging to identify appropriate regional innovation system boundaries 
in Canadian contexts (Holbrook & Wolfe, 2000). Particularly in Atlantic Canada, one 
must consider whether the maritime provinces constitute one region or three regions 
                                                 
23  In all interviews, I used the colloquial label “government” and avoided engaging 
respondents in a complex theoretical discussion about the public/private distinction. 
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(Holbrook & Wolfe, 2000). There is also increasing emphasis on major cities as the 
appropriate contexts for regional innovation system research in Canada (Wolfe, 2014). To 
this end, the five experts were given latitude to define the regional boundary based on 
their understandings of the innovation system context. The experts were not directly 
asked to identify the region, but rather were asked to name appropriate organizations “in 
this region.” All five experts named a key organization outside the city of Halifax. Four 
experts restricted their lists to organizations in Nova Scotia. The fifth expert included 
organizations located elsewhere in Atlantic Canada, including organizations in New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador. Based on the majority opinion of the 
experts, the innovation system’s regional boundary was confirmed to be the Province of 
Nova Scotia. 
Organizations were included in the fixed list of network nodes if they were named 
by the majority of experts. In other words, all those organizations that were named by 
three or more experts were included in the fixed list (see Table 6). All five experts 
independently named the same 11 organizations. An additional six organizations were 
named by four experts, and 10 were named by three experts. In total, the five experts 
named 126 organizations: 60 public organizations and 66 private companies. All 
academic, government, and not-for-profit organizations that were named were classified 
as public organizations (per the criteria from Perry & Rainey, 1988). The first four 
experts named between 25 and 40 organizations each, while the fifth expert named 92. 
The fifth expert named disproportionately more organizations because they defined the 
regional boundary differently. 
Table 6 
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Levels of Agreement Among Experts 
 
Level of Expert Agreement Organizations 
No agreement (One expert: 20%) 72 
2 Experts Agree (40% agreement) 27 
3 Experts Agree (60%) 10 
4 Experts Agree (80%) 6 
All 5 Experts Agree (100%) 11 




Number of Ocean Science Instrumentality Organizations Identified by Experts 
 
Expert No. of Orgs. 
Agreement with other Experts 
2 or more others 1 other No others 
#1 32 18 6 8 
#2 25 19 5 1 
#3 28 17 7 4 
#4 40 19 15 6 
#5 92 23 16 53 
Total 126 27 27 72 
Note. Totals indicate the number of unique organizations named. 
There were important differences in the ways that the experts spoke about 
Dalhousie University and the Nova Scotia Community College. One expert named 
Dalhousie University as a key organization, but not all kind-of-activity units (KAUs) 
within the university engage in using or producing ocean science instrumentalities. The 
four other experts all named the university’s Oceanography Department and three of the 
experts named another specific KAU that remains confidential in this study. I gave the 
fifth expert the benefit of the doubt; I assumed that this expert would have named both of 
these units, if he had been able to name specific KAUs. The Oceanography Department is 
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included among those organizations named by all five experts and the other KAU is 
included among those organizations named by four experts.  
Similarly, three experts named the Nova Scotia Community College (NSCC) as a 
key organization, but were unable to identify specific KAUs in the college that engage in 
using or producing ocean science instrumentalities. The other two experts could identify 
specific KAUs and they both named the Applied Geomatics Research Group at Annapolis 
Valley Campus, and the ocean science and technology operations at the NSCC 
Waterfront Campus—one expert called this the “waterfront program” and the other called 
it the “advanced diploma program.” There are indeed two closely-related KAUs at the 
NSCC Waterfront Campus that are engaged in using and producing ocean science 
instrumentalities: the NSCC Advanced Diploma in Ocean Technologies is a training 
program for ocean technologists and the NSCC Applied Oceans Research Group is a 
research laboratory partly funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada. These three KAUs at NSCC were therefore treated as if they would 
have been named by the other experts, if those experts had been able to name specific 
KAUs within the college. However, three other KAUs at NSCC were named by expert 4 
but not by any other expert. Since these were only named by one expert, they were not 
included in the fixed list. 
A different issue arose with the Bedford Institute of Oceanography (BIO). All five 
experts identified BIO as a relevant organization. However, BIO is technically a 
Government of Canada campus: it consists of buildings owned by the Department of 
Public Works and Government Services. Multiple public organizations are tenants at the 
site. The Bedford Institute of Oceanography is a collection of buildings, not a legal 
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organization or a KAU. The KAUs present at BIO are regional divisions of two federal 
departments: the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the Geological Survey 
of Canada Atlantic—a KAU of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan). These were both 
included on the fixed list as BIO-DFO and BIO-NRCan. 
The fixed list did not include organizations that were named by only one or two of 
the experts. Seventy-eight organizations were named by only one of the five experts—the 
other four experts did not identify these organizations. This included 53 organizations that 
were named only by Expert 5—58% of the organizations named by this expert. This 
expert named 23 organizations outside of Nova Scotia, 15 organizations in other sectors 
such as shipbuilding and offshore energy, and 15 public organizations that are not 
involved in using or producing scientific instruments.  
An additional 27 organizations were named by only two experts—the other three 
experts did not identify these organizations. This number includes four units of Dalhousie 
University and three campuses of NSCC that were each only named by one expert, but 
treated as if they had been named by two, per the discussion above. This number also 
includes four non-research public organizations and one industry association that all 
clearly support the sector, but are not involved in using or producing scientific 
instrumentalities. Four of these were the workplaces of the experts, but interestingly, none 
of the experts identified his or her own organization as being qualified to participate in 
the study.  
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In short, there were 99 organizations mentioned during individual expert interviews 
that did not meet the threshold for inclusion on the fixed list24; the majority of experts did 
not identify these organizations. There are three potential reasons why an organization 
may have been named by only a minority of experts. First, one or more experts may have 
forgotten to name an organization. However, experts were selected based on their 
specialized knowledge of the ocean science and technology sector, they knew in advance 
that the interview would be focused on identifying relevant organizations, and elicitation 
prompts were used during the expert interviews to reduce the risk of forgetting (Brewer, 
2000). The second possibility is that a minority of experts mistakenly named 
organizations that do not meet the inclusion criteria. This clearly occurred in several 
examples above, and in the case of Expert 5 using broader regional inclusion criteria than 
the other experts. It is not appropriate to include such organizations in this study because 
doing so would introduce false-positive node inclusion errors (Wang, Shi, McFarland, & 
Leskovec, 2012). A third possibility is that some organizations named by only a minority 
of experts do meet the inclusion criteria, but are peripheral to the network. Peripheral 
organizations might be new entrants to the network and/or they might be relatively less 
engaged in interactive learning about scientific instrumentalities in Nova Scotia. It is 
plausible that three or four experts might have been unaware of organizations in the 
loosely-connected periphery of the network. If this is the case, excluding those 
organizations from the study is consistent with a focus on the core of the network.  
                                                 
24 Fifty-four of these were private companies and forty-five were public organizations. 
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To test my fixed list approach, I conducted interviews with five of the organizations 
that were excluded from the list. In these interviews, I confirmed that four of these 
organizations did not meet the boundary specification criteria developed in Chapter 4. 
The fifth was the Bras d’Or Institute, a small research unit with three full-time equivalent 
employees at Cape Breton University (CBU). The Bras d’Or Institute is physically 
located within the Verschuren Centre for Sustainability at CBU. The Verschuren Centre 
was included in the fixed list because it was named by three experts, while the Bras d’Or 
Institute was not—it was only named by two experts. Overall, these five interviews 
supported the argument that the organizations named by a minority of experts either do 
not fall within the network boundary specification or are peripheral actors in the network. 
Data Collection 
I identified key informants for all 27 organizations on the fixed list. The key 
informants were either the head of the organization (e.g., President, CEO, Executive 
Director) or a vice-head with sufficient knowledge of the organization’s research and 
development activities (e.g., Vice President, Director). These individuals were invited to 
participate in an interview and presented with a research consent agreement (see 
Appendix E) based on the best practices template developed by Borgatti and Molina 
(2005). This consent agreement was reviewed and approved by the research ethics boards 
at both Saint Mary’s University and Acadia University (see Appendix F). The consent 
agreements for expert interviews (Appendix D) and organizational key informant 
interviews (Appendix E) were similar in form. They followed a standard format, and 
included additional detail on the nature of network research and the risks of participating 
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in such research, as suggested by Borgatti and Molina (2005) and Borgatti et al. (2013). 
With respect to confidentiality, the consent agreement specified that 
All data obtained from private sector companies will be kept confidential and will 
only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined statistics and 
by representing all private companies using one common colour/shape on network 
diagrams). No one other than the primary investigator and supervisor listed above 
will have access to the data about individual interviewees and the data about private 
companies. Data about public and not-for-profit organizations will be treated as 
public-record (i.e., not confidential), except where relationships with private sector 
companies are noted. To protect the strategic interests of private companies, this 
data will remain confidential. (Informed Consent Agreement 2—see Appendix E) 
 
The consent agreement included a sample network graph which was used at the outset of 
each interview to explain the risk that private sector organizations may be identifiable in 
the research outputs. Given sufficient knowledge of the research context, an informed 
reader may be able to infer the names of particular network participants from their 
relations or positions on a network graph (Borgatti et al., 2013). This consent agreement 
was signed by all participants. 
I opted to perform all interviews face-to-face. To that end, two interviews were 
conducted via Skype and the remainder were conducted in-person at the respondents’ 
offices. Face-to-face interviews are the most effective approach to collecting network data 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). The lower response rate from survey approaches tends to introduce 
non-response bias in network studies, but this can be addressed by establishing rapport in 
face-to-face interviews (Borgatti et al., 2013). Self-completion surveys are also limited 
because the researcher is unable to improve data collection through prompts and probes 
(Bryman, Bell, Mills, & Yue, 2011). Conversely, face-to-face interviews allow the 
researcher to ensure clarity and encourage completion through prompts (Bryman et al., 
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2011). In short, face-to-face interviews improve network data collection by increasing 
rapport and allowing greater elicitation of network data (Borgatti et al., 2013).  
I conducted face-to-face interviews with key informants from 25 of the 27 
organizations on the fixed list. Only two of the 27 organizations on the fixed list did not 
participate in an interview. After multiple interview requests, senior officials at one 
private company and one academic PRO did not respond. To maintain confidentiality, 
these two organizations are unnamed in my work. 
As with the preliminary round of expert interviews, the organizational key 
informant interviews were conducted using a touch screen computer running the network 
data collection platform EgoWeb 2.0 ("EgoWeb,"). Draft interview questions were 
reviewed by the five system-level experts and then revised to clarify language, expedite 
data entry, and better reflect the context of ocean science and technology. The same 
structured interview questions were used for all types of organizations—private 
companies, PROs, other public organizations, and not-for-profit organizations. Interviews 
ranged from approximately 30 to 90 minutes in length. Screenshots of the full interview 
instrument can be found in Appendix C. 
To reduce interviewee burden, the interviews did not include superfluous questions 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). Respondents first signed the consent agreement and confirmed 
tombstone data, including their organization’s official name, their email address, and 
whether or not they consented to being contacted with project updates or for future 
studies. The interview then consisted of seven components. First, respondents were asked 
simple questions about (1) the type of organization they were representing: academic, 
government research, other government, private company, not-for-profit; (2) the total 
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number of full-time equivalent employees working at the organization, and the number 
working in research & development; (3) the kinds of outputs the organization produced 
over the previous five years and the novelty of those outputs; and (4) whether there had 
been any changes to the way these outputs were produced over the previous five years, 
and the novelty of those changes. The majority of time in each interview was devoted to 
the final three components, which elicited the network data.  
The final three components took up the majority of the time allotted for each 
interview, and followed a standard “personal-network research design” (Borgatti et al., 
2013). This personal-network research design produces ego-network data: data on the 
network of alters, or relations, around each ego, or focal organization. A standard 
personal-network interview instrument includes two phases of network questions: a name 
generator questions to establish a list of alters, followed by name interpreter questions to 
collect data about the alters and about ego’s relationships with them. For this study, the 
name generator used a roster recall approach. The roster recall approach involves 
prompting interviewees with a pre-defined list of network participants. Roster recall is not 
only consistent with a fixed list approach, but it eliminates respondent recall error and 
limits the biases associated with the probability that one network actor will select another 
network actor (Borgatti et al., 2013; J. C. Johnson, Boster, & Palinkas, 2003). The 
alternative approach—free recall—would only be preferable if the research question 
required an unrestricted set of alters and if the research design used snowball selection 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). 
Each respondent was presented with a roster that included the 27 organizations on 
the fixed list, plus the 20 additional organizations that were named by only two experts. 
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Respondents were asked to review the roster and identify those organizations on the 
roster that their organization usually interacted with over the past five years (part 5 of the 
interview).  
Each interview concluded with name interpreter questions (parts 6 and 7 of the 
interview). The EgoWeb software (Kennedy & McCarty, 2016) and touch-screen 
computer interface facilitated a smooth name interpreter process. The name interpreter 
questions were presented as grids that contained all selected alters as rows and the 
response options as columns (see Figure 5). This multigrid format has an important 
psychological effect on respondents because it appears short, compact, and less 
burdensome than alternative presentations (Borgatti et al., 2013). Participants appeared 
comfortable with the touch screen interface: many collaborated with me to enter their 
responses into the system. 
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Figure 6. Screenshot of the multigrid interactive learning relationships component of the 
interview instrument, in EgoWeb 2.0 (2016). 
 
For the second name interpreter question, the seven types of interactive learning 
relationships identified in Chapter 2, Table 2 were used. All relations that can have 
directionality were presented twice. For example, respondents could say that they 
licensed or transferred intellectual property to an alter organization, and/or that they 
licensed or transferred intellectual property from an alter organization. This meant that 
respondents could choose from among the 
10 different interactions listed in Figure 5 above, and select all that applied. On the 
following screen, they were provided with an opportunity to identify other types of 
interactions that were not listed. Respondents typically wanted to use the “other” field to 
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provide additional description of relationships that were already captured under one of the 
10 categories in Figure 5. However, two additional types of relations were captured 
multiple times in the “other” field: financial contributions and association memberships. 
In the first case, respondents noted loans, grants, and other financial support received 
from various public organizations. In the second case, they noted their membership status 
in the Ocean Technology Council of Nova Scotia and other not-for-profit associations. 
For each of these financial and membership relationships, probes were used to ensure that 
the appropriate interactive learning relationships had been selected on the previous 
screen. For example, if an association membership coincided with informal learning 
interactions then that relation was selected. In some cases, public financing and 
association memberships did not coincide with any interactive learning relations, so that 
pair of organizations was not considered to have a relationship in the interactive learning 
network (see discussion on the relationship boundary specification in Chapter 4). 
Personal-network research designs sometimes include an optional third phase of 
name interrelator questions that collects data on the connections between alters. However, 
including this third phase of questions introduces considerable interviewee burden 
because it is time-intensive (Borgatti et al., 2013). Rather than using a name interrelator 
to collect nearly identical whole networks from each respondent, I used the common 
approach of aggregating ego-alter data across all respondents (Borgatti et al., 2013). This 
approach involved overlaying and merging network data from multiple respondents into 
one whole network that includes all respondents and the relations among them. A 
convenient by-product of this process is triangulation of the network data, which 
contributes to increased data reliability (Borgatti et al., 2013).  
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Data Management 
Handling of missing data. This data fusion also provides an opportunity to reliably 
reconstruct minimal levels of missing data (Huisman, 2009; Stork & Richards, 1992). 
This reconstruction is possible because the responses provided by each respondent 
overlap with missing values from each non-respondent. Huisman (2009) demonstrated 
that reconstruction corrects for the effects of nonresponse in network data. As noted 
above, only two of the 27 organizations on the fixed list did not participate in an 
interview. However, all 25 participating organizations provided data on their relations, or 
lack of relations, with the non-respondent organizations. These two nodes can therefore 
be included in the network, as data was collected on 25 of their 26 possible relationships.  
In compiling my data, I addressed three minor limitations of the missing data. First, 
the attributes of each organization—age, size, geographic location, and R&D intensity—
had to be identified from publicly accessible secondary sources rather than self-reports. 
This data was publicly available for the nonresponding PRO. It was also publicly 
available for the nonresponding company, except for the proportion of FTEs that 
company devoted to R&D. The average R&D intensity for private companies (41%) was 
imputed for this company, but as I point out in the next chapter, the R&D intensity 
variable was dropped from my analysis because it was not a significant predictor. The 
missing value for R&D intensity was not consequential. 
The second limitation was that the relationship between the two non-respondent 
organizations could not be reconstructed. I did not have data about interactive learning 
between the two nonresponding organizations. This meant that 2 of the 702 possible 
relations—0.003% of the observations—were missing from the network dataset. Many 
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studies have examined the impact of missing observations for network analysis (Borgatti, 
Carley, & Krackhardt, 2006; Kossinets, 2006; Stork & Richards, 1992; Wang et al., 2012) 
and a variety of modelling techniques have been developed to address such missing 
observations (Huisman, 2009; Robins, Pattison, & Woolcock, 2004; Ward, Hoff, & 
Lofdahl, 2003; Žnidaršič, Ferligoj, & Doreian, 2012). Because only one dyadic 
relationship was missing from my data, I did not engage in computer-aided modelling of 
the missing data. Instead, I conducted all analyses twice: first with the relationship 
recorded as “0” and then with the relationship recorded as “1”. Because there was no 
significant difference in the results under these two scenarios, I report the more 
conservative assumption—the absence of an interactive learning relationship. 
The third limitation was that the relationships between the responding and 
nonresponding organizations—7.1% of the 702 observations—could not be not 
triangulated; I do not know whether responses from the nonresponding organizations 
would have matched the responses from the responding organizations in the network. 
However, research on reliability issues in network data suggests that working with the 
non-triangulated data is acceptable (Stork & Richards, 1992). Stork and Richards (1992) 
explain that it is appropriate to reconstruct up to 40% of the data in a network, provided 
that nonrespondents are not systematically different from respondents and the 
confirmation rate between respondents is at least moderate. Both conditions are 
favourable in this study. The two nonresponding organizations each have 10-12 peer 
organizations in the network—other similar companies and PROs, all of which operate in 
the same region and the same socio-technical regime. Furthermore, the confirmation rate 
between respondents was high: in 86% of cases, both parties agreed on the presence or 
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absence of an interactive learning relationship. Stork and Richards (1992) do not provide 
criteria for assessing the strength of confirmation rates, but Robins et al. (2004) argue that 
38% is high. They then demonstrate a reconstruction approach for network data with a 
90% confirmation rate (Robins et al., 2004). The reconstruction approach is therefore 
appropriate to these circumstances, and the result is a whole network dataset that is 
missing less than 1% of the possible observations. 
Measures. Data was aggregated across interviews using the data manipulation 
functions in EgoWeb (Kennedy & McCarty, 2016), Microsoft Excel, and UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Data was first exported from EgoWeb (Kennedy & 
McCarty, 2016) in an edge-list comma-separated values (.csv) format and then imported 
to Excel for deidentification and data cleaning. During this process, the names of 
individual key informants and the names of private companies were replaced with 
nondescript alpha-numeric codes. Attribute data for organizations in the network was 
moved into a separate .csv spreadsheet (i.e., the nodal attribute sheet). The edge-list and 
nodal attribute sheets were then imported into UCINet (Borgatti et al., 2002) and this final 
piece of software provided the functions necessary to convert the spreadsheet data into a 
series of adjacency matrices. A careful step-wise approach was used to avoid data 
manipulation errors (Borgatti et al., 2013). The resulting dataset consists of 16 variables 
that are constructed as adjacency matrices and 3 variables that capture node attributes in 
simple arrays. Because there are 27 nodes in the network, the adjacency matrices all 
consist of 702 dyadic observations, n=(n-1). The measures are described below. 
(1) Master Relations Matrix. When any type of interactive learning relationship was 
reported between any two organizations in the network, this was entered as a value of “1” 
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in the appropriate cell of an undirected and symmetrical adjacency matrix called 
MASTER. When no relationships were reported between a pair of organizations, a value 
of “0” was entered in the corresponding cell in the matrix. Of the 351 dyads in this 
matrix, 225 pairs of organizations had engaged in some form of interactive learning over 
the previous five years and 125 pairs had not. A conservative approach was used for the 
one remaining relationship—the interaction between the two non-respondent 
organizations was imputed as “0” per the preceding discussion about the handling of 
missing data.  
(2) Degree Centrality Array. Degree centrality scores were calculated for each 
organization based on the master relations matrix. Degree centrality is the row sum of the 
matrix (Borgatti et al., 2013). These scores were recorded in a nodal attribute array called 
DEGREE. 
(3) Edge Betweenness Matrix. Edge betweenness scores were calculated for each 
edge in the master relations matrix. The value is a count of the number of times an edge 
lies on the shortest path between any two pairs of nodes (L. C. Freeman, 1977; Girvan & 
Newman, 2002). Where relations were not present in the master relations matrix, an edge 
betweenness score of “0” was recorded. Edge betweenness values were recorded in an 
undirected adjacency matrix called BETWEENNESS. 
(4-10) Types of Relations Matrices. Separate matrices were also constructed to 
capture each of the seven types of interactive learning relationships. These seven matrices 
are described in Table 8. Three of these matrices are not symmetrical because they 
capture interactive learning relationships that are directed. The other four matrices capture 
bidirectional flows and are therefore mathematically symmetrical and undirected. All 
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seven matrices were combined into a multiple matrix dataset called RELATIONS using 
the matrix operation functions in UCInet (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Rather than 
simulate all possible observations for the missing pair of organizations, the two 
corresponding observations were coded as missing in the RELATIONS matrix. 
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Table 8 
 














“We had a formal R&D 
contract, partnership, or 
sponsorship with...” 




“We licensed or 
transferred intellectual 
property to…” and “We 
licensed or transferred 
intellectual property to 
from...” 





individuals moved here 
from…” and 
“Knowledgeable 
individuals left here for...” 








“We formally shared 
information with...” 
FormalInfo Undirected 200 / 500 
“We maintained informal 
relationships with...” 





“We acquired equipment / 
services from...” and “We 
provided equipment / 
services to...” 
EquipServices Directed  148 / 552 
 
 (11)  Multiplex Relations Matrix. When any two or more types of interactive 
learning relationships were reported between any two organizations in the network, this 
was entered as a value of “1” in an undirected and symmetrical adjacency matrix called 
MULTIPLEX. When fewer than two types of interactive learning relationships were 
reported, a value of “0” was entered in the matrix. In other words, a multiplex tie was 
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observed if two organizations were connected in any two or more of the matrices listed in 
Table 8. Of the 350 dyads in this matrix, 152 pairs had engaged in multiplex interactive 
learning and 198 pairs had not. One pair was coded as missing. 
(12)  Bidirectional Relations Matrix. A bidirectional tie was observed for a pair of 
organizations if a relation was recorded in any of the bidirectional RELATIONS matrices: 
RandD, HRsharing, FormalInfo, or InformalInfo. A bidirectional tie was also observed 
when at least one in-flow and at least one out-flow were recorded in any of the directed 
RELATIONS matrices: IPflow, HRflow, or EquipServices. Based on these rules, an 
undirected and symmetrical adjacency matrix called BIDIRECTIONAL was constructed. 
Of the 350 dyads in this matrix, 112 pairs had engaged in bidirectional interactive 
learning and 238 pairs had not. One pair was coded as missing. 
(13) Geographic Proximity Matrix. The latitude and longitude of each 
organization’s place of business was determined by entering their civic address into the 
website http://www.latlong.net/. The spherical distance calculator in UCInet (Borgatti et 
al., 2002) was then used to produce a matrix of distances in kilometres between each pair 
of organizations. Eight pairs of participants were co-located at 0 km apart. The average 
distance between any two participants was 57.45 km (SD = 87.09 km), and the most 
distant pair was 410.63 km apart. Following Sorenson et al. (2006), distance values were 
rescaled using the formula, x = −1[log(distance)]. 
(14) Organization Type Array. Each respondent identified their organization as one 
of five types (values in parentheses were recorded in the interview software): a private 
company (1), an academic organization (university or college) (2), a government research 
organization (3), a non-research government organization (4), or a not-for-profit 
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organization (5). This data was recoded to produce the variable ORGTYPE. Private 
companies retained the value of “1”. Academic and government research organizations 
were recoded as PROs and assigned a value of “2”.  All other organizations were assigned 
a value of “3”. This coding scheme worked for all organizations except the Advanced 
Diploma in Ocean Technology Program (ADOT) at NSCC. The ADOT was classified as 
an academic organization, but it does not perform research. It was therefore recoded as an 
“other” type of organization, i.e., not a PRO. The ORGTYPE variable was recorded as a 
nodal attribute array in UCInet. 
(15) Public Research Organizations Array. Data on organizational types was further 
transformed to create a dummy-coded Boolean variable called PRO. In this nodal 
attribute array, all PROs were assigned a value of “1” and all other types of organization 
were assigned a value of “0”. The The PRO variable was recorded as a nodal attribute 
array in UCInet. 
(16) PRO-Industry Matrix. Based on ORGTYPE and PRO, a dummy-coded 
Boolean matrix variable was created with all possible relationships between PROs and 
companies coded as “1” and all other relations—e.g., PRO-PRO, Company-Company—
coded as “0”. This PRO-I variable was recorded as an adjacency matrix in UCInet. 
(17) Organization Age Matrix. The year of incorporation, registration, or 
establishment for each organization was identified from public online sources. The age of 
each organization was then calculated by subtracting from the base year, 2017. 
Organizational ages were first recorded in a nodal attribute array, then an adjacency 
matrix called AGE was constructed using the attribute-to-matrix function in UCInet. For 
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each pair of organizations, the lowest of the two age values was used to represent the 
number of years in which an interactive learning relationship could have formed.  
(18) Organization Size Matrix. Each respondent provided an estimate of the number 
of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees working for their organization in Nova Scotia. 
For the two non-respondent organizations, this data was available from public online 
sources. The number of FTEs was recorded in a nodal attribute array called SIZE. An 
adjacency matrix was then constructed using the attribute-to-matrix function in UCInet. 
Each cell in the matrix was calculated as the sum of the sizes for the two corresponding 
organizations. These values represent the number of FTEs potentially engaged in 
interactive learning across each edge. 
(19) R&D Intensity Matrix. Each respondent also provided an estimate of the 
number of FTE employees who were devoted to research and/or development activities. 
The number of FTEs devoted to R&D was divided by the total number of FTEs in the 
organization to produce an R&D intensity score. This score was recorded in a nodal 
attribute array called INTENSITY. As noted above, this data was publicly available for 
one of the nonresponding organizations and the other organization was assigned the 
average intensity score for its peers in the networ—i.e., the other private companies 
(41%). An adjacency matrix was then constructed using the attribute-to-matrix function in 
UCInet. Each cell in the matrix was calculated as the sum of the intensity scores for the 
two corresponding organizations. This is a proxy for the total absorptive capacity across 
each edge.  
Data quality. The internal validity of data was checked through respondent 
verification and data triangulation. After each interview, respondents received an email 
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thank you message with an attached output of the data they provided. Respondents were 
asked to reply with any errors or omissions. Four respondents corrected minor errors in 
the validity of the data they had provided during their interviews. An additional six 
respondents verified that there were no errors in the data they provided. As discussed 
above, the data from each organization was also triangulated against data from other 
respondents. This triangulation was a by-product of aggregating the individual ego-
networks into a whole network dataset. These verification and triangulation techniques 
helped to confirm the validity of the data (Bryman et al., 2011; Yin, 2009).  
Even with respondent verification and data triangulation, the principle threat to 
validity of network data is nonresponse bias (Borgatti et al., 2013). I addressed the 
challenge of the two nonresponding organizations using the reconstruction approach, 
which is well-supported by the network analysis literature (Huisman, 2009; Stork & 
Richards, 1992). As discussed above, I also took several steps to minimize interviewee 
burden because it is the principle cause of nonresponse during network interviews 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). I chose a face-to-face interview format to increase rapport, used a 
roster-based name generator and multigrid name interpreter to expedite interviewee 
responses, and did not include superfluous questions in the interview instrument. These 
steps are consistent with the recommendations provided by Borgatti et al. (2013) for 
managing nonresponse within network interviews. In this way, threats to validity were 
addressed by following best practices for network data collection (Borgatti et al., 2013). 
One further threat to data quality relates to internal reliability. Network data 
collection is particularly susceptible to interviewer effects, which are variations in the 
ways that multiple interviews are delivered and perceived (Carrington, Scott, & 
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Wasserman, 2005). These interviewer effects are most evident in the name generator 
phase of network interviews due to inconsistent elicitation of alters. This problem was 
avoided through the use of a fixed-list roster recall name generator (Borgatti et al., 2013). 
Carrington et al. (2005) argue that standardized administration of interview questions also 
addresses this issue. To this end, all interviews were conducted by the same interviewer. 
The interviews were also structured to ensure consistency, and the interview questions 
were visible to the interviewees on the data collection computer throughout each 
interview. Follow-up prompts—sometimes called elicitation probes (Brewer, 2000)—
were also provided on-screen and used in all interviews to ensure reliability. 
The total data collection effort entailed 35 first-person interviews, averaging 1 hour 
in length. Expert interviews were conducted in July 2016 and organizational key 
informants were interviewed between August 2016 and February 2017. In this chapter I 
have described the careful approach that was taken over this period to ensure a high-
quality network dataset. The most important implication of the data collection process is 
public and private organizations were treated equally. A roster of organizations was 
identified by system-level experts and this roster included any type of organization that 
fell within the network boundary specification criteria. Then, key informants with those 
organizations all responded to the same structured interview, regardless of public/private 
sector distinctions. Because all organizations were treated equally for data collection, it is 
now possible to test the four hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 and to then draw 
conclusions regarding the importance of public organizations for ocean science 
instrumentality innovation in Nova Scotia.   
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Chapter 6: Analysis & Results 
This chapter presents an analysis of the interactive learning network for ocean 
science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia. First, I describe the network in general terms. 
Then, I provide descriptive statistics regarding the types of product and process 
innovations that were found within the network and the novelty of these innovations. I 
then present results from each hypothesis test: first, the hypothesis regarding network 
position (H1), then the hypotheses regarding network composition (H2 and H3), and 
finally the hypothesis regarding network dynamics (H4). I conclude the chapter by 
summarizing these results and laying the foundation for discussion and conclusions in 
Chapter 7. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The network. The interactive learning network is one strongly-connected 
component that comprises 27 organizations (see Figure 6). In other words, no 
organizations were isolated and all organizations were reachable through paths of 
interorganizational interactive learning relationships. The network includes 12 scientific 
instrumentality companies and 10 PROs. The 10 PROs are listed and described in Table 
9. The network also includes five organizations that are highly engaged in ocean science, 
but do not directly engage in scientific investigations. One of these is a teaching unit of 
the Nova Scotia Community College. Four of these are not-for-profit organizations that 
meet two of the three criteria developed by Perry and Rainey (1988) for being classified 
as public organizations. I have therefore labelled all five of these organizations as public 
support organizations. They are listed and described in Table 10. All told, the 27 
organizations in this network have an average degree of 16.67. The average distance 
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between any two nodes is 1.36 edges. The network density is 0.64, indicating that 64% of 
the possible dyadic relationships are present. 
Types of innovation. Table 11 provides a summary of the product and process 
innovations reported by participating organizations. All participating organizations were 
involved in the production of novel outputs (i.e., outputs that were new to the world or 
new to their field, sector, or market) and had incorporated some process innovations over 
the past 5 years. Indeed, R&D intensity—a proxy for absorptive capacity—was high 
throughout the network: 44% of the 1,783 employees were dedicated to research and/or 
development activities. The average R&D intensity of public support organizations was 
lower (16%) than the R&D intensity of PROs (46%) and companies (41%). 
I asked respondents to indicate the types of outputs produced by their organization 
over the past five years. All five product types were reported by a majority of 
respondents. This included “instruments, machinery, and equipment” which were 
produced by 20 of the 25 responding organizations. It is interesting that all the companies, 
eight of the PROs, and one of the public support organizations engaged in the production 
of instruments, machinery or equipment. Novelty levels were also high across all three 
types of organizations. All the PROs, nine of the companies, and three of the public 
support organizations reported introducing goods or services that were “new to the world” 
over the past 5 years.  
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Figure 7. Interactive learning network for ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia, Canada. Graph produced in NetDraw 
(Borgatti, 2002) with nodes sized by degree.  
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Table 9 
Public Research Organizations in the Interactive Learning Network 
Organization FTEs R&D Intensity Degree Centrality 
DF 
Acadia Tidal Energy Institute 11 98% 14 -0.004 
Bedford Institute of Oceanography (Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans) 700 21% 22 0.008 
Bedford Institute of Oceanography (Natural Resources Canada) 55 82% 17 0.001 
Verschuren Institute, Cape Breton University 40 90% 16 -0.001 
Oceanography Department, Dalhousie University 118 97% 22 0.008 
Defense Research and Development Canada: Atlantic Research 
Centre 165 61% 22 0.008 
Applied Geomatics Research Group, Nova Scotia Community 
College 20 75% 12 -0.007 
Applied Oceans Research Group, Nova Scotia Community College 10 100% 21 0.007 
Ocean Tracking Network, Dalhousie University 12 88% 18 0.002 
Academic Kind-of-Activity Unit (non-participant) — — 18 0.002 
 
Note. DF = distance-weighted fragmentation (Borgatti, 2006); FTEs = full-time equivalent employees. All organizations in this 
table are public, per the criteria developed by Perry and Rainey (1988): they are all under public ownership, receive public 
funding, and operate under polyarchal social control. Size and R&D intensity for the non-participating PRO were available 
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Table 10 
Public Support Organizations in the Interactive Learning Network 




Fundy Ocean Research Centre for Energy Private1 Public Polyarchy 10 40% 19 0.004 
Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise Private1 Public Polyarchy 4 13% 19 0.004 
Advanced Diploma in Oceans 
Technology Program, Nova Scotia 
Community College 
Public Public Polyarchy 2 0% 19 0.004 
Marine Environmental Observation 
Prediction and Response Private
1 Public Polyarchy 7 0% 17 0.001 
Offshore Energy Research Association of 
Nova Scotia Private
1 Public Polyarchy 5 0% 21 0.007 
 
Note. DF = distance-weighted fragmentation (Borgatti, 2006); FTEs = full-time equivalent employees. 
  
1These organizations are legally constituted as not-for-profit corporations and therefore classified as “privately held.” However, 
they are all considered public organizations under the criteria developed by Perry and Rainey (1988) because they receive 
public funding and they operate under polyarchal control rather than under market forces.   
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All responding organizations incorporated some degree of process innovation into 
their operations over the past 5 years. Nearly all organizations introduced new production 
techniques/methods and adopted new software. A sizeable majority (84%) also reported 
introducing new machinery or equipment into their operations. There were fewer 
organizations involved in novel process innovations than in novel product innovations. 
Nonetheless, 56% of organizations reported process innovations that were “new to the 
world”. 
The types of innovation and innovation novelty levels reported here confirm the 
high levels of innovation activity in this relatively small interactive learning network. It is 
particularly important to note that public research organizations and public support 
organizations in this network all reported high levels of R&D intensity, product 
innovation, and process innovation. Most interestingly, innovative goods—instruments, 
machinery or equipment—were produced by 9 of the 14 public organizations in this 
study. Note that this finding alone runs counter to the widespread assumption—discussed 
in Chapter 1—that innovation in goods is the exclusive domain of the private sector. 
These results are therefore revelatory in that they confirm the production of innovative 
technological goods by public organizations.  
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Table 11 
 
Product and Process Innovations in Nova Scotia’s Ocean Science Instrumentalities 
Innovation System 
 
 PROs Companies 
Support 
Orgs Total 
Number of Organizations 10 12 5 25 
Employees (full-time equivalents) 1,281 474 28 1,783 
R&D Intensity1 46% 41% 16% 44% 
Product Innovations2 
Percent of organizations that 
produced…     
 instruments, machinery or 
equipment 89% 100% 20% 80% 
 reports, information, documents 
or manuscripts 100% 45% 80% 72% 
 computer software or datasets 78% 73% 60% 72% 
 education, training or 
professional development 89% 73% 100% 84% 
 data collection, processing or 
analysis services 100% 45% 60% 68% 
Percent of organizations 
introducing products that were…     
 new to the organization 78% 73% 100% 80% 
 new to the field, sector or 
market 89% 73% 60% 76% 
 new to the world 100% 82% 60% 84% 
Process Innovations2 
Percent of organizations that 
introduced new…     
 techniques or methods 100% 100% 80% 96% 
 machinery or equipment 100% 73% 80% 84% 
 software 100% 91% 80% 92% 
Percent of organizations 
introducing processes that were…      
 new to the organization 89% 82% 60% 80% 
 new to the field, sector or 
market 89% 64% 60% 72% 
 new to the world 100% 36% 20% 56% 
 
Notes. 1R&D Intensity is the proportion of total employees (full-time equivalents) 
devoted to research and/or development. 2Percentages based on 25 organizations, which 
excludes one non-responding PRO and one non-responding company. 
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Centrality (H1) 
As noted in Chapter 2, prior research demonstrated that scientists, rather than 
private companies, are the locus of innovation for scientific instruments (Riggs & von 
Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). I therefore proposed that PROs—
organizations that employ scientists and use scientific instrumentalities—will be the locus 
of innovation for a scientific instrumentalities innovation system. In Chapter 4, I noted 
that the loci of an interactive learning network are those organizations with the greatest 
degree centrality. My hypothesis (H1) was: PROs have significantly greater average 
degree centrality than all other types of organizations in a scientific instrumentalities 
interactive learning network. 
I conducted a quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) t-test to compare the degree 
centrality of public research organizations with the degree centrality of other 
organizations in the network: private companies and public support organizations. The 
degree centrality scores for PROs (M=18.20, SD=3.37) were not significantly higher than 
the degree centrality scores for other organizations in the network (M=15.65, SD=5.34); 
t(25) = 2.55, p = 0.11. Hypothesis 1(a) was not supported. This result suggests that the 
slightly higher average degree centrality for PROs in this network could occur at random: 
a similar difference in means occurred in 11% of 10,000 random permutations of the 
observed data.  
In interpreting this result it is important to note that H1 was drawn from a literature 
on scientific instrumentality innovation that does not discuss public support organizations 
(i.e., de Solla Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; 
Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Rosenberg, 1992; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). Prior 
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studies of scientific instrument innovation examined the relative importance of only two 
roles: “users” and “producers” (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 
1976, 1988). These studies did not include any individuals or organizations that were 
similar to the public support organizations in Nova Scotia’s ocean science instrumentality 
innovation system. It is possible that similar public support organizations did not exist at 
the time or in the context of prior research. Indeed, such organizations did not appear in 
the historical data for Nova Scotia’s ocean science instrumentalities innovation system 
(see Chapter 3). They are likely a relatively recent addition (see further discussion in 
Chapter 7). 
To further understand the impact of public support organizations on my results for 
H1, I conducted a post hoc hypothesis test (H1b). If this study had used a data sampling 
approach, post hoc hypothesis testing using classical statistical tests would be 
problematic; there would be a high risk of type 1 error. However, there are fundamental 
differences between the assumptions underlying classical statistical tests of sample data 
and the assumptions underlying QAP hypothesis tests of whole network data (Borgatti et 
al., 2013; Dekker, Krackhardt, & Snijders, 2007; Krackhardt, 1988). It is appropriate to 
state and test post hoc hypotheses in this study because the dataset includes the whole 
network population—not a sample, and because the significance of each result is 
evaluated using a new, randomly-generated distribution of permuted observations—not 
an assumed normal distribution. Under these network analysis conditions, it is normal and 
appropriate to conduct post hoc tests (e.g., Grosser, Lopez-Kidwell, & Labianca, 2010; 
Kilduff, 1992; Lopez-Kidwell, 2013; Soltis, 2012; Tang, Wang, & Kishore, 2014) and to 
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undertake exploratory data analysis (e.g., Borgatti et al., 2013; Butts, 2008; De Nooy, 
Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2011). 
My post hoc hypothesis test (H1b) was that public organizations have significantly 
greater average degree centrality than private companies in this network. I conducted a 
QAP t-test to compare the mean degree centrality of public organizations—PROs and 
support organizations—with the mean degree centrality of private companies. I found that 
the degree centrality scores for public organizations (M=18.47, SD=2.87) were 
significantly higher than the degree centrality scores for private companies (M=14.25, 
SD= 5.75) in this network; t(25) = 4.22, p = 0.02. The post hoc hypothesis (H1b) was 
supported. This could suggest that public organizations—PROs and support 
organizations—are more important than private companies in the interactive learning 
network. The relatively lower degree centrality scores for private companies in this 
network is consistent with prior conclusions that private manufacturers are less 
important—i.e., not the “locus”—for scientific instrument innovation (Riggs & von 
Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). The highest degree scores in this 
network are found among a combination of public organizations, including both PROs 
and public support organizations. This may suggest that public support organizations are 
an important extension of the scientific enterprise, even if their employees do not directly 
perform scientific investigations.  
Because degree centrality is a common proxy for importance in a network (Borgatti 
et al., 2013; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Takeda et al., 2008), the foregoing is a common 
interpretation of differences in degree centrality. However, there is an alternative 
explanation that cannot be discounted: higher degree centrality scores could also suggest 
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that public organizations in this system have a greater propensity to establish interactive 
learning relationships than private companies in this system. For now, a cautious 
interpretation of the results for H1(b) is that public organizations are more connected 
within this network than private companies. The relative importance of different 
organizations will be revisited in the results for H4. 
Symbiosis (H2) 
The literature on scientific instrumentality innovation discusses symbiotic 
relationships between those who produce science and those who produce scientific 
instrumentalities (de Solla Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992).  I have 
therefore proposed that the majority of relationships between PROs and instrumentality 
companies include multiple concurrent types of interactive learning with knowledge 
flows in both directions. In network terms, such relations should be multiplex and 
bidirectional. My hypothesis (H2) was: within a scientific instrumentalities interactive 
learning network, relations between PROs and private companies are multiplex and 
bidirectional. 
Out of the 702 possible relations in this network, there are 240 possible relations 
between PROs and instrumentality companies. Interactions were reported for 124 of these 
dyadic pairs. Seventy-four of these interactions were multiplex. Ninety-two relations were 
bidirectional. Seventy relations were both multiplex and bidirectional.  
I calculated a Jaccard similarity coefficient to assess the degree to which the set of 
relationships between PROs and instrumentality companies (MASTER-PRO-I) 
intersected with the set of multiplex and bidirectional PRO-company relations 
(SYMBIOTIC-PRO-I). For this test, the Jaccard coefficient was more appropriate than a 
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Pearson correlation coefficient because the data are binary (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
The Jaccard coefficient is an index of the similarity between two sets of binary values. 
The hypothesis was focused on the composition of PRO-company relations, so the test 
was conducted using only the data on PRO-company dyads. In other words, support 
organizations were not included in this analysis, nor were PRO-PRO and Company-
Company relations. The results of the test were assessed for significance using the QAP 
with 10,000 permutations25. I found a significant similarity between the two sets of 
relations, J = 0.56, n = 124, p < 0.001. The majority (56%) of observed relationships 
between PROs and instrumentality companies were multiplex and bidirectional. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Channels of Interaction (H3) 
In Chapter 2, I developed a channels of interactive learning model and proposed that 
the capital equipment and technical services channel is important for scientific 
instrumentality innovation. Then, in Chapter 4, I presented the concept of edge 
betweenness as a measure of the importance of ties in a network. My hypothesis (H3) 
was: the presence of a capital equipment and technical services interaction significantly 
and positively predicts the edge betweenness of a relationship in a scientific 
instrumentalities interactive learning network.  
I used the double Dekker semi-partialling (DSP) multiple regression technique 
(Dekker et al., 2007) to assess the effects of my channels of the interactive learning model 
                                                 
25  The distribution of similarities for the 10,000 random permutations ranged from 4% to 
54% (M = 23.2%, SD = 6.3%). 
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on edge betweenness. Dekker et al. (2007) demonstrated that the DSP technique is the 
most appropriate choice for fitting linear models, such as this, that include continuous and 
network count data. The dependent variable, edge betweenness, was produced from the 
master relations matrix. Independent variables included the seven types of interactive 
learning relations: R&D Partnerships, IP flows, HR flows, HR sharing, formal knowledge 
sharing, informal knowledge sharing, and the provision/acquisition of capital equipment 
or technical services. Additional variables were included to control for geographic 
proximity, the potential age of a relationship, the size of organizations, and R&D 
intensity. One model also controlled for PRO-Industry relations, a theoretically-important 
category of relationships in the network. Further to the results presented earlier, also I 
tested a second model that replaced the PRO-I control with a control for relations between 
public and private sectors (Public-Private). Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for 
all variables can be found in Table 12. Note that collinearity of independent variables was 
not an issue, ri,j < 0.70 (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2013). Skewness was also not an 
issue because the DSP technique is robust for skewed data under situations where 
spuriousness is not high. The various control variables listed above are those identified in 
the literature (see Chapter 4) and were included to ensure low levels of spuriousness. 
 All four iterations of the model significantly predicted edge betweenness, n = 700, 
p < .001, adj. R2 = .36. Note that the DSP regression technique does not incorporate an F-
statistic like ordinary linear regression: the significance of the R2 fit statistic is evaluated 
by comparison against the distribution of R2 values for 10,000 random permutations. 
Regression coefficients and standard errors for the DSP multiple regression models can 
be found in Table 13.  
OCEAN SCIENCE INSTRUMENTALITIES  163 
Table 12 
Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Multiple Regression Models 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Edge Betweenness               
2. Informal  0.51**              
3. Formal  0.35**  0.50**             
4. HR Flows  0.18**  0.09*  0.09*            
5. HR Sharing  0.19**  0.33**  0.30**  0.20**           
6. IP Flows  0.07  0.11**  0.21**  0.10*  0.07          
7. R&D   0.39**  0.40**  0.46**  0.20**  0.61**  0.17**         
8. Equip. & Services  0.34**  0.25**  0.30**  0.11*  0.22**  0.19**  0.31**        
9. Proximity  0.13**  0.15 -0.01  0.11*  0.13*  0.00  0.01  0.13*       
10. PRO-I -0.09 -0.27** -0.15* -0.05 -0.14* -0.02 -0.17**  0.03 -0.03      
11. Public-Private -0.15** -0.28** -0.23** -0.07 -0.21** -0.05 -0.18** -0.05  0.01 0.70**     
12. Age  0.07 -0.03  0.00  0.23**  0.09 0.05  0.05  0.24**  0.23 0.18* -0.01    
13. Size  0.15*  0.10  0.11  0.15*  0.09 -0.03  0.12  0.13*  0.18 0.14** -0.03 0.42**   
14. R&D Intensity -0.03 -0.12  0.04 -0.02 -0.09  0.05 -0.07  0.01 -0.21 0.37** -0.01 0.04 -0.15  
Mean  1.36  0.47  0.29  0.07  0.14  0.02  0.31  0.21 -2.83 0.34  0.51 10.65 132.09 1.08 
Standard Deviation  1.25  0.50  0.45  0.26  0.35  0.15  0.46  0.41  1.68 0.47  0.50 10.45 184.85 0.43 
Minimum Value  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0  0 3 5 0 
Maximum Value  6.90  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1  1 58 865 2 
 
Note. Each variable is a 27 row by 27 column adjacency matrix. Listwise N = 700 (i.e., 2 missing observations). *p < .05 and 
**p < .01. Remaining correlations are ns. Correlations are based on 5,000 random permutations. 
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Table 13 
Multiple Regression Models to Predict Edge Betweenness in the Interactive Learning Network 








     B  SEB    B  SEB    B  SEB    B  SEB 
Independent Variables 
 Informal Sharing 1.01 *** (0.13) 0.99 *** (0.13) 1.01 *** (0.13) 1.04 *** (0.12) 
 Formal Sharing 0.10  (0.13) 0.09  (0.13) 0.10  (0.13)    
 HR Flows 0.50 ** (0.17) 0.48 ** (0.17) 0.53 ** (0.17) 0.53 ** (0.17) 
 HR Sharing -0.54 *** (0.17) -0.55 *** (0.17) -0.53 *** (0.17) -0.53 *** (0.17) 
 IP Flows -0.45 * (0.27) -0.44 * (0.27) -0.47 * (0.28) -0.44 * (0.27) 
 R&D Partnership 0.65 *** (0.14) 0.64 *** (0.14) 0.62 *** (0.14) 0.65 *** (0.14) 
 Equip. & Services 0.53 *** (0.12) 0.54 *** (0.12) 0.57 *** (0.12) 0.58 *** (0.12) 
Control Variables             
 Proximity 0.04  (0.04) 0.05  (0.04)       
 PRO-Company 0.09  (0.11)          
 Public-Private    -0.00  (0.09)       
 Age -0.00  (0.01) -0.00  (0.01)       
 Size 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00)       
 R&D Intensity 0.09  (0.17) 0.13  (0.17)       
Constant 0.57   0.57   0.60   0.60   
 
Note. For all models, N = 700. *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p<.001. Remaining coefficients are ns. 
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Note that none of the control variables added significantly to the models. This did 
not change when I replaced the PRO-I relations control variable (B = 0.09, p = 0.18) with 
a control for public-private relations (B = -0.00, p = 0.49). Given this result, I reduced the 
model to eliminate the superfluous control variables. The change in R2 after removing the 
control variables was less than 0.01.  
In the model without controls (labelled “Parsimony 1” in Table 13), the presence of 
a formal knowledge sharing relationship did not add significantly to the prediction of 
edge betweenness (B = 0.10, p = 0.22). A similar result can be observed for both control 
models. All other independent variables added significantly to the prediction of edge 
betweenness, p < .05. The sharing of human resources (B = -0.53, p < 0.001) and the 
licensing / transfer of intellectual property (B = -0.47, p = 0.02) were both significant 
negative predictors of edge betweenness. In other words, learning relationships were less 
important to the overall network if they included the licensing/transfer of intellectual 
property or the sharing of human resources—such as cross-appointments, sabbatical 
projects, or students on work placement in private companies. All other variables were 
positive predictors of edge betweenness, including the key channel under hypothesis 3: 
the provision / acquisition of capital equipment or technical services (B = 0.57, p < 
0.001). Hypothesis 3 was supported. Note, however, that the size of the effect for this 
channel was less than the effect sizes for informal knowledge sharing (B = 1.01, p < 
0.001) and R&D partnerships (B = 0.62, p < 0.001). In other words, the best predictor of 
the most important learning relationships in the network was informal knowledge sharing, 
followed by R&D partnerships, followed by the provision / acquisition of capital 
equipment or technical services.  
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In a final iteration of the model (labelled “Parsimony 2” in Table 13), I removed the 
formal knowledge sharing variable. This resulted in an R2 change of less than 0.01; I 
achieved parsimony without compromising explanatory power. The removal of this 
variable resulted in increased effect sizes for informal knowledge sharing (B = 1.04, p < 
.001), IP flows (B = -0.44, p = 0.03), R&D partnerships (B = 0.65, p < .001), and the 
provision/acquisition of capital equipment and technical services (B = 0.58, p < .001). 
This suggests that formal knowledge sharing—such as shared training, workshops, or 
research coauthorship—did not directly contribute to the importance of interactive 
learning relationships in this network, but it did co-occur with other types of learning 
interactions that were significantly related to edge betweenness. 
As predicted in my theoretical framework, all specifications of the model indicated 
that the use of a capital equipment and technical services channel was positively and 
significantly related to the importance of an interactive learning relationship in this 
network. However, informal knowledge-sharing relationships and formal R&D 
partnerships were stronger predictors of the most important relationships in the network. 
By demonstrating the relative importance of these channels in this context, my results 
extend prior discussion about the nature of interactive learning in scientific 
instrumentalities (de Solla Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). 
Fragmentation (H4) 
In Chapter 3, I presented historical evidence that suggesting that PROs may have 
served as anchor tenants in the evolution of this innovation system. Based upon my 
analysis of the historic context and on the theoretical framework I developed in Chapter 
2, I proposed that a scientific instrumentalities innovation system will be more susceptive 
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to the loss of PROs than to the loss of private companies. Then, in my analytical 
framework I introduced distance-weighted fragmentation (DF) as a measure of changes in 
network cohesion. My hypothesis (H4) was: removing individual PROs from a scientific 
instrumentalities interactive learning network results in significantly greater distance-
weighted fragmentation than removing other types of organizations. 
I conducted a QAP t-test to compare the mean change in DF after removal of a PRO 
with the mean change in DF after removal of other organizations in the network (i.e., 
private companies and support organizations). The fragmentation scores for PROs 
(M=0.002, SD=0.005) were not significantly greater than the fragmentation scores for 
other organizations in the network (M=-0.001, SD=0.008); t(25) = 0.004, p = 0.11. 
Hypothesis 4(a) was not supported. This result suggests that the larger average 
fragmentation scores that were observed for PROs in this network could occur at random: 
differences that were the same or greater than the observed difference occurred in 11% of 
10,000 random permutations of the observed data.  
The result for this test is similar to the result for the test of degree centrality scores 
(H1). As with hypothesis 1, I formed a post hoc hypothesis to account for the presence of 
public support organizations in the data: removing individual public organizations from a 
scientific instrumentalities interactive learning network results in significantly greater 
distance-weighted fragmentation than removing private companies (H4b). 
I conducted a second QAP t-test to compare the mean fragmentation scores for 
public organizations (i.e., PROs and public support organizations) with those for private 
companies. The fragmentation scores for public organizations (M=0.003, SD=0.004) were 
significant greater than the fragmentation scores for private companies (M=-0.004, 
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SD=0.009); t(25) = 0.006, p = 0.013. The post hoc hypothesis (H4b) was supported. This 
result suggests that, on average, this innovation system would become more fragmented 
following the loss of a public organization than it would become following the loss of a 
private company. The results of this test are consistent with the results for hypothesis 
1a/b: public support organizations appear to be an important extension of the scientific 
enterprise. This is not discussed in the existing literature on scientific instrument 
innovation, so it warrants further discussion in my final chapter. 
Summary of Results 
In this chapter I presented the results from various analyses of the interactive 
learning network for ocean science instrumentalities in Nova Scotia. The network 
includes 27 PROs, companies, and public support organizations. Key informants from all 
three types of organizations reported product and process innovations over the past 5 
years. Further to prior research on scientific instrumentality innovation, but contrary to 
both neoliberal discourse and existing taxonomies of public innovation, the network 
included 9 public organizations that produced new goods.  
The literature on scientific instrument innovation suggested that organizations 
employing scientists—PROs—would be more important/central in a scientific 
instrumentalities innovation network. In my results, public organizations involved in 
science did have greater centrality than private companies. However, the present-day 
scientific enterprise appears to include both PROs and public support organizations that 
do not directly engage in producing science. The full set of public organizations not only 
had greater average centrality than private companies, but was also more important to the 
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cohesion of the network—the removal of a public organization from this network would 
result in greater average fragmentation than the removal of a private company.  
In Chapter 2 I also proposed that certain types of interactive learning are 
particularly important for scientific instrumentality innovation. Further to hypothesis 2, I 
found that the majority of relations between PROs and instrumentalities companies in this 
network were multiplex and bidirectional. This is consistent with existing descriptions of 
symbiotic relationships in scientific instrumentality innovation (de Solla Price, 1984; 
Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). However, the literature suggested that the 
provision/acquisition of capital equipment and technical services was the most important 
form of interactive learning. The presence of such equipment/service interactions did help 
predict the most important learning relationships in this network. Yet several other 
channels of interactive learning—informal knowledge sharing, R&D partnerships, and the 
movement of knowledgeable individuals—also predicted the most important ties in the 
network. The channel discussed in the literature was not the strongest predictor, and so 
my results provide an opportunity to extend the literature on scientific instrumentality 
innovation. 
Taken together, the results of this network analysis are revelatory. This innovation 
system includes public organizations that are producing new to the world innovations, 
including new to the world scientific instruments, machinery and equipment. My analysis 
therefore shows that discussions of the entrepreneurial state and of public innovation can 
be expanded to recognize that public organizations produce novel goods. Note, however, 
that the important public organizations in this network were not only those that use 
scientific instruments to perform scientific investigations, as was suggested by the 
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literature (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). Several 
public support organizations were important to the scientific enterprise, suggesting the 
need to update our understanding of scientific instrumentality innovation. My 
investigations of the interactive learning channels/relationships in this network also 
contribute to a richer understanding of scientific instrumentality innovation. The next and 
final chapter discusses these insights and the contributions that arise from this work.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Contributions 
In this dissertation I have asked, “how important are public organizations for 
scientific instrumentality innovation?” This question was a preliminary response to what I 
have called the public innovation in goods gap. I described the gap as a type of dark 
innovation: the role of public organizations in the development of technological goods is 
frequently acknowledged (e.g., De Vries et al., 2016; Fagerberg et al., 2013; Holbrook, 
2010; Koch & Hauknes, 2005; Mazzucato, 2013a; Mazzucato & Penna, 2016; Windrum 
& Koch, 2008), but there is a lack of empirical research on public innovation in goods 
(Arundel & Huber, 2013). Most empirical research in this field is focused on innovation 
in public services and in public policy (e.g., Gallouj et al., 2013; Halvorsen et al., 2005; 
Koch & Hauknes, 2005; Mazzucato, 2013a, 2016; Windrum & Koch, 2008). The 
importance of public organizations for innovation is therefore underestimated. My study 
of Nova Scotia’s ocean science instrumentalities innovation system is a first attempt to 
address this gap. Thanks to a carefully developed theoretical framework, analytical 
framework, and research method, I conducted a network analysis that explored the 
importance of public organizations for innovation in ocean science instruments and 
techniques. In so doing, I have made some contributions toward two of Ben Martin’s 
(2013, 2016) grand challenges in innovations studies: the entrepreneurial state challenge 
and the dark innovation challenge. 
In this final chapter, I discuss my findings and their implications. I begin by 
revisiting the first research objective I stated in Chapter 1: confirming that public 
organizations produce technological goods. To this end, I discuss the implications of my 
finding that several public organizations produced novel technological goods in this 
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innovation system over the past 5 years. This finding points to an opportunity for 
expanded research on the entrepreneurial state, and it reinforces the call for innovation in 
goods to be included in studies of public innovation (Arundel & Huber, 2013). After 
discussing this finding, I turn to a discussion of the methodological contributions that 
made it possible. Martin (2013, 2016) asserts that new and revised research methods are 
necessary for uncovering dark innovation. After discussing some methodological 
contributions, I look more closely at the findings they accorded. I discuss the relative 
importance of public and private organizations for scientific instrumentality innovation 
(i.e., research objective 2) and then the nature of interactive learning relationships for 
scientific instrumentality innovation—particularly the relationships between public and 
private organizations (i.e., research objective 3). I revisit the metaphors of anchors and 
quartermasters introduced in Chapter 3 and use these to describe three roles that appear in 
this system. Because my focus is on ocean science instrumentalities and the province of 
Nova Scotia, Canada, my findings relate specifically to this context and may or may not 
transfer to other contexts. At the close of the chapter, I present the corresponding local 
policy implications and conclude by discussing limitations of my research and several 
future research directions. 
Discussion 
The entrepreneurial state challenge: Public innovation in goods. At the 
beginning of this work, I discussed the neoliberal belief that private companies operating 
in a free market are more effective innovation actors than public organizations which are 
seen to be outside the market. I joined a conversation that is underway about the influence 
of neoliberal ideas in innovation studies (see Archibugi & Filippetti, 2017; Cooke, 2016; 
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Cruz et al., 2015; Fløysand & Jakobsen, 2011; Gallouj & Zanfei, 2013; Lundvall, 2016). I 
highlighted the corresponding view—that public innovation should be focused on the 
efficient delivery of public services with minimal strain on the market. This perspective 
on public innovation restricts our understanding of the roles performed by public 
organizations; public innovation in goods is seen as anecdotally interesting, but it is a 
deviation from norms. Goods are typically missing from most research instruments that 
are used to measure public innovation (Arundel & Huber, 2013) and goods have been 
heretofore missing from most taxonomies of public innovation (Halvorsen et al., 2005; 
Koch & Hauknes, 2005). My research presents another perspective. I have carefully 
aligned theory, context, analytical approach, and methodological techniques so that I 
might investigate this aspect of innovation that is otherwise missing from the 
entrepreneurial state and public innovation research agendas.  
My results suggest that some public organizations do produce innovation in goods. I 
found that technological goods—instruments, machinery, and equipment—were 
developed by 8 out of 14 public organizations in this innovation system over the past 5 
years. Because this phenomenon is so rarely studied, my results would be interesting even 
if I had only observed one technological good produced by one public organization. By 
empirically observing this phenomenon in any quantity, I can assert that public 
innovation in goods exists and can be studied. As Barbara Spellman (2012) explains, 
“science proceeds not only by the accretion of new facts but also by the weeding out of 
what was once falsely believed” (p. 59). My results suggest it is false to believe that 
“technological innovations, especially goods, are the exclusive domain of the private 
sector” (Windrum & Koch, 2008, p. 239). This is the first contribution of my dissertation. 
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I have shown that public innovation in goods does occur and that neglecting goods and 
privileging service and policy innovation does not fully explain the roles of public 
organizations—or the entrepreneurial state—in innovation systems. Public organizations 
have been producing novel technological goods within Nova Scotia’s ocean science 
instrumentalities innovation system. This finding reinforces calls by Arundel and Huber 
(2013) and Gault (2018) for goods to be included in the public innovation literature.  
Apart from neoliberal hegemony, some readers may wonder whether there are other 
explanations for the limited research on public innovation in goods. One alternative 
explanation is that the goods produced by public organizations might be developed in-
secret for the purposes of national defense, security, and intelligence. These would be the 
kinds of technological goods—such as the global positioning system (GPS)—that 
originate within the defense-security establishment and are not publicly revealed for long 
periods of time. However, this is a weak explanation for the absence of empirical research 
on public innovation in goods. These kinds of technologies do not remain secret; indeed, I 
argued in Chapter 1 that they are regularly included as anecdotes in discussion of public 
innovation. Furthermore, the instruments, machinery and equipment innovations that I 
observed in this dissertation were in an institutional field dominated by the norms of open 
science—norms that favour disclosure and recognition, not secrecy (Merton, 1957, 1973).  
Another possible explanation for the limited research on public innovation in goods 
is that it might only occur in rare contexts. If these contexts are relatively unknown, then 
the lack of research on public innovation in goods may be a simple oversight. However, 
several scholars have demonstrated that they are anecdotally aware of this phenomenon in 
defense-security contexts (Gallouj et al., 2013; Mazzucato, 2013a) and in public 
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medical/health care contexts (Hartley, 2005; Windrum & Koch, 2008). Furthermore, there 
were signals in the literature (i.e., Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 
1976, 1988) pointing toward the presence of public innovation in goods in the context of 
scientific instrumentalities. Defense, health care, and science are not rare or unstudied 
contexts.  
These two alternative explanations for the lack of research on public innovation in 
goods—that it is secret or that it is rare—do not account for many instances where public 
innovation in goods is mentioned in the literature but not incorporated into empirical 
work (e.g., De Vries et al., 2016; Halvorsen et al., 2005; Hartley, 2005; Koch & Hauknes, 
2005; Mazzucato, 2013a; R. M. Walker et al., 2002; Windrum & Koch, 2008). Further to 
this, it is probable that public innovation in goods is understudied because it is a form of 
dark innovation. This phenomenon is not overly secret or rare. Rather, it is partially 
obscured by market-oriented theoretical and analytical frameworks.   
There is also an alternate explanation for my funding that warrants discussion. I 
have found that, in this innovation system, eight public organizations produced innovative 
goods over the past 5 years. However, some readers might argue that I have observed 
process innovations, not product innovations—and process innovations in public service 
organizations are relatively well-studied (see De Vries et al., 2016; Gallouj et al., 2013; 
Hartley, 2005; Røste, 2005; R. M. Walker, 2014; R. M. Walker et al., 2002). It is 
common to dismiss public innovation in goods as something less than it is: as process 
innovation, rather than product innovation. For example, von Hippel and his colleagues 
labelled their observations as “user-innovation” even through the scientists they observed 
were clearly doing much more than simply using new process equipment (Riggs & von 
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Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). These scientists were also building 
multiple copies of their new scientific instruments and providing these to other scientists 
in external organizations (von Hippel, 1976). But von Hippel considered this to be a “pre-
commercial” activity (von Hippel, 1976)—taking place outside the market—and therefore 
not product innovation. Robert Dalpé (1994) has drawn a similar conclusion based on 
Canadian patent data, which he says “reveal government ownership of a sizeable number 
of patents in various industries involved with the government market [emphasis added]” 
(p. 76). He characterized these as the by-products of public service delivery and he 
suggested that these innovations eventually come to rest on the private-sector side of a 
public procurement process (Dalpé, 1994). Also, in Chapter 1, I discussed two studies 
(i.e., Arundel & Huber, 2013; Bugge et al., 2011) that report data on public innovation in 
goods but suggest that these may have been components of service innovations—i.e., 
process innovations that enabled services innovation. In sum, then, the prevalent 
argument is that public organizations are outside the market and so any goods they might 
develop are merely process innovations. These goods might not qualify as product 
innovations because they are not introduced “on the market” (OECD, 2005, p. 47) until 
they have been sold by a private sector manufacturer.  
My research supports a counterargument. Attributing product innovations to the 
market, and thinking that public organizations are outside the market, keeps such 
innovation in the dark. To achieve a different perspective on public innovation, I used a 
systems of innovation approach and framed innovation as an interactive learning process. 
I did not focus exclusively on market transactions because the “theoretical core” of the 
innovation systems approach is the learning interaction (Lundvall, 2013, p. 32), not the 
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market transaction. In my interview instrument, I allowed capital equipment and technical 
services to be provided by one organization and acquired by another organization via 
market and non-market exchanges. In this way, I defined product innovations as any 
goods or services that were produced by one organization and brought into use by any 
other organization. My definition of innovation conforms with only part of the language 
in OECD’s third edition Oslo Manual. The manual—which is widely used by statistical 
agencies and researchers—does say that innovations must be “implemented” and 
“brought into use,” but I have joined Gault (2018) in arguing that it goes one step too far 
by also suggesting that this use must be “on the market” (OECD, 2005, p. 47).  
I assert that a market-based definition of innovation creates a double-standard. It 
allows any new goods sold by a private company to be immediately labelled as “product 
innovations.” These goods then become “process innovations” in any type of customer 
organization—including a public organization. However, a market-based definition also 
means that new goods provided by one public organization to another will continue to be 
labelled as “process innovations” if they have not entered the market. Large volumes of 
such goods could be produced and disseminated by a public organization, but they would 
not be considered “product innovations” until they are bought and sold on the market, 
or—in the case of the strictest neoliberal definitions—until they are produced and sold by 
a private company. Rather than reifying the market—treating it like a real and special 
place—my approach includes various market transactions among many forms of 
interactive learning. This has allowed me to observe innovations that are produced by 
public organizations and brought into use through non-market transactions. This opens up 
a space for new and different understandings of public innovation. 
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While conducting the interviews for this study, I asked each organizational key 
informant to categorize their organization’s outputs and then to categorize their 
organization’s process innovations. Responses indicated that the outputs from 8 out of 14 
public organizations included instruments, machinery and equipment; these outputs or 
products became process innovations when they were introduced into recipient 
organizations. I asked a separate question about process innovation and 13 out of 14 
public organizations reported the introduction of new machinery or equipment into their 
processes. By rejecting a market-oriented definition of innovation, I observed goods that 
were being implemented as process innovations by public organizations, but more 
importantly, I also observed goods that were being produced by public organizations. 
While I concede that the production of innovative goods is not the primary activity of 
most public organizations, my results support the contention that such innovations are not 
exclusive to the private sector. 
In Chapter 1, I note that there is very limited research investigating public 
innovation in goods. My results have now shown that the phenomenon exists, and that it 
can be studied. So far in this chapter I have focused on the simplest yet most important 
contribution of this dissertation: expanding the scope of research into the entrepreneurial 
state by removing public innovation in goods from the realm of dark innovation. In the 
following sections I discuss contributions that arise from my network analysis and I make 
specific recommendations for future research into this phenomenon. 
The dark innovation challenge: Methodological contributions. My assertion that 
public organizations produce innovative goods underscores the importance of my 
methodological contributions. I needed to make careful decisions with respect to my 
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theoretical framework, my choice of empirical context, and my analytical framework. 
These decisions allowed me to develop a research design that did not automatically 
exclude the possibility of public innovation in goods. The adjustments I made in my 
analytical framework and research methods fit together to produce methodological 
contributions that can be transferred to future research. Such methodological 
contributions are likely to arise from any research into dark innovation, because dark 
innovation is only unobservable due to the current limitations of our social science 
instrumentalities (B. Martin, 2013, 2016). The theoretical contributions from this 
dissertation were made possible by assembling a “flashlight” that was capable of 
searching outside the neoliberal spotlight. Martin (2013, 2016) identified the need for 
methodological contributions like this as one of his grand challenges in innovation 
studies. 
Illuminating dark innovation. To achieve this methodological advance, I took 
advantage of several theoretical tools that are underutilized in innovation systems 
research. Many innovation scholars use the term “institution” to separate public 
organizations from private companies (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). Instead of using this 
term in this way, I followed the work of Edquist and Johnson (1997) and North (1990) to 
clearly differentiated between the components of an innovation system: the organizations, 
their learning interactions, and the institutional field. Conceiving the system as made up 
of these components allowed me to include PROs and other public organizations under 
the same umbrella as private companies—I considered them all to be organizations.  
Overcoming a market-orientation meant framing the innovation system as a range 
of different learning interactions, not all of which involved market exchanges. While it is 
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more common to conceptualize interactive learning as a set of market transactions 
between users and producers (Lundvall, 1988), this encourages a focus on the private 
sector. Because my channels of interactive learning framework (Table 2 and Figure 3) 
does not make a distinction between users and producers, or between public and private 
organizations, I was able to ask all organizational key informants the same questions 
during data collection.  
Finally, because I approached my research with a systems of innovation framework, 
I overcame key limitations of linear and chain-linked models. I conceptualized and then 
analyzed innovation at a system-level—as the sum of many interdependent dyads. I 
thereby produced a dataset with which I could test hypotheses about the importance of 
public organizations.  
Taken together, these moves form one methodological contribution: I have shown 
that, contrary to Mazzucato’s (2013a) arguments, the systems of innovation approach is 
not inherently blind to the entrepreneurial state. The innovation systems literature in fact 
already contains the necessary theoretical and analytical concepts for overcoming 
neoliberal biases; nonetheless, I needed to take exceptional care in my assembly of theory 
and method. 
 Specifying system boundaries. Two additional methodological contributions can 
be drawn from my analytical framework and research method: a contribution related to 
boundary specification, and one related to system-level analysis. As I argued in Chapter 
4, innovation system boundaries are typically taken for granted: care must be taken in 
defining regional boundaries (Doloreux & Parto, 2005) and in defining the boundaries 
around a socio-technical system. The regional boundary for this study was relatively easy 
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to identify and was confirmed by expert key informants. However, I could not use a 
standard approach for identifying the socio-technical—or sectoral—boundary. Such 
boundaries are typically identified based upon statistical agencies’ product classification 
systems. I could not use this approach here because these classification systems separate 
public organizations from private companies, even when their products are similar. 
Instead, I combined insights from the literature on innovation systems and from the 
literature on network analysis to produce a theoretically-rigorous boundary specification. 
My boundary specification approach not only allowed public organizations to be part of 
the system, but also stayed true to the theoretical core of an innovation systems 
approach—I used the concept of interactive learning and created a boundary specification 
that was primarily “activity-based” (Laumann et al., 1983). If innovation studies has truly 
advanced from a focus on innovation-as-outcomes to an understanding of innovation as 
an interactive learning process (Fagerberg et al., 2013; Lundvall, 2013), then the 
continued use of product-based sectoral boundaries may be inappropriate. Activity-based 
boundary specifications may be more appropriate to a processual understanding of 
innovation. Furthermore, I demonstrate in Chapter 4 that an activity-based boundary is 
entirely consistent and reconcilable with a conceptualization of innovation systems as 
institutional fields that are shaped by socio-technical regimes (Breschi & Malerba, 1997) 
and regional geographies (Asheim et al., 2011; Cooke, 2001; Doloreux & Parto, 2005). 
Following on my work in Chapter 4, then, future innovation systems research can engage 
directly with questions of boundary specification. 
From linear to systems analysis. My third methodological contribution is the use of 
network analysis for revisiting insights from linear innovation models. I agree with von 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  182 
Hippel and his colleagues  that scientists are the locus of innovation—the most important 
actors—for scientific instruments (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 
1976, 1988). But I dispute the validity of the linear innovation model they used in their 
research. Over the course of several chapters, I introduced an innovation systems 
theoretical framework and then a network-based analytical framework. My first 
hypothesis was that the conclusions from von Hippel et al. (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; 
Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988) would hold under a network analysis using a static 
node-based conceptualization of importance: degree centrality. My fourth hypothesis was 
based on a more dynamic and network-wide measure of importance: distance-weighted 
fragmentation. In both cases, I found that the conclusions derived from a linear model did 
not translate directly to a systems model. As might be expected, the greater complexity of 
a systems model means that my results are different than those of von Hippel et al. (Riggs 
& von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). 
In the simple linear model that was used for early research on scientific instrument 
innovation there were only two actors for each product innovation: a user and a producer. 
This naturally led to the conclusion that one type of actor was more important than the 
other. There could only be one locus of innovation, and it had to be either the user or the 
producer. The advantage of a systems approach is that it can overcome the dichotomies 
embedded in linear (e.g., Myers & Marquis, 1969), chain-linked (e.g., Kline, 1985; Kline 
& Rosenberg, 1986), and even symbiotic (e.g., de Solla Price, 1984; Rosenberg, 1992) 
understandings of innovation relationships. My data collection process was open to any 
organizations that might be identified by system-level experts. As a result, my data 
included organizations that use and produce scientific instrumentalities—PROs and 
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private companies, plus a third type of organization—public organizations that supported 
the production and use of scientific instrumentalities. In my tests of hypotheses 1 and 4—
based on static (H1) and dynamic (H4) conceptualizations of importance in a network—I 
found that the locus of innovation was not confined to any one of these three types of 
organization. Instead, the most important organizations in the network were distributed 
across the two categories of public organizations. My data suggest that there are multiple 
loci of innovation in this particular innovation system.  
 Network analysis is thus a valuable tool for advancing toward more complex 
understandings of innovation. While it is true that scholars already know that these 
methods have considerable potential for innovation studies (Bergenholtz & Waldstrøm, 
2011; van der Valk & Gijsbers, 2010), my contribution shows how network analysis of 
innovation systems can capture additional complexity and nuance that may be absent 
from linear analyses. Degree centrality and other point-based network measures can be 
used to identify multiple loci. However, I believe that the greater promise for network 
analysis of innovation systems lies in the use of dynamic network-wide measures—such 
as distance-weighted fragmentation. Such measures have not yet been widely deployed in 
economic geography (Glückler & Doreian, 2016) or innovation studies (Bergenholtz & 
Waldstrøm, 2011), although Giuliani (2013) has made some great strides on this path. My 
use of distance-weighted fragmentation is a further advancement. At the end of Chapter 3, 
I identified the future potential for fragmentation and robustness analyses of innovation 
systems. Thus far, such concepts have been applied in qualitative analysis (Ferrary & 
Granovetter, 2009; Powell et al., 2012). The quantitative methodological tools I have 
introduced here align with the theoretical direction of the field, and promise to help with a 
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shift in thinking from dyads and dichotomies toward complexities and systems. The 
greatest risk in the use of these methods is that they are highly sensitive to anything more 
than minimal levels of nonresponse. 
Scientific instrumentalities: Expanding the evidence base. 
Public organizations as anchor tenants. Earlier, I introduced the concepts of 
robustness and fragmentation because the historical evidence was pointing toward a 
particular way that PROs had been important for this innovation system. The historical 
evidence suggests that four PROs—the Naval Research Establishment, the Nova Scotia 
Research Foundation, Dalhousie University’s Oceanography Institute/Department, and 
the Bedford Institute of Oceanography—may have been anchor tenants during the 
formation of Nova Scotia’s ocean science instrumentalities innovation system. Where 
anchor tenants are typically defined in terms of the functions they perform for a regional 
innovation system—i.e., knowledge spillovers and attraction of firms (Agrawal & 
Cockburn, 2003; Feldman, 2003; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010)—I considered the ways in which 
an interactive learning network might be structurally-dependent upon its anchor tenants. I 
built upon the work of Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) and Powell et al. (2012) to develop 
a theoretical proposition regarding the system-wide effect of losing an anchor tenant. As I 
discuss above, I used a measure of distance weighted-fragmentation and tested a 
hypothesis about the structural effects of losing PROs from the system. The focus on 
PROs proved overly simplistic. However, I did find that this particular interactive 
learning network would experience greater average fragmentation upon the removal of a 
public organization versus a private company. It would therefore be problematic to 
conclude that a small group of PROs have been anchoring this system over the past 5 
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years. A more appropriate conclusion is that a network of public organizations may be 
collectively responsible for the structural cohesion of this innovation system. Public 
organizations appear to anchor this system. This conclusion responds directly to my 
research question—“how important are public organizations for scientific instrumentality 
innovation?”—and advances the concept of anchor tenants as important for the structural 
cohesion of regional innovation systems. 
Note, however, that there appear to be two very different anchor tenant roles 
performed by the public organizations in this system. In the first case, there are the PROs, 
all of which produce new research and many of which also produce new scientific 
instrumentalities. Secondly, the system also includes public support organizations. There 
were five such organizations in the network (see Table 10). These are organizations that 
do not produce research themselves, but provide coordination, networking, funding, and 
training functions to the innovation system. The Advanced Diploma in Oceans 
Technology (ADOT) program at NSCC Ivany Campus is a specialized training program 
that provides students with the necessary skills to work as technicians in this system. The 
Fundy Ocean Research Centre for Energy (FORCE) located in Parrsboro is a not-for-
profit consortium that manages Nova Scotia’s tidal energy test facility in the Minas 
Passage. The Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise (IORE) is a not-for-profit 
organization that facilitates relationships between PROs and private companies, and is 
also a lead partner in the Centre for Ocean Ventures & Entrepreneurship (COVE) facility 
being developed in Dartmouth. The Marine Environmental Observation Prediction and 
Response (MEOPAR) Network is a not-for-profit corporation headquartered at Dalhousie 
University that supports nation-wide research partnerships through funding from the 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  186 
Government of Canada’s National Centres of Excellence (NCE) program. And finally, 
the Offshore Energy Research Association (OERA) of Nova Scotia is also a not-for-profit 
organization that facilitates and funds research partnerships. Its focus is on offshore 
energy and environmental research and it is funded by the provincial government. In sum, 
these five public organizations support the functioning of this scientific instrumentalities 
innovation system. Public support organizations like these are not discussed in the 
existing literature on scientific instrumentality innovation. In the next two subsections, I 
ask why this type of organizations might not have been previously identified in the 
literature on scientific instrumentality innovation and then I expand my discussion on the 
role of these public support organizations versus the role of PROs in this system. 
Support organizations and New Public Management. There are two explanations 
for the absence of these public support organizations from the existing literature on 
scientific instrumentality innovation. I have already discussed the first of these: a systems 
lens was needed to observe more than two roles. The theoretical and analytical 
frameworks used in earlier research about scientific instrumentalities focused on two-role 
relationships. The linear models used by von Hippel and his colleagues focused on users 
and producers (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). 
Discussions about scientific instrumentality innovation under the chain-linked model 
dichotomized research and development roles (Kline, 1985; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986), 
and dichotomies were also used in STS discussions of science-technology symbiosis (de 
Solla Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). My shift from a linear to a 
system-level analysis was a prerequisite to observing a third role—the role of public 
organizations that support science—in scientific instrumentality innovation. 
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However, I am not convinced that this third role would have been present in 1976, 
even if von Hippel had used a systems approach. I believe that the presence of these 
organizations is best explained by the rise of New Public Management (NPM). In Chapter 
3, I introduced NPM as a set of widely adopted neoliberal public policy reforms (Hood, 
1991; Lorenz, 2012) that have been connected with decades of changes in Canadian 
science policy (Atkinson-Grosjean, 2006). One element of the NPM agenda is 
particularly useful in understanding why my results differ from earlier studies of scientific 
instrument innovation: the “shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector” (Hood, 
1991, p. 5). Sociologist of science Janet Atkinson-Grosjean (2006) has argued that the 
NPM-inspired reorganization of public science in Canada was punctuated by the 
establishment of the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) program by the 
Government of Canada in 1988 (Atkinson-Grosjean, 2002, 2006; Fisher, Atkinson-
Grosjean, & House, 2001). MEOPAR—one of the five public support organizations in 
my dataset—is one of 44 present-day NCEs across Canada. Atkinson-Grosjean (2006) 
has argued that the NCE program was a key means by which the Government of Canada 
introduced neoliberal ideals and NPM reforms into public science. Over time, the NCE 
program instituted “structural changes” that were “reminiscent of organizational and 
managerial innovations implemented in the late 1870s by the German dye manufacturing 
industry” (Fisher et al., 2001, p. 317)—i.e., specialization, division of labour, and 
cooperative team/network structures. The governments of Canada and Nova Scotia both 
support many similar network organizations today, such as FORCE, IORE, MEOPAR, 
and OERA. In this way, some of the governance and management of science has been 
disaggregated from PROs into separate organizations. Remember that the historical 
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records discussed in Chapter 3 placed these functions within the operations of the BIO 
campus and the NSRF—both had internal units devoted to managing relationships with 
external learning partners. It is therefore plausible that NPM reforms led to some 
disaggregation of science management and governance functions from the work of 
scientific investigation. The separation between NSCC’s ADOT program and its Applied 
Oceans Research Group might also be explained by NPM’s disaggregation doctrine. One 
of my dissertation’s theoretical contributions is the identification of this third role—an 
organizational support role—in scientific instrumentality innovation.  
Public organizations as innovation agents and quartermasters. By dropping the 
ADOT training program for a moment, and focusing on the other four public support 
organizations, I can highlight a further theoretical contribution from my research. 
FORCE, IORE, MEOPAR, and OERA are all engaged in the kind of “embedded network 
governance” that Erica Fuchs (2010) has attributed to DARPA in the period after 1992. 
Fuchs (2010) makes an important contribution, identifying what she considers to be “a 
new form of technology policy, in which embedded government agents re-architect social 
networks among researchers so as to identify and influence new technology directions in 
the U.S.” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 1145). My research suggests that this function is not unique to 
DARPA. Indeed, this function may be quite widespread if it is indeed driven by the 
disaggregation doctrine of NPM and the subsequent era of “networked governance” in the 
public sector (Hartley, 2005). Atkinson-Grosjean (2006) described the NCE program in 
Canada as a means by which “the state attempts to steer the research agenda and 
institutionalize processes of agenda building” (p. 34). This is similar to the way that 
Fuchs’ (2010) describes DARPA’s embedded network governance function. Linking the 
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concept of embedded network governance with the literature on NPM suggests that such 
organizations may be found across the many countries that engaged in NPM reforms, 
opening an important avenue for future research on the entrepreneurial state. Linking 
these ideas also suggests that the critique of NPM reforms (Hood, 1991; Lorenz, 2012) 
might extend to embedded network governance organizations.  
At the end of Chapter 3, I combined an understanding of this system’s historical 
context with my insights about scientific instrumentality innovation leading to new 
metaphors that could be used when thinking about a scientific instrumentality innovation 
system. I suggested that PROs might be considered the anchors and private companies 
might be considered the “quartermasters”—providing the necessary equipment for 
scientific research. However, my results now suggest that these role assignments may be 
insufficient. The support I found for hypotheses 1b and 4b does suggest that public 
organizations might be performing a type of anchor tenant function in this innovation 
system. But I also found that multiple public organizations were quartermastering: they 
were actively engaged in a range of product innovations. It is therefore possible to think 
of some public organizations as quartermasters, alongside private companies. Other 
public organizations in this system—the public support organizations—were performing 
a third role. Here, it is useful to think about two different kinds of quartermasters. There 
is the army quartermaster function I introduced in Chapter 3: the one that performs a 
product innovation function. But in navies, the quartermaster is chief navigator and 
master of the quarterdeck—the room from which the Captain and helmsman control the 
ship. Thus, some public organizations in this system are like the naval quartermasters: 
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they manage, govern, and/or facilitate network relations. This is not product innovation or 
process innovation; rather, it is an organizational innovation function.  
 In the research question at the heart of this dissertation, I asked about the 
importance of public organizations for scientific instrumentality innovation. In the system 
I studied, I found public organizations to be anchor tenants—the loci of innovation in the 
system. But because the network contained two broad types of public organizations—
PROs and support organizations—I have consequently developed a more nuanced answer 
to my research question. I propose that public organizations are important for scientific 
instrumentality innovation because they are both system anchors and quartermasters. 
The importance of private companies. While this work aims to increase attention 
on public innovation, I do not intend to minimize the importance of private companies. 
All the private companies that participated in my research reported product innovations, 
so it is appropriate to continue thinking of them as quartermasters for science—i.e., the 
suppliers of capital equipment and technical services. And yet, my data suggest it is 
inappropriate to assume this quartermaster role is more passive than the role performed 
by public organizations. Indeed, earlier research on scientific instrumentality innovation 
(de Solla Price, 1984; Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Rosenberg, 1992; Spital, 1979; von 
Hippel, 1976, 1988) may have over-simplified the private sector role. To explain this 
point further, let me illustrate the functions of these roles in terms of epistêmê and technê.  
I have already pointed out that public organizations in this system are proficient in 
the production of highly technical devices. At least 8 of 9 PROs were engaged in 
producing both epistêmê and technê. And it is also important to note that private 
companies in this system are proficient not only in technê, but also in the epistêmê of 
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ocean science. This is recorded in the types of innovations reported in Table 11. Five of 
11 private companies that participated in this research had produced the kinds of reports, 
information, documents or manuscripts that might be more commonly expected of the 
PROs that produce epistêmê. Five companies also reported delivering science-like 
services including data collection, processing or analysis. I therefore conclude that the 
private companies in this system are not passive quartermasters. Indeed, many of these 
companies engaged in the epistêmê of ocean science.  
My dataset therefore suggests that epistêmê is not the exclusive domain of PROs 
and technê is not the exclusive domain of scientific instrumentality companies. This is 
contrary to the conclusions one might draw from the writings of de Solla Price (1984) and 
Rosenberg (1992). They described epistêmê and technê as separate but mutually-
dependent knowledge bases for scientific instrumentality innovation. Because most 
organizations in my dataset have proficiencies in both the epistêmê and technê elements 
of ocean science, I have identified a more complex “systemic interdependence” 
(Lundvall, 1988, p. 350) that was only implied by earlier research in this context (de Solla 
Price, 1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). With respect to this 
interdependence, I contend that the relationships between PROs and companies in this 
system are productive because the parties are sufficiently proficient in both the epistêmê 
and technê of ocean science. In other words, an organization may have substantial 
expertise in epistêmê, but this does not mean the organization is inept in technê—or visa 
versa. Within this system there does not appear to be a clear division of responsibilities 
with respect to the epistêmê and technê of ocean science. I therefore propose that the 
socio-technical regime around scientific instrumentalities may be a bridge between what 
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some scholars consider to be separate systems of science and technology (e.g., Kaufmann 
& Tödtling, 2001) and between analytic and synthetic knowledge bases (e.g., R. Martin, 
2012, 2013; R. Martin & Moodysson, 2011a). Since most public and private 
organizations in this system appear to cross this boundary, the system itself might be in a 
brokerage position. 
Further, my results imply that scientific instrumentality companies may be more 
multidimensional than prior research suggests (i.e., de Solla Price, 1984; Riggs & von 
Hippel, 1994; Rosenberg, 1992; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). The prior 
literature suggests that private companies have limited roles as producers of scientific 
instruments (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988) and it says 
that these companies primarily provide the “private goods of the scientific research 
industry” (Rosenberg, 1992, p. 381). I therefore hypothesized that the flow of capital 
equipment and technical services would be the most important channel for interactive 
learning in scientific instrumentalities. But, as I describe in Chapter 6, this was an 
oversimplification of the interactive learning network. The most important relationships 
in this network were indeed predicted by capital equipment and technical service 
interactions. However, informal knowledge sharing and R&D partnerships were stronger 
predictors of the most important relationships. Notice how these top two predictors of the 
most important learning interactions were bidirectional channels. Notice also that my 
channels of interactive learning framework—adapted from De Fuentes and Dutrénit 
(2012)—provided a significant prediction of the most important relationships in the 
network, whereas commonly used variables—geographic proximity, organizational age, 
size, and R&D intensity—did not. Consistent with prior research, multiple channels of 
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interactive learning were coupled together in a “dynamic interaction” (Azagra-Caro, 
Barberá-Tomás, Edwards-Schachter, & Tur, 2017), although “formal knowledge sharing” 
was not an important component of the model. For ocean science instrumentality 
innovation in Nova Scotia, my results suggest that it might not be appropriate to narrowly 
focus on encouraging innovation via procurement policies. One might be inclined to 
focus on procurement after reading Rosenberg (1992), Dalpé, DeBresson, and Xiaoping 
(1992), or Dalpé (1994). However, my results support the view that interactive learning in 
this context is more multidimensional. 
My results are therefore consistent with some prior descriptions of scientific 
instrumentality relationships, particularly those that describe symbiosis (de Solla Price, 
1984; Gorm Hansen, 2011; Rosenberg, 1992). I found that the majority of relationships 
between PROs and companies were multiplex and bidirectional, pointing to symbiosis 
and mutual dependence between public and private organizations. But, this symbiosis 
does not imply a division of responsibilities; instead, it may be a function of overlapping 
proficiencies in both epistêmê and technê. If this is the case, scientific instrumentality 
innovation may be a useful context for advancing research into knowledge bases for 
innovation (R. Martin, 2012, 2013; R. Martin & Moodysson, 2011a).  
Policy Implications 
Although “ocean technologies” have been identified as an industrial policy priority 
by all three levels of government in this region (Atlantic Coastal Zone Information 
Steering Committee, 2006; Government of Nova Scotia, 2012; Greater Halifax 
Partnership, 2012), only a minimal evidence base is currently available with respect to 
ocean technology innovation in the region. Prior policy research in this region has 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  194 
produced a basic understanding of ocean technology products (Atlantic Coastal Zone 
Information Steering Committee, 2006), a map of global ocean technology value chains 
(Gereffi, Brun, Lee, & Turnipseed, 2013), and an understanding of local human capital 
requirements (Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise, 2015). Outside of this region, the 
OECD has published a policy paper on the future of the global ocean economy (OECD, 
2016). My policy contribution is different from these prior reports in that I am not 
focused exclusively on industrial policy. I add to the discussion of industrial policy in this 
region by linking it to policy matters that are sometimes treated separately—in the realm 
of science policy (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Bianchini & Llerena, 2016; Salazar & 
Holbrook, 2007). This dissertation simultaneously speaks to issues of concern for both 
industrial policy and science policy.  
The innovation studies literature often analytically separates science, technology, 
and innovation (STI) policies (Dodgson, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005), however these 
policy realms normally overlap in practice (Dodgson, 2000). Problems can arise when 
these policy realms diverge (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Bianchini & Llerena, 2016). In 
Canada, the cohesiveness of STI policies is influenced by the constitutional separation of 
powers between federal and provincial governments (Sá, 2010; Salazar & Holbrook, 
2007). The Government of Canada has a long history of active science policy (Fisher et 
al., 2001; Sá & Litwin, 2011; Salazar & Holbrook, 2007), but most provincial 
governments—including Nova Scotia—engage in limited science policy effort (Sá, 2010; 
Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). Meanwhile, technology and innovation policies—defined via 
industrial policy in Canada—are orchestrated by complex regional policy networks 
(Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). Salazar and Holbrook (2007) argue that neither federal nor 
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provincial government “can afford to renege on its responsibilities” to engage 
cooperatively in science, technology, and innovation policy. Coordination—via multi-
level governance—is required to overcome system failures in Canadian regional 
innovation systems (Salazar & Holbrook, 2007). 
In Chapter 3, I noted a potential failure in Nova Scotia’s ocean science 
instrumentalities innovation system. Five years ago, substantial federal cuts were made in 
ocean science across Canada (Bailey et al., 2016; Turner, 2013) at the same time as 
regional policy networks were prioritizing investments in ocean technology innovation 
via industrial policy (Government of Nova Scotia, 2012; Greater Halifax Partnership, 
2012). Ocean science and ocean industry policies were moving in opposite directions. My 
results suggest that this disconnect may have been problematic because, in the interactive 
learning network that I observed, the loss of a public organization would cause greater 
fragmentation to the network—on average—than the loss of a private company (see 
results for hypothesis 4). This suggests that the innovation system may be structurally 
dependent upon public organizations. Furthermore, I found that the majority of interactive 
learning relationships between PROs and private companies in this network were 
symbiotic (see results for hypothesis 2). This suggests that it may be important to connect 
public policies in support of private companies in this system (i.e., industrial policies) 
with policies that affect PROs and public support organizations (i.e., science policies). 
In 2016, the Government of Nova Scotia announced plans to more fully engage in 
regional science policy networks via the establishment of a new public organization—
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Research Nova Scotia (Grant, 2016)26. This is a potentially promising step toward 
resolving the disconnect between ocean science and ocean industry policies; the 
Government of Nova Scotia may be becoming more active in regional science policy 
networks. Meanwhile, the Government of Canada has begun to reinvest in science over 
the past year. An Advisory Panel for the Review of Federal Support for Fundamental 
Science has advised Parliament on future directions for science policy in the country 
(Naylor et al., 2017). However, the report from this panel only briefly mentions funding 
for “research tools and instruments” (Naylor et al., 2017, p. 126 and 176). As 
reinvestments in science are being made, federal policymakers might consider 
opportunities for innovation in scientific instrumentalities. For example, it might not be 
appropriate to completely outsource technical expertise via procurement from PROs to 
the private sector. NPM reforms have included widespread outsourcing of activities from 
public organizations to the market (Hood, 1991). However, further to my results for 
hypothesis 3, the capital equipment and technical services channel was not the strongest 
predictor of the most important relationships in this network. Informal knowledge 
sharing, R&D partnerships, and HR flows were stronger predictors. Policy makers should 
carefully consider whether particular procurement practices might encourage interactive 
learning for scientific instrumentality innovation or whether they might create arms-
length relationships between companies and public organizations. Similarly, it may be 
problematic for policy to focus on intellectual property rights channels for this system 
                                                 
26  At the time of this writing (February 2018) some preliminary steps had been taken 
toward establishing Research Nova Scotia (Government of Nova Scotia, 2017). 
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since the presence of an IP interactive was a negative predictor of the most important 
interactive learning relationships in this network. This finding reinforces a concern about 
Canadian science policy that has been raised by Creso Sá and Jeffrey Litwin (2011). With 
respect to federal science policies and university research, they say, 
The emphasis on commercialization has some potential drawbacks…overall, this 
emphasis on producing short term commercial outcomes steers university research 
towards near-term applications, and may not necessarily lead to deep relationships 
between universities and firms or to building capacity in the firms (Sá & Litwin, 
2011, p. 432). 
 
I observed deep relationships—i.e., multiplex and bidirectional learning interactions—
within the ocean science instrumentality innovation system in Nova Scotia (see results for 
hypothesis 2). To continue this interdependence, policy might support a mix of 
bidirectional learning channels between public and private organizations. To enable these 
symbiotic relationships, it might also be important for public organizations to have their 
own in-house technical capacities—so that they are not technically inept.  
Overall, my work reinforces the importance of federal investments in science for 
ocean science instrumentality innovation in this region, and the importance of provincial 
government participation in regional STI policy networks. I have also expanded on 
Mazzucato’s policy contributions (2016; 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2016; 2016) by showing 
that the entrepreneurial state’s market-creation powers may include the ability to develop 
novel new technologies—i.e., scientific instrumentalities. Furthermore, there are some 
indications that the entrepreneurial state may have more ability to govern innovation 
networks—and thereby create new markets—than previously thought. NPM reforms may 
have led to a proliferation of public support organizations dedicated to network 
governance of public science. It is possible that these disaggregated units may be in a 
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better position to perform network brokerage functions. However, future research should 
ask questions about the impact of NPM on the effectiveness of public science. For 
example, in my history of the BIO (see Chapter 3), I briefly mention the shift from a large 
internal technical unit to an industry liaison officer, which may have been an NPM-style 
outsourcing of technical competencies. Such moves might not be beneficial for the 
symbiotic nature of interactive learning in this innovation system. Further policy research 
is needed regarding public innovation in goods, NPM, networked governance, and the 
entrepreneurial state. 
Limitations 
Before concluding this work, I must caution readers not to assume that my results 
are generalizable to other contexts. Achieving generalizability means designing research 
in such a way that the participants represent a broader population. By demonstrating the 
representative nature of a sample, researchers argue that their findings are generalizable 
across an entire population. This logic is based upon a nomothetic approach borrowed 
from the natural sciences. The goal of nomothetic research is to establish general laws 
that can describe and predict a phenomenon. As Lincoln and Guba (1985) explain, 
“generalizations are assertions of enduring value that are context-free” (p. 110). The 
drawback is that details of each case are lost in the generalization. 
The alternative logic, which I have used here, is an idiographic approach common 
to the humanities. Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe an idiographic approach as one 
that “places considerable stress upon getting close to one’s subject and exploring its 
detailed background and life history” (p. 6). In short, the goal of an idiographic approach 
is to specify the details of a case. Case studies are therefore inherently idiographic 
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(Bryman et al., 2011): they are useful when the researcher is more interested in the details 
of one or more cases than in the generalizability across all cases. A true idiographic 
approach does not attempt to claim external validity via generalizability. The case study is 
not treated as a sample of one. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed an alternative standard for evaluating the 
external validity of idiographic case studies: transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Where generalizability means demonstrating that one’s empirical material is 
representative of other contexts, transferability means demonstrating that one’s findings 
are applicable to other contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that transferability is 
established through the contextual details provided in a study—such as those I provide in 
Chapter 3. This is what Geertz (1973) referred to as “thick description.” These details 
help the reader to evaluate similarities and differences between her context and the 
research context. The reader is therefore armed with all necessary information with which 
to determine the transferability of the research findings. The notion of transferability 
accepts that there are limits to the external validity of a case study but still attempts to 
establish theoretical generalizations that may apply under certain similar contexts. This 
entire work was designed to achieve transferability rather than generalizability. To this 
end, I have focused on revealing and describing a particular phenomenon, in a particular 
context. I can not yet say whether my results are generalizable to other contexts, but I can 
assert that they open new ways of thinking about research and policy. 
Further to this point, I raise three specific cautions regarding generalizability and 
transferability. First, it is important to emphasize that the p-values reported in Chapter 6 
are not indicative of the probability that a particular observation might generalize beyond 
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this study. Under the QAP network analysis approach, the p-values indicate the 
probability that the observation might have occurred at random. The p-values represent 
the proportion of random permutations that yielded values greater or less than the 
observed values. QAP p-values cannot be interpreted in the same way as a classic 
significance test. Further discussion can be found in Borgatti et al. (2013). Second, it is 
important to emphasize that the policy implications discussed above should not 
necessarily be generalized beyond Nova Scotia’s present-day ocean science 
instrumentalities innovation system. As Lundvall and Borrás (2005) explain, “innovation 
policy needs to build upon insight in a specific context […] ‘best practice’ cannot be 
transplanted from one innovation system to another” (p. 617). The risk here is that the 
policy implications discussed above may be taken up by organizations whose mandate 
extends beyond this innovation system to other regions or sectors. Policy makers are 
urged to consider the limits to the transferability of policy implications. 
The third specific point of caution regarding transferability is with respect to 
jurisdictional differences in the way that one might distinguish between public and private 
organizations, particularly public and private universities. In Nova Scotia, all PROs—
including universities—are public organizations, given the guidance provided by Perry 
and Rainey (1988). However, “private” universities may be present in other regions. The 
private versus public nature of universities in the USA has been debated in the legal 
community (see O'Neil, 1969). Nonetheless, regional differences in the ownership, 
funding, and governance of PROs are real limits to the transferability of this research. 
Several additional limitations have been discussed briefly throughout this 
dissertation. In Chapter 3, I discussed the limitations imposed by the historical evidence 
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that was available. Most of this evidence was produced by the four PROs discussed in the 
chapter. Their importance in the historical narrative may be related to their authorship of 
the archival material. The regional history section of Chapter 3 should not stand alone as 
evidence that the PROs were serving as anchor tenants in this innovation system. Chapter 
3 provided some context with which to begin understanding the institutional environment 
around this innovation system, and yet my research question and analytical framework 
(i.e., my use of quantitative network analysis) meant that this study has provided limited 
qualitative evidence on the institutions that shape interactive learning in this system. 
Further qualitative research would be helpful here. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the limitations of the fixed list approach for network data 
collection. The fixed list approach does not account for the open nature of innovation 
systems. Also, it captures the core of a network but not the periphery (Doreian & 
Woodard, 1992). Peripheral network positions could be important for creativity and 
innovation (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Kudic et al., 2015), but generally core network 
positions are more valuable for innovation because they provide better access to 
knowledge in the network (Giuliani, 2013; Giuliani & Bell, 2005; Kudic et al., 2015; 
Rank et al., 2006). There is a valid concern that the exclusion of peripheral nodes from a 
network dataset may introduce bias in certain network measures, however, Doreian and 
Woodard (1992) have shown that the effect is an understatement rather than a 
misstatement of the core nodes’ centrality in the network. It is nonetheless important to 
reiterate that the network examined in this dissertation represents the core—not the 
periphery—of the innovation system.  
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In Chapter 6, I discussed a further limitation related to the interpretation of degree 
centrality values. Degree centrality is a common proxy for importance in a network 
(Borgatti et al., 2013; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Takeda et al., 2008), but high degree 
centrality scores can also indicate higher propensity to establish network relationships. 
For this reason, I presented a cautious interpretation of the result for hypothesis 1 (b): the 
result indicates that public organizations were more connected, on average, than private 
companies in this network. I was only comfortable drawing conclusions about the 
importance of public organizations in this network after this result was combined with a 
dynamic conceptualization of importance—via the results for hypothesis 4(b). 
Future Research Directions 
Future research on public innovation and the entrepreneurial state. This study 
is only the first of others that should follow in an effort to address the public innovation in 
goods gap. My work suggests that taxonomies of public innovation should include a 
category for goods (like De Vries et al., 2016; Hartley, 2005) as should instruments 
designed to measure public innovation (further to Arundel & Huber, 2013; Gault, 2018). 
Furthermore, future adaptations of the general taxonomies of innovation (e.g., Archibugi, 
2001; Castellacci, 2008; Pavitt, 1984) should consider public organizations. A new a line 
of research investigating public innovation in goods could help determine where public 
organizations fit and how such taxonomies might be revised or expanded. Another 
potentially fruitful line of research could develop at the intersection of innovation studies 
and marketing; In Chapter 1, I suggested that innovation studies could benefit from a 
services-dominant logic like the one found in marketing (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008).  
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My discussion above also suggests that innovation studies could benefit from further 
investigation into the ways that private companies might serve as quartermasters for 
public innovation. This could advance the procurement-for-innovation literature (Dalpé, 
1994; Dalpé et al., 1992; Edquist et al., 2000; Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012, 
2015). The importance of public organizations for innovation systems might be further 
explored by more advanced applications of robustness analysis. Robustness analysis can 
be used simulate the effect of removing public organizations from an innovation 
system—employing a network-based definition of anchor tenants. However, I have 
cautioned that such analyses are sensitive to high levels of missing data; it is challenging 
and risky to collect primary data on whole networks.  
In short, my research points to a wider range of research questions related to public 
innovation and to the entrepreneurial state challenge in innovation studies (B. Martin, 
2013, 2016). Interesting future research questions include:  
− In what other contexts might public innovation in goods be observed? What roles do 
public organizations play in these contexts? What activities do they perform? 
− How might public innovation be constrained through neoliberal discourse? What are 
the effects of NPM reforms for innovation systems (Røste, 2005)? 
− How do procurement-for-innovation policies relate to public innovation in goods? 
− In what other contexts might public organizations serve as anchor tenants? What are 
the implications for our understanding of the roles public organizations can play if 
they are anchor tenants in some regional innovation systems? 
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Overall, this dissertation reinforces the argument that public organizations should not 
remain “conspicuously missing” (Koch & Hauknes, 2005) from analyses of new product 
and process innovation. 
Future research on innovation in scientific instrumentalities. In indicating the 
importance of public organizations for ocean science instrumentality innovation in Nova 
Scotia, my work points toward potential for further research on scientific instrumentality 
innovation. Whereas von Hippel (1988) suggested that the field of scientific instruments 
was not normal and did not warrant further study, I call for more research into scientific 
instrumentality innovation. Not only has this context provided a “revelatory” case (Yin, 
2009) of dark innovation, but it has pointed to a possible intersection of analytical and 
synthetic knowledge bases—epistêmê and technê. The potential importance of this 
context is reinforced in a very recent study by Shu-Hao Chang (2017), which found the 
international patent class G01N—measuring/testing instruments for physics—to have the 
greatest betweenness centrality of all patent classes in a university-industry co-patenting 
network. Furthermore, there is the decades old observation that the scientific 
instrumentalities field might be home to some of the world’s most radical innovations (de 
Solla Price, 1984). To these ends, future research could investigate scientific 
instrumentality innovation in other fields of science, other regional contexts, and with 
other research questions. These questions might include: 
− Are there differences in scientific instrumentality innovation across different scientific 
disciplines? Do the important interactive learning channels differ from one system to 
the next? 
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− What is the role of scientific instrumentality innovation in the emergence of new 
scientific disciplines? 
− In what ways are analytic and synthetic knowledge bases present in scientific 
instrumentality innovation systems? 
− Are regional scientific instrumentality innovation systems connected through global 
innovation networks (Chaminade & Plechero, 2015; Liu et al., 2013)? 
− In what ways do different approaches to science policy influence scientific 
instrumentality innovation? 
− How prevalent is user-innovation (von Hippel, 2005) in the field of scientific 
instrumentalities?  
Furthermore, given my discussion above, I believe it is particularly important to pursue 
future research regarding the implications of NPM and the (re)organization of science on 
public organizations’ innovation competencies. Clearly DARPA is not the only public 
support organization that performs an embedded network governance function (Fuchs, 
2010), and this point warrants further research. 
Future research on research methods and dark innovation. To produce my 
contributions, I had to align theory, context, analytical framing and research methods 
such that my research was not constrained to a market-orientation. This allowed me to 
observe some dark innovation. My methodological contributions can now be used to 
further advance the dark innovation challenge (B. Martin, 2013, 2016). Most importantly 
for this challenge, my research reinforces discussion by Gault (2018) on the need to 
update definitions of innovation (i.e., OECD, 2005). My approach to boundary 
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specification and my adapted channels of interactive learning framework could help to 
advance the dark innovation challenge. These are both transferable social science 
instrumentalities that can be used by other researchers to observe innovation outside the 
market. What else might be learned about dark innovation by using methods like these? 
Future research can and should continue to develop the necessary social science 
instrumentalities for studying dark innovation. Tools like the diverse economies 
framework (Gibson-Graham, 1997, 2005, 2008, 2010) hold considerable potential for 
revealing additional innovation that might be outside the market. 
  





A table that represents a network graph using one row and one 
column for each node. The cells in the table represent relations 
between each dyad, or pair of nodes. 
Bidirectional 
Ties 
Edges that represent relationships where learning/knowledge accrues 
to both parties. 




The extent to which distances between nodes in a network increase 
following the removal of a focal node (Borgatti, 2006). 
Edge 
Betweenness 
A measure of how important an edge is within a network, based 
upon how many pairs of nodes the edge lies between (L. C. 
Freeman, 1977). 
Edges The linkages between nodes in a network. For an interactive 
learning network these are the interactive learning relationships. 
Industrial Policy Technology policy and innovation policy are often framed as 
economic policies (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005) under the umbrella of 
industrial policy (Edquist & Chaminade, 2006; Salazar & Holbrook, 
2007). Industrial policies are those public policies that promote 
development of private companies in key economic sectors (Salazar 
& Holbrook, 2007). 
Innovation An on-going process of interactive learning. 
Innovation Policy Public policies that aim to promote the effectiveness of innovation 
systems (Dodgson, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). 
Innovation 
System 
A set of organizations that engage in interactive learning within an 
institutional field. 




Inter-organizational processes that (re)combine knowledge. These 





A graphical representation of the organizations and interactive 
learning relationships in an innovation system. 
Multiplex Ties Edges that represent two or more types of relationships. 
Nodes The vertices that may or may not be connected to one another in a 
network. For an interactive learning network these are the 
organizations. 
Ocean Science The full range of chemical, biological and physical scientific 
investigations of the ocean and its contents. 
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Term Definition 
Organizations Standalone legal entities or a kind-of-activity units (KAUs). 
(Includes all legal forms: government departments, agencies, etc.; 
privately-owned proprietorships, partnerships and corporations; and 
not-for-profit societies, associations, and corporations). 
Public Innovation Innovation undertaken by public organizations (see a review of the 
relevant literature in De Vries et al., 2016). 
Private 
Organization 
An organization that meets two or more of the following criteria: 
private ownership, private funding, and market-based social control 
(Perry & Rainey, 1988). 
Public 
Organization 
An organization that meets two or more of the following criteria: 
public ownership, public funding, and polyarchal social control 
(Perry & Rainey, 1988). 
Public Research 
Organizations 
Organizations that conduct scientific research and meet the public 
organization criteria above (e.g., government laboratories, 
universities, and colleges). 




A combinatorial procedure for resampling matrix data, thereby 
overcoming the statistical interdependence of the data. It results in a 
distribution of possible observations that can be compared against 
observed data to evaluate the probability that the observations would 
have been observed at random. 
Robustness The ability of a network or system to remain connected when 
individual nodes or edges are removed. 
Science Policy Public policies that promote research in universities and PROs 
(Dodgson, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). Sometimes referred to 
as “research policy” (but not in this dissertation). 
Scientific 
Instruments 
The machinery and equipment used in the scientific process. In this 
dissertation, this term is primarily used when referencing research 
by Eric von Hippel and his colleagues (Riggs & von Hippel, 1994; 
Spital, 1979; von Hippel, 1976, 1988). 
Scientific 
Instrumentalities 
The instruments and techniques used in the scientific process (de 
Solla Price, 1984). 
Technology 
Policy 
Public policies that promote development of key technologies (e.g., 
ICTs, biotechnology) (Dodgson, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). 
 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  209 
References 
Agrawal, A., & Cockburn, I. (2003). The anchor tenant hypothesis: exploring the role of 
large, local, R&D-intensive firms in regional innovation systems. International 
Journal Of Industrial Organization, 21(9), 1227-1253.  
Ahuja, G. (2000). Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A 
longitudinal study. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(3), 425-455.  
Altshuler, A., & Behn, R. D. (2010). Innovation in American government: Challenges, 
opportunities, and dilemmas: Brookings Institution Press. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2016). The evolution of science, technology and innovation 
policies: A review of the Ghanaian experience. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 110, 134-142. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.11.022 
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.. ed.). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Archibugi, D. (2001). Pavitt's taxonomy sixteen years on: a review article. Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology, 10(5), 415-425. 
doi:10.1080/10438590100000016 
Archibugi, D., & Filippetti, A. (2017). The retreat of public research and its adverse 
consequences on innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.05.022 
Arundel, A., & Huber, D. (2013). From too little to too much innovation? Issues in 
measuring innovation in the public sector. Structural change and economic 
dynamics, 27, 146-159. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2013.06.009 
Arza, V., & Carattoli, M. (2017). Personal ties in university-industry linkages: a case-
study from Argentina. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 42(4), 814-840. 
doi:10.1007/s10961-016-9544-x 
Arza, V., De Fuentes, C., Dutrénit, G., & Vazquez, C. (2015). Channels and benefits of 
interactions between public research organizations and industry: comparing 
country cases in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In E. Albuquerque, W. Suzigan, 
G. Kruss, & K. Lee (Eds.), Developing national systems of innovation. 
University‑Industry Interactions in the Global South. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
Asheim, B. T., & Isaksen, A. (2002). Regional innovation systems: the integration of 
local "sticky" and global "ubiquitous" knowledge. The Journal of Technology 
Transfer, 27(1), 77-86.  
Asheim, B. T., Smith, H. L., & Oughton, C. (2011). Regional innovation systems: theory, 
empirics and policy. Regional Studies, 45(7), 875-891. 
doi:10.1080/00343404.2011.596701 
Atkinson-Grosjean, J. (2002). Canadian science at the public/private divide: The NCE 
experiment. Journal of Canadian Studies, 37(3), 71.  
Atkinson-Grosjean, J. (2006). Public Science, Private Interests: Culture and Commerce 
in Canada's Networks of Centres of Excellence. Toronto, ON: University of 
Toronto Press. 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  210 
Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee. (2006). The Ocean Technology 
Sector in Atlantic Canada. Moncton, NB: Government of Canada. Retrieved from 
http://aczisc.dal.ca/oceantech-1.pdf. 
Ausubel, J. H., Trew Crist, D., & Waggoner, P. E. (Eds.). (2010). First Census of Marine 
Life 2010: Highlights of a Decade of Discovery. Washington, DC: Census of 
Marine Life International Secretariat, Consortium for Ocean Leadership. 
Azagra-Caro, J. M., Barberá-Tomás, D., Edwards-Schachter, M., & Tur, E. M. (2017). 
Dynamic interactions between university-industry knowledge transfer channels: A 
case study of the most highly cited academic patent. Research Policy, 46(2), 463-
474. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.11.011 
Bailey, M., Favaro, B., Otto, S. P., Charles, A., Devillers, R., Metaxas, A., . . . Sumaila, 
U. R. (2016). Canada at a crossroad: The imperative for realigning ocean policy 
with ocean science. Marine Policy, 63, 53-60. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.10.002 
Balconi, M., Breschi, S., & Lissoni, F. (2004). Networks of inventors and the role of 
academia: an exploration of Italian patent data. Research Policy, 33(1), 127-145. 
doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(03)00108-2 
Barabási, A. L. (2013). Network Robustness in Network Science. Barabási Lab. Retrieved 
from http://barabasilab.com/networksciencebook.  
Barabási, A. L., & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 
286(5439), 509-512. doi:10.2307/2899318 
Barras, R. (1986). Towards a theory of innovation in services. Research Policy, 15(4), 
161-173.  
Bascom, W. (1988). The crest of the wave: adventures in oceanography. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Bason, C. (2010). Leading public sector innovation: Co-creating for a better society. 
Bristol, UK: Policy Press. 
Bekkers, R., & Freitas, I. M. B. (2008). Analysing knowledge transfer channels between 
universities and industry: To what degree do sectors also matter? Research Policy, 
37(10), 1837-1853.  
Belussi, F., Sammarra, A., & Sedita, S. R. (2010). Learning at the boundaries in an “Open 
Regional Innovation System”: A focus on firms’ innovation strategies in the 
Emilia Romagna life science industry. Research Policy, 39(6), 710-721. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.014 
Benito, G. R. G., Berger, E., de la Forest, M., & Shum, J. (2003). A cluster analysis of the 
maritime sector in Norway. International Journal of Transport Management, 1(4), 
203-215. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijtm.2003.12.001 
Benson, K. R., & Rehbock, P. F. (1993). Oceanographic history: the Pacific and beyond. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
Bergé, L., Scherngell, T., & Wanzenböck, I. (2017). Bridging centrality as an indicator to 
measure the ‘bridging role’ of actors in networks: An application to the European 
Nanotechnology co-publication network. Journal of Informetrics, 11(4), 1031-
1042. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2017.09.004 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  211 
Bergenholtz, C., & Waldstrøm, C. (2011). Inter-organizational network studies—a 
literature review. Industry & Innovation, 18(6), 539-562. 
doi:10.1080/13662716.2011.591966 
Bianchini, S., & Llerena, P. (2016). Science policy as a prerequisite of industrial policy. 
Economia e Politica Industriale, 43(3), 273-280. doi:10.1007/s40812-016-0040-y 
BIO. (1962-1992). Annual Reviews. Dartmouth, NS: Government of Canada. Retrieved 
from http://www.bio.gc.ca/info/publications-eng.php. 
BIO. (2002). The first 40 years at BIO. In 2002 in Review: 40th Anniversary Edition. 
Dartmouth, NS: Government of Canada. 
Bishop, K., D’Este, P., & Neely, A. (2011). Gaining from interactions with universities: 
Multiple methods for nurturing absorptive capacity. Research Policy, 40(1), 30-
40.  
Bloch, C. (2011). Measuring Public Innovation in the Nordic Countries: Copenhagen 
Manual. Aargus: The Danish Centre for Studies in Research and Research Policy. 
Bloch, C., & Bugge, M. M. (2013). Public sector innovation—From theory to 
measurement. Structural change and economic dynamics, 27, 133-145. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2013.06.008 
Boardman, P. C. (2008). Beyond the stars: The impact of affiliation with university 
biotechnology centers on the industrial involvement of university scientists. 
Technovation, 28(5), 291-297.  
Boardman, P. C., & Ponomariov, B. L. (2009). University researchers working with 
private companies. Technovation, 29(2), 142-153.  
Bogers, M., Afuah, A., & Bastian, B. (2010). Users as innovators: a review, critique, and 
future research directions. Journal of Management, 36(4), 857-875. 
doi:10.1177/0149206309353944 
Booth, C., & Rowlinson, M. (2006). Management and organizational history: Prospects. 
Management and Organizational History, 1(1), 5-30.  
Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. (1968). Management of new products. McLean, VA: Booz, 
Allen & Hamilton. 
Borgatti, S. P. (2002). NetDraw Software for Network Visualization. Lexington, KY: 
Analytic Technologies.  
Borgatti, S. P. (2006). Identifying sets of key players in a social network. Computational 
and Mathematical Organization Theory, 12(1), 21-34. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-7084-x 
Borgatti, S. P., & Molina, J.-L. (2005). Toward ethical guidelines for network research in 
organizations. Social Networks, 27(2), 107-117. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2005.01.004 
Borgatti, S. P., Carley, K. M., & Krackhardt, D. (2006). On the robustness of centrality 
measures under conditions of imperfect data. Social Networks, 28(2), 124-136. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2005.05.001 
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Freeman, L. C. (2002). Ucinet for Windows: Software 
for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.  
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Johnson, J. C. (2013). Analyzing social networks. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Breimyer, H. F. (1991). Government "Intervention:" A Deceptive Label. Choices, 06(2).  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  212 
Breschi, S., & Catalini, C. (2010). Tracing the links between science and technology: An 
exploratory analysis of scientists’ and inventors’ networks. Research Policy, 
39(1), 14-26.  
Breschi, S., & Malerba, F. (1997). Sectoral Innovation Systems: Technological Regimes, 
Schumpeterian Dynamics, and Spatial Boundaries. In C. Edquist (Ed.), Systems of 
Innovations: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations (pp. 130-156). 
Hoboken, NJ: Routledge. 
Breschi, S., Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (2000). Technological regimes and 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation. The Economic Journal, 110(463), 388-410.  
Brewer, D. D. (2000). Forgetting in the recall-based elicitation of personal and social 
networks. Social Networks, 22(1), 29-43. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
8733(99)00017-9 
Broekel, T., & Mueller, W. (2017). Critical links in knowledge networks – What about 
proximities and gatekeeper organisations? Industry and Innovation, 1-21. 
doi:10.1080/13662716.2017.1343130 
Brooks, P. (2015, November 3). Rolls-Royce moves some marine work out of Dartmouth, 
17 jobs lost. The Chronicle Herald.  
Broström, A. (2010). Working with distant researchers—Distance and content in 
university–industry interaction. Research Policy, 39(10), 1311-1320.  
Bryman, A., Bell, E., Mills, A. J., & Yue, A. R. (2011). Business research methods 
(Canadian Edition ed.). Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press. 
Bugge, M., Mortensen, P. S., & Bloch, C. (2011). Report on the Nordic Pilot studies - 
Analyses of methodology and results. Measuring Public Innovation in Nordic 
Countries. Retrieved from: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/282035 
Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis : 
elements of the sociology of corporate life. London, UK: Heinemann. 
Burt, R. S. (1978). Stratification and prestige among elite experts in methodological and 
mathematical sociology circa 1975. Social Networks, 1(2), 105-158.  
Bush, V. (1945a). As We May Think. The Atlantic, 176, 101-108. 
Bush, V. (1945b). Science, the endless frontier. A report to the President. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Govt. print. off. 
Butts, C. T. (2008). Social network analysis: A methodological introduction. Asian 
Journal of Social Psychology, 11(1), 13-41.  
Calignano, G., & Fitjar, R. D. (2017). Strengthening relationships in clusters: How 
effective is an indirect policy measure carried out in a peripheral technology 
district? The Annals of Regional Science, 59(1), 139-169. doi:10.1007/s00168-
017-0821-x 
Calignano, G., Fitjar, R. D., & Kogler, D. F. (2018). The core in the periphery? The 
cluster organization as the central node in the Apulian aerospace district. Regional 
Studies, 1-12. doi:10.1080/00343404.2017.1420155 
Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E., Strogatz, S. H., & Watts, D. J. (2000). Network 
robustness and fragility: Percolation on random graphs. Physical review letters, 
85(25), 5468.  
Campbell, E. M. (1950). A New Deal for Nova Scotia. Quill & Quire, 24-25. 
Canadian Institute of Oceanography. (1959). Nature, 184, 769.  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  213 
Cantner, U., & Graf, H. (2006). The network of innovators in Jena: An application of 
social network analysis. Research Policy, 35(4), 463-480. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2006.01.002 
Capone, F., & Lazzeretti, L. (2018). The different roles of proximity in multiple informal 
network relationships: evidence from the cluster of high technology applied to 
cultural goods in Tuscany. Industry and Innovation, 1-21. 
doi:10.1080/13662716.2018.1442713 
Caraça, J., Lundvall, B.-Å., & Mendonça, S. (2009). The changing role of science in the 
innovation process: From Queen to Cinderella? Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 76(6), 861-867. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2008.08.003 
Carrington, P. J., Scott, J., & Wasserman, S. (2005). Models and methods in social 
network analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Casper, S. (2007). How do technology clusters emerge and become sustainable? Research 
Policy, 36(4), 438-455. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.02.018 
Casper, S., Hollingsworth, J. R., & Whitley, R. (2005). Varieties of Capitalism: 
Comparative Institutional Approaches to Economic Organization and Innovation. 
In S. Casper & F. Van Waarden (Eds.), Innovation and Institutions (pp. 193-228). 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Castellacci, F. (2008). Technological paradigms, regimes and trajectories: Manufacturing 
and service industries in a new taxonomy of sectoral patterns of innovation. 
Research Policy, 37(6-7), 978-994. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2008.03.011 
Castellacci, F. (2009). The interactions between national systems and sectoral patterns of 
innovation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 19(3), 321-347. 
doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0113-9 
Cattani, G., & Ferriani, S. (2008). A core/periphery perspective on individual creative 
performance: Social networks and cinematic achievements in the Hollywood film 
industry. Organization Science, 19(6), 824-844.  
Chaminade, C., & Plechero, M. (2015). Do regions make a difference? Regional 
innovation systems and global innovation networks in the ICT industry. European 
Planning Studies, 23(2), 215-237. doi:10.1080/09654313.2013.861806 
Chaminade, C., & Vang, J. (2008). Globalisation of knowledge production and regional 
innovation policy: Supporting specialized hubs in the Bangalore software 
industry. Research Policy, 37(10), 1684-1696. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2008.08.014 
Chang, S.-H. (2017). The technology networks and development trends of university-
industry collaborative patents. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
118, 107-113. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.02.006 
Chang, Y.-C. (2011). Maritime clusters: What can be learnt from the South West of 
England. Ocean & Coastal Management, 54(6), 488-494. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2011.03.005 
Chen, K., Zhang, Y., Zhu, G., & Mu, R. (2017). Do research institutes benefit from their 
network positions in research collaboration networks with industries or/and 
universities? Technovation. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2017.10.005 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  214 
Chen, S.-H., & Lin, W.-T. (2017). The dynamic role of universities in developing an 
emerging sector: a case study of the biotechnology sector. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 123, 283-297. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.006 
Chidamber, S. R., & Kon, H. B. (1994). A research retrospective of innovation inception 
and success: the technology–push, demand–pull question. International Journal of 
Technology Management, 9(1), 94-112.  
Choi, H. (2017). Ready-steady-go for emerging technologies in post catch-up countries: a 
longitudinal network analysis of nanotech in Korea. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 29(8), 946-959. doi:10.1080/09537325.2016.1260103 
Ciapetti, L., & Perulli, P. (2018). New tech spaces for old tech places? Exploring the 
network of research and technology organizations across North Italian Regions. 
European Planning Studies, 26(1), 192-211. doi:10.1080/09654313.2017.1386626 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152.  
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R., & Walsh, J. P. (2002). Links and impacts: the influence of 
public research on industrial R&D. Management Science, 48(1), 1-23.  
Confraria, H., & Vargas, F. (2017). Scientific systems in Latin America: performance, 
networks, and collaborations with industry. The Journal of Technology Transfer. 
doi:10.1007/s10961-017-9631-7 
Cooke, P. (2001). Regional innovation systems, clusters, and the knowledge economy. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4), 945.  
Cooke, P. (2002). Biotechnology clusters as regional, sectoral innovation systems. 
International Regional Science Review, 25(1), 8-37. 
doi:10.1177/016001760202500102 
Cooke, P. (2016). The virtues of variety in regional innovation systems and 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, 
and Complexity, 2(1), 13. doi:10.1186/s40852-016-0036-x 
Cooke, P., Porter, J., Cruz, A. R., & Pinto, H. (2011). Maritime Clusters - Institutions and 
Innovation Actors in the Atlantic Area (978-989-8472-08-3). Retrieved from: 
http://kimeraa.eu/gestor/upload_files/Documentos/Maritime_Clusters_-
_Institutions_and_Innovation_Actors_in_the_Atlantic_Area_Digital_Version.pdf 
Cooke, S. J., Iverson, S. J., Stokesbury, M. J., Hinch, S. G., Fisk, A. T., VanderZwaag, D. 
L., . . . Whoriskey, F. (2011). Ocean Tracking Network Canada: a network 
approach to addressing critical issues in fisheries and resource management with 
implications for ocean governance. Fisheries, 36(12), 583-592.  
Cooper, R. G. (1994). Third‐generation new product processes. Journal of product 
innovation management, 11(1), 3-14.  
Cooper, R. G., & Kleinschmidt, E. J. (1986). An investigation into the new product 
process: steps, deficiencies, and impact. Journal of product innovation 
management, 3(2), 71-85.  
Coriat, B., & Weinstein, O. (2002). Organizations, firms and institutions in the generation 
of innovation. Research Policy, 31(2), 273-290. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00141-X 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  215 
Crane, D. (1972). Invisible colleges; diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities. 
Chicago,: University of Chicago Press. 
Crescenzi, R., Filippetti, A., & Iammarino, S. (2017). Academic inventors: collaboration 
and proximity with industry. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 42(4), 730-762. 
doi:10.1007/s10961-016-9550-z 
Cruz, S., Paulino, S., & Gallouj, F. (2015). Public service innovation: solid waste sector 
from the perspective of clean development mechanism landfill projects. Journal of 
Inspiration Economy, 2(2), 93-112.  
D’Este, P., & Patel, P. (2007). University–industry linkages in the UK: What are the 
factors underlying the variety of interactions with industry? Research Policy, 
36(9), 1295-1313. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.05.002 
Dalpé, R. (1994). Effects of government procurement on industrial innovation. 
Technology in Society, 16(1), 65-83. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0160-
791X(94)90021-3 
Dalpé, R., DeBresson, C., & Xiaoping, H. (1992). The public sector as first user of 
innovations. Research Policy, 21(3), 251-263. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-
7333(92)90019-Z 
De Fuentes, C. (2009). Derramas de conocimiento de empresas grandes y capacidades de 
absorción de pymes: el caso de Querétaro. In G. Dutrénit (Ed.), Sistemas 
regionales de innovación: un espacio para el desarrollo de las PYMES. El caso 
de la industria de maquinados industriales. Mexico: UAM-X. 
De Fuentes, C., & Dutrénit, G. (2012). Best channels of academia–industry interaction for 
long-term benefit. Research Policy, 41(9), 1666-1682. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.026 
De Fuentes, C., & Dutrénit, G. (2016). Geographic proximity and university–industry 
interaction: the case of Mexico. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 41(2), 329-
348. doi:10.1007/s10961-014-9364-9 
De Nooy, W., Mrvar, A., & Batagelj, V. (2011). Exploratory social network analysis with 
Pajek. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
de Solla Price, D. J. (1984). The science/technology relationship, the craft of 
experimental science, and policy for the improvement of high technology 
innovation. Research Policy, 13(1), 3-20. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-
7333(84)90003-9 
De Vries, H., Bekkers, V., & Tummers, L. (2016). Innovation in the public sector: a 
systematic review and future research agenda. Public Administration, 94(1), 146-
166. doi:10.1111/padm.12209 
Dekker, D., Krackhardt, D., & Snijders, T. A. B. (2007). Sensitivity of MRQAP Tests to 
Collinearity and Autocorrelation Conditions. Psychometrika, 72(4), 563-581. 
doi:10.1007/s11336-007-9016-1 
Demircioglu, M. A., & Audretsch, D. B. (2017). Conditions for innovation in public 
sector organizations. Research Policy, 46(9), 1681-1691. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.08.004 
Department of Oceanography. (2011). Making Waves: The early days of Oceanography 
at Dalhousie University. Retrieved from 
http://oceanography.dal.ca/alumni/OceanographyHistory.pdf  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  216 
Dodgson, M. (2000). Policies for science, technology and innovation in Asian newly 
industrializing economies. In L. Kim & R. R. Nelson (Eds.), Technology, 
learning, and innovation: Experiences of newly industrializing economies (pp. 
229-268). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Doloreux, D. (2003). Regional innovation systems in the periphery: the case of the 
Beauce in Québec (Canada). International Journal of Innovation Management, 
7(1), 67.  
Doloreux, D. (2008). Quebec's coastal maritime industrial cluster: (not) innovative and 
(locally) embedded? Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 21(3), 325-
343,377.  
Doloreux, D., & Melançon, Y. (2008). On the dynamics of innovation in Quebec's coastal 
maritime industry. Technovation, 28(4), 231-243. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2007.10.006 
Doloreux, D., & Parto, S. (2005). Regional innovation systems: Current discourse and 
unresolved issues. Technology in Society, 27(2), 133-153. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2005.01.002 
Doloreux, D., & Shearmur, R. (2009). Maritime clusters in diverse regional contexts: The 
case of Canada. Marine Policy, 33(3), 520-527. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.12.001 
Doloreux, D., Freel, M., & Shearmur, R. (2010). Knowledge-Intensive Business Services: 
Geography and Innovation. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. 
Doreian, P., & Woodard, K. L. (1992). Fixed list versus snowball selection of social 
networks. Social Science Research, 21(2), 216-233.  
DREA. (c. 1985). Defence Research Establishment Atlantic. Dartmouth, NS: Nova Scotia 
Public Archives collection, V/F Vol 415 #11. 
Durepos, G., & Mills, A. J. (2011). Actor-Network Theory, ANTi-History and critical 
organizational historiography. Organization. doi:10.1177/1350508411420196 
Durepos, G., & Mills, A. J. (2012). Anti-history: theorizing the past, history, and 
historiography in management and organization studies. Charlotte, NC: 
Information Age. 
Dutrénit, G., & Arza, V. (2010). Channels and benefits of interactions between public 
research organisations and industry: comparing four Latin American countries. 
Science and Public Policy, 37(7), 541-553.  
Edquist, C. (1997). Systems of innovation: technologies, institutions, and organizations. 
London, UK: Pinter. 
Edquist, C. (2001). The systems of innovation approach and innovation policy: an 
account of the state of the art. Paper presented at the DRUID, Aalborg, Denmark.  
Edquist, C. (2004). Reflections on the systems of innovation approach. Science and 
Public Policy, 31(6), 485-489.  
Edquist, C., & Chaminade, C. (2006). Industrial policy from a systems-of-innovation 
perspective. EIB Papers, 11(1), 108-132.  
Edquist, C., & Johnson, B. (1997). Institutions and organisations in systems of 
innovation. In C. Edquist (Ed.), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions 
and Organizations. New York, NY: Pinter. 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  217 
Edquist, C., & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M. (2012). Public procurement for innovation as 
mission-oriented innovation policy. Research Policy, 41(10), 1757-1769. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.022 
Edquist, C., & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M. (2015). Pre-commercial procurement: a 
demand or supply policy instrument in relation to innovation? R&D Management, 
45(2), 147-160. doi:10.1111/radm.12057 
Edquist, C., Hommen, L., & Tsipouri, L. J. (2000). Public technology procurement and 
innovation. New York, NY: Springer. 
Edqvist, O. (2003). Layered science and science policies. Minerva: A Review of Science, 
Learning & Policy, 41(3), 207.  
Eom, B.-Y., & Lee, K. (2009). Modes of knowledge transfer from PROs and firm 
performance: the case of Korea. Seoul Journal of Economics, 22(4), 499-528.  
ERISS Corporation, & The Maritime Alliance. (2014). The Ocean Enterprise: A study of 
US business activity in ocean measurement, observation and forecasting. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.ioos.noaa.gov/ioos_in_action/yearonereport_st_1114.pdf 
Ernst, D. (2006). Innovation Offshoring: Asia's Emerging Role in Global Innovation 
Networks. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center. 
Etzkowitz, H. (2002). Incubation of incubators: innovation as a triple helix of university-
industry-government networks. Science and Public Policy, 29(2), 115-128. 
doi:10.3152/147154302781781056 
Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. A. (1997). Universities and the global knowledge 
economy : a triple helix of university-industry-government relations. New York, 
NY: Pinter. 
Expert Panel on Canadian Ocean Science. (2013). Ocean science in Canada: meeting the 
challenge, seizing the opportunity. Ottawa, ON: Council of Canadian Academies 
Retrieved from 
http://www.scienceadvice.ca/en/assessments/completed/oceans.aspx. 
Fagerberg, J., Fosaas, M., & Sapprasert, K. (2012). Innovation: Exploring the knowledge 
base. Research Policy, 41(7), 1132-1153.  
Fagerberg, J., Fosaas, M., & Sapprasert, K. (2012). Innovation: Exploring the knowledge 
base. Research Policy, 41(7), 1132-1153.  
Fagerberg, J., Martin, B. R., & Andersen, E. S. (2013). Innovation studies: evolution and 
future challenges. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Feldman, M. (2003). The locational dynamics of the US biotech industry: knowledge 
externalities and the anchor hypothesis. Industry and Innovation, 10(3), 311-329.  
Ferrary, M., & Granovetter, M. (2009). The role of venture capital firms in Silicon 
Valley's complex innovation network. Economy and Society, 38(2), 326-359.  
Filippetti, A., & Savona, M. (2017). University–industry linkages and academic 
engagements: individual behaviours and firms’ barriers. Introduction to the special 
section. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 1-11. doi:10.1007/s10961-017-
9576-x 
Fisher, D., Atkinson-Grosjean, J., & House, D. (2001). Changes in 
academy/industry/state relations in Canada: The creation and development of the 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  218 
Networks of Centres of Excellence. Minerva, 39(3), 299-325. 
doi:10.1023/A:1017924027522 
Florizone, R., & Cullen, J. (2014). The role of a university in developing marine science, 
technology and management in support of prosperous and sustainable human-
ocean relations. Paper presented at the Beijing Forum, Beijing.  
Fløysand, A., & Jakobsen, S.-E. (2011). The complexity of innovation: A relational turn. 
Progress in Human Geography, 35(3), 328-344.  
Fontana, R., Geuna, A., & Matt, M. (2006). Factors affecting university–industry R&D 
projects: The importance of searching, screening and signalling. Research Policy, 
35(2), 309-323.  
Foray, D., Mowery, D. C., & Nelson, R. R. (2012). Public R&D and social challenges: 
What lessons from mission R&D programs? Research Policy, 41(10), 1697-1702. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.07.011 
Freeman, C. W. (1987). Technology, policy, and economic performance: lessons from 
Japan. New York, NY: Pinter. 
Freeman, C. W. (2002). Continental, national and sub-national innovation systems—
complementarity and economic growth. Research Policy, 31, 191-211.  
Freeman, L. C. (1977). A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, 
35-41.  
Fuchs, E. R. H. (2010). Rethinking the role of the state in technology development: 
DARPA and the case for embedded network governance. Research Policy, 39(9), 
1133-1147. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.07.003 
Fuenfschilling, L., & Truffer, B. (2014). The structuration of socio-technical regimes—
Conceptual foundations from institutional theory. Research Policy, 43(4), 772-
791. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.010 
Fuglsang, L. (2010). Bricolage and invisible innovation in public service innovation. 
Journal of Innovation Economics & Management, 5(1), 87. 
doi:10.3917/jie.005.0067 
Gaede, R. L., & Merklinger, H. M. (2003). Seas, Ships and Sensors: An informal history 
of the Defense Research Establishment Atlantic 1968-1995. (D2-153/2003E). 
Dartmouth, NS: Government of Canada. 
Galaskiewicz, J. (1979a). Exchange networks and community politics. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage. 
Galaskiewicz, J. (1979b). The structure of community organizational networks. Social 
forces, 57(4), 1346-1364. doi:10.2307/2577274 
Gallouj, F. (2002). Innovation in the service economy the new wealth of nations. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Gallouj, F., & Weinstein, O. (1997). Innovation in services. Research Policy, 26(4-5), 
537-556. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00030-9 
Gallouj, F., & Zanfei, A. (2013). Innovation in public services: Filling a gap in the 
literature. Structural change and economic dynamics, 27, 89-97.  
Gallouj, F., Rubalcaba, L., & Windrum, P. (2013). Public–Private Innovation Networks 
in Services. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Gault, F. (2012). User innovation and the market. Science and Public Policy, 39(1), 118-
128. doi:10.1093/scipol/scs005 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  219 
Gault, F. (2018). Defining and measuring innovation in all sectors of the economy. 
Research Policy, 47(3), 617-622. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.01.007 
Gay, B., & Dousset, B. (2005). Innovation and network structural dynamics: Study of the 
alliance network of a major sector of the biotechnology industry. Research Policy, 
34(10), 1457-1475. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2005.07.001 
Geertz, C. (1973). Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. (pp. 3-30). New York, NY: Basic 
Books. 
Gephi Consortium. (2012). Gephi. Paris, FR. Retrieved from www.gephi.org 
Gereffi, G., Brun, L. C., Lee, J., & Turnipseed, M. (2013). Nova Scotia's Ocean 
Technologies: A Global Value Chain Analysis of Inshore & Extreme Climate 
Vessels, Remotely Operated & Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, and 
Underwater Sensors & Instrumentation. Durham, NC: Duke University. Retrieved 
from www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2012-03-05_NovaScotia_OTReport.pdf. 
Gertler, M. S. (2010). Rules of the game: The place of institutions in regional economic 
change. Regional Studies, 44(1), 1-15. doi:10.1080/00343400903389979 
Geuna, A., & Muscio, A. (2009). The governance of university knowledge transfer: a 
critical review of the literature. Minerva, 47(1), 93-114. doi:10.1007/s11024-009-
9118-2 
Gibaldi, J. (2008). MLA style manual and guide to scholarly publishing (3rd ed.). New 
York, NY: Modern Language Association of America. 
Gibbons, M. (1994). The new production of knowledge : the dynamics of science and 
research in contemporary societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Gibbons, M. (2000). Mode 2 society and the emergence of context-sensitive science. 
Science and Public Policy, 27(3), 159-163. doi:10.3152/147154300781782011 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (1997). The end of capitalism (as we knew it): A feminist critique 
of political economy. Capital & Class, 21(2), 186-188.  
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2005). Surplus possibilities: Postdevelopment and community 
economies. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 26(1), 4-26.  
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2008). Diverse economies: performative practices for `other 
worlds'. Progress in Human Geography, 32(5), 613-632. 
doi:10.1177/0309132508090821 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2010). Post-Development Possibilities for Local and Regional 
Development. In A. Pike, A. Rodriguez-Pose, & J. Tomaney (Eds.), Handbook of 
Local and Regional Development. London, UK: Routledge. 
Gilsing, V., Nooteboom, B., Vanhaverbeke, W., Duysters, G., & van den Oord, A. 
(2008). Network embeddedness and the exploration of novel technologies: 
Technological distance, betweenness centrality and density. Research Policy, 
37(10), 1717-1731. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2008.08.010 
Girvan, M., & Newman, M. E. J. (2002). Community structure in social and biological 
networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 99(12), 7821-7826.  
Giuliani, E. (2005). Cluster absorptive capacity. European Urban and Regional Studies, 
12(3), 269-288. doi:10.1177/0969776405056593 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  220 
Giuliani, E. (2013). Network dynamics in regional clusters: evidence from chile. 
Research Policy, 42(8), 1406-1419. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.04.002 
Giuliani, E., & Arza, V. (2009). What drives the formation of ‘valuable’ university–
industry linkages?: Insights from the wine industry. Research Policy, 38(6), 906-
921. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.02.006 
Giuliani, E., & Bell, M. (2005). The micro-determinants of meso-level learning and 
innovation: evidence from a Chilean wine cluster. Research Policy, 34(1), 47-68. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.10.008 
Giuliani, E., Morrison, A., Pietrobelli, C., & Rabellotti, R. (2010). Who are the 
researchers that are collaborating with industry? An analysis of the wine sectors in 
Chile, South Africa and Italy. Research Policy, 39(6), 748-761. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.03.007 
Glückler, J., & Doreian, P. (2016). Editorial: social network analysis and economic 
geography—positional, evolutionary and multi-level approaches. Journal of 
Economic Geography, 16(6), 1123-1134. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbw041 
Godin, B. (2006). The linear model of innovation: The historical construction of an 
analytical framework. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 31(6), 639-667.  
Godin, B. (2017). Models of Innovation: The History of an Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Gorm Hansen, B. (2011). Beyond the boundary: Science, industry, and managing 
symbiosis. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 31(6), 493-505. 
doi:10.1177/0270467611422834 
Government of Nova Scotia. (2012). Defined by the sea: Nova Scotia’s Oceans 
Technology Sector present and future. Halifax, NS: Government of Nova Scotia 
Retrieved from http://novascotia.ca/cof/docs/NS-Ocean-Technology-Sector.pdf. 
Government of Nova Scotia. (2017, Nov. 16). Research Nova Scotia Trust.   Retrieved 
from https://novascotia.ca/lae/ResearchNSTrust/ 
Graff, G., & Birkenstein, C. (2017). They Say, I Say: The moves that matter in academic 
writing (3rd ed.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Grant, Hon. J.J. (2016) Speech from the Throne, Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly, 62(3) 
Sess. 
Greater Halifax Partnership. (2012). Ocean Technology.   Retrieved from 
http://www.greaterhalifax.com/en/home/halifax-nova-scotia/business-
sectors/ocean_industries/ocean_technology.aspx 
Greenlaw, M. E., Roff, J. C., Redden, A. M., & Allard, K. A. (2011). Coastal zone 
planning: a geophysical classification of inlets to define ecological representation. 
Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, 21(5), 448-461. 
doi:10.1002/aqc.1200 
Grimpe, C., & Fier, H. (2010). Informal university technology transfer: a comparison 
between the United States and Germany. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 
35(6), 637-650.  
Grønning, T. (2008). Institutions and Innovation Systems: The meanings and roles of the 
institution concept within systems of innovation approaches. Paper presented at 
the DRUID, Copenhagen. 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  221 
Grosser, T. J., Lopez-Kidwell, V., & Labianca, G. (2010). A social network analysis of 
positive and negative gossip in organizational life. Group & Organization 
Management, 35(2), 177-212.  
Gulbrandsen, M., & Smeby, J.-C. (2005). Industry funding and university professors’ 
research performance. Research Policy, 34(6), 932-950.  
Haeussler, C., & Colyvas, J. A. (2011). Breaking the ivory tower: academic 
entrepreneurship in the life sciences in UK and Germany. Research Policy, 40(1), 
41-54.  
Halvorsen, T., Hauknes, J., Miles, I., & Røste, R. (2005). On the differences between 
public and private innovation. Retrieved from: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan046809.pdf 
Hamblin, J. D. (2005). Oceanographers and the cold war: disciples of marine science. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
Hanel, P., & St-Pierre, M. (2006). Industry–university collaboration by Canadian 
manufacturing firms. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 31(4), 485-499.  
Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to social network methods.  
Retrieved from http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/  
Hansen, M. B. (2011). Antecedents of organizational innovation: The diffusion of new 
public management into danish local government. Public Administration, 89(2), 
285-306. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01855.x 
Hartley, J. (2005). Innovation in Governance and Public Services: Past and Present. 
Public Money & Management, 25(1), 27-34. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9302.2005.00447.x 
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hayes, R. (1959). Institute of Oceanography, Dalhousie. Nature, 183, 1161.  
Hoag, H. (2011). Canadian research shift makes waves. Nature, 472, 269.  
Hoag, H. (2012). Canadian budget hits basic science. Nature News (Mar 30).  
Hoag, H. (2013). Lady of the lakes. Nature, 502(7473), 612.  
Holbrook, J. A. (2010). Innovating in the public sector services? Science and Public 
Policy, 37(2), 161-162.  
Holbrook, J. A., & Wolfe, D. A. (2000). Innovation, institutions and territory: regional 
innovation systems in Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Holdaway, E. A., Newberry, J. F., Hickson, D. J., & Heron, R. P. (1975). Dimensions of 
organizations in complex societies: The educational sector. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 20(1), 37-58. doi:10.2307/2392122 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), 3-
19. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x 
Hubert, L. J. (1987). Assignment methods in combinatorial data analysis. New York, NY: 
Dekker. 
Hughes, T. P. (1976). Science and the instrument-maker: Michelson, Sperry, and the 
speed of light. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. 
Huisman, M. (2009). Imputation of missing network data: Some simple procedures. 
Journal of Social Structure, 10(1), 1-29.  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  222 
Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise. (2015). Marine people partnership. Halifax, NS: 
IORE. Retrieved from http://shipsforcanada.ca/images/uploads/Final-Report-
October-2015.pdf. 
Jacobs, M., & Mazzucato, M. (2016). Rethinking capitalism: economics and policy for 
sustainable and inclusive growth. Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Jacomy, M., Venturini, T., Heymann, S., & Bastian, M. (2014). ForceAtlas2, a 
Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy Network Visualization Designed 
for the Gephi Software. PLoS One, 9(6), e98679. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098679 
Johnson, J. C., Boster, J. S., & Palinkas, L. A. (2003). Social roles and the evolution of 
networks in extreme and isolated environments. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, 27(2-3), 89-121.  
Johnson, S. C., & Jones, C. (1957). How to organize for new products. Harvard Business 
Review, 35(3), 49-62.  
Kastelle, T., & Steen, J. (2010). Using network analysis to understand innovation. 
Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice, 12(1), 2-4.  
Katz, J. S., & Martin, B. (1997). What is research collaboration? Research Policy, 26(1), 
1-18. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(96)00917-1 
Kauffeld-Monz, M., & Fritsch, M. (2013). Who are the knowledge brokers in regional 
systems of innovation? A multi-actor network analysis. Regional Studies, 47(5), 
669-685.  
Kaufmann, A., & Tödtling, F. (2001). Science–industry interaction in the process of 
innovation: the importance of boundary-crossing between systems. Research 
Policy, 30, 791–804.  
Kennedy, D., & McCarty, C. (2016). EgoWeb 2.0 (Version 2.0). Retrieved from 
http://github.com/qualintitative/egoweb 
Kilduff, M. (1992). The friendship network as a decision-making resource: Dispositional 
moderators of social influences on organizational choice. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 62(1), 168.  
Kline, S. J. (1985). Innovation is not a linear process. Research management, 28(4), 36-
45.  
Kline, S. J., & Rosenberg, N. (1986). An overview of innovation. In R. Landau & N. 
Rosenberg (Eds.), The positive sum strategy: Harnessing technology for economic 
growth (pp. 275-305). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Klofsten, M., & Jones-Evans, D. (2000). Comparing academic entrepreneurship in 
Europe – the case of Sweden and Ireland. Small Business Economics, 14(4), 299-
309. doi:10.1023/A:1008184601282 
Knoke, D., & Yang, S. (2008). Social network analysis (Vol. 154). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Koch, P., & Hauknes, J. (2005). On innovation in the public sector. Oslo: Nordic Institute 
for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education. 
Kossinets, G. (2006). Effects of missing data in social networks. Social Networks, 28(3), 
247-268. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2005.07.002 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  223 
Krackhardt, D. (1988). Predicting with networks: Nonparametric multiple regression 
analysis of dyadic data. Social Networks, 10(4), 359-381. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(88)90004-4 
Kudic, M., Ehrenfeld, W., & Pusch, T. (2015). On the trail of core–periphery patterns in 
innovation networks: measurements and new empirical findings from the German 
laser industry. The Annals of Regional Science, 55(1), 187-220. 
doi:10.1007/s00168-015-0679-8 
Lamont, M. (2012). Toward a comparative sociology of valuation and evaluation. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 38(1), 201-221. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120022 
Larsen, M. T. (2011). The implications of academic enterprise for public science: An 
overview of the empirical evidence. Research Policy, 40(1), 6-19. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.09.013 
Latorre, M. P., Hermoso, R., & Rubio, M. A. (2017). A novel network-based analysis to 
measure efficiency in science and technology parks: the ISA framework approach. 
The Journal of Technology Transfer, 42(6), 1255-1275. doi:10.1007/s10961-017-
9585-9 
Laumann, E., Marsden, P., & Prensky, D. (1983). The boundary specification problem in 
network analysis. In R. S. Burt & M. Minor (Eds.), Applied Network Analysis: A 
Methodological Introduction (pp. 18-34). New York, NY: Sage. 
Laursen, K., & Salter, A. (2004). Searching high and low: what types of firms use 
universities as a source of innovation? Research Policy, 33(8), 1201-1215.  
Laursen, K., Reichstein, T., & Salter, A. (2011). Exploring the effect of geographical 
proximity and university quality on university–industry collaboration in the 
United Kingdom. Regional Studies, 45(4), 507-523.  
Lazonick, W., & Mazzucato, M. (2013). The risk-reward nexus in the innovation-
inequality relationship: who takes the risks? Who gets the rewards? Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 22(4), 1093-1128.  
Lim, H., & Kidokoro, T. (2017). Comparing a spatial structure of innovation network 
between Korea and Japan: through the analysis of co-inventors’ network. Asia-
Pacific Journal of Regional Science, 1(1), 133-153. doi:10.1007/s41685-017-
0037-1 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75). London, UK: Sage. 
Liu, J., Chaminade, C., & Asheim, B. (2013). The geography and structure of global 
innovation networks: a knowledge base perspective. European Planning Studies, 
21(9), 1456-1473.  
Longard, J. R. (1993). Knots, volts and decibels: an informal history of the Naval 
Research Establishment, 1940-1967. Dartmouth, NS: Defence Research 
Establishment Atlantic. 
Lopez-Kidwell, V. (2013). The heart of social networks: The ripple effect of emotional 
abilities in relational well-being. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Kentucky).    
Lorenz, C. (2012). If you're so smart, why are you under surveillance? Universities, 
neoliberalism, and new public management. Critical inquiry, 38(3), 599-629.  
Lundvall, B.-Å. (1988). Innovation as an interactive process: from user-producer 
interaction to the national system of innovation. In G. Dosi, C. W. Freeman, R. R. 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  224 
Nelson, & L. Soete (Eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory (pp. 349-
369). London: Pinter. 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (1992). National systems of innovation: towards a theory of innovation 
and interactive learning. New York, NY: Pinter. 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2013). Innovation studies: a personal interpretation of 'the state of the 
art'. In J. Fagerberg, B. R. Martin, & E. S. Andersen (Eds.), Innovation studies: 
evolution and future challenges (pp. 21-71). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2016). From manufacturing nostalgia to a strategy for economic 
transformation. Economia e Politica Industriale, 43(3), 265-271. 
doi:10.1007/s40812-016-0034-9 
Lundvall, B.-Å., & Borrás, S. (2005). Science, technology, and innovation policy. Oxford 
handbook of innovation (pp. 599-631). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Lyu, L., Wu, W., Hu, H., & Huang, R. (2017). An evolving regional innovation network: 
collaboration among industry, university, and research institution in China’s first 
technology hub. The Journal of Technology Transfer. doi:10.1007/s10961-017-
9620-x 
MacNeil, R. T. (2014a). Hybrid, larval and symbiotic companies: some taxonomic 
problems in Nova Scotia’s ocean technology industries. Paper presented at the 
Atlantic Schools of Business, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, NS. 
MacNeil, R. T. (2014b). Post-academic collaboration mechanisms: exploring the 
organization of ocean science, after the census of marine life. Manuscript in 
preparation.  
Malerba, F. (2002). Sectoral systems of innovation and production. Research Policy, 
31(2), 247-264. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00139-1 
Malerba, F. (2005). Sectoral systems of innovation: a framework for linking innovation to 
the knowledge base, structure and dynamics of sectors. Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, 14(1-2), 63-82. doi:10.1080/1043859042000228688 
Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (1996). Schumpeterian patterns of innovation are 
technology-specific. Research Policy, 25(3), 451-478. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(95)00840-3 
Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (1997). Technological regimes and sectoral patterns of 
innovative activities. Industrial and Corporate Change, 6(1), 83-118. 
doi:10.1093/icc/6.1.83 
Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of economics. London, UK: Macmillan. 
Martin, B. (2010). Science policy research-having an impact on policy? London, UK: 
Office of Health Economics. 
Martin, B. (2013). Innovation studies: an emerging agenda. In J. Fagerberg, B. R. Martin, 
& E. S. Andersen (Eds.), Innovation studies: evolution and future challenges (pp. 
168-193). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, B. (2016). Twenty challenges for innovation studies. Science and Public Policy, 
43(3), 432-450. doi:10.1093/scipol/scv077 
Martin, J. L. (1999). A general permutation-based QAP analysis approach for dyadic data 
from multiple groups. Connections, 22(2), 50-60.  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  225 
Martin, R. (2012). Measuring knowledge bases in Swedish regions. European Planning 
Studies, 20(9), 1569-1582. doi:10.1080/09654313.2012.708022 
Martin, R. (2013). Differentiated knowledge bases and the nature of innovation networks. 
European Planning Studies, 21(9), 1418-1436. 
doi:10.1080/09654313.2012.755836 
Martin, R., & Moodysson, J. (2011a). Comparing knowledge bases: on the geography and 
organization of knowledge sourcing in the regional innovation system of Scania, 
Sweden. European Urban and Regional Studies, 20(2), 170-187. 
doi:10.1177/0969776411427326 
Martin, R., & Moodysson, J. (2011b). Innovation in symbolic industries: The geography 
and organization of knowledge sourcing. European Planning Studies, 19(7), 1183-
1203.  
Martin, R., & Rypestøl, J. O. (2017). Linking content and technology: on the geography 
of innovation networks in the Bergen media cluster. Industry and Innovation, 1-
24. doi:10.1080/13662716.2017.1343132 
Martinelli, A., Meyer, M., & Von Tunzelmann, N. (2008). Becoming an entrepreneurial 
university? A case study of knowledge exchange relationships and faculty 
attitudes in a medium-sized, research-oriented university. The Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 33(3), 259-283.  
Mazzucato, M. (2013a). The entrepreneurial state: debunking public vs. private myths in 
innovation. London, UK: Anthem Press. 
Mazzucato, M. (2013b). Financing innovation: creative destruction vs. destructive 
creation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(4), 851-867.  
Mazzucato, M. (2013c). Smart and Inclusive Growth: Rethinking the State's Role and the 
Risk-Reward Relationship. In J. Fagerberg, B. R. Martin, & E. S. Andersen (Eds.), 
Innovation studies : evolution and future challenges (pp. 194-201). Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mazzucato, M. (2015). The green entrepreneurial state. In I. Scoones, M. Leach, & P. 
Newell (Eds.), The politics of green transformations (pp. 134-152). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
Mazzucato, M. (2016). From market fixing to market-creating: a new framework for 
innovation policy. Industry and Innovation, 23(2), 140-156. 
doi:10.1080/13662716.2016.1146124 
Mazzucato, M. (2017). The Value of Everything Makers and Takers in the Global 
Economy. London, UK: Penguin. 
Mazzucato, M., & Penna, C. C. (2016). Beyond market failures: The market creating and 
shaping roles of state investment banks. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 
19(4), 305-326.  
Mazzucato, M., & Semmler, W. (2002). Market share instability and stock price volatility 
during the industry life-cycle: the US automobile industry. Economic Evolution, 
Learning, and Complexity (pp. 97-126): Physica, Heidelberg. 
Mazzucato, M., & Tancioni, M. (2008). Innovation and idiosyncratic risk: an industry-
and firm-level analysis. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(4), 779-811.  
Meeus, M., & Oerlemans, L. (2005a). Innovation Strategies, Interactive Learning and 
Innovation Networks. In S. Casper & F. van Waarden (Eds.), Innovation and 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  226 
Institutions: A Multidisciplinary Review of the Study of Innovation Systems (pp. 
152-189). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Meeus, M., & Oerlemans, L. (2005b). National innovation systems. In S. Casper & F. van 
Waarden (Eds.), Innovation and Institutions: A Multidisciplinary Review of the 
Study of Innovation Systems (pp. 51). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Merton, R. K. (1957). Priorities in scientific discovery: a chapter in the sociology of 
science. American Sociological Review, 22(6), 635-659.  
Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Meyers, L. S., Gamst, G., & Guarino, A. J. (2013). Applied Multivariate Research: 
Design and Interpretation (2 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Miles, I., Kastrinos, N., Flanagan, K., Bilderbeek, R., Den Hertog, P., Huntink, W., & 
Bouman, M. (1995). Knowledge-intensive business services. The University of 
Manchester. PREST.  
Mills, E. L. (1994). Bringing oceanography into the Canadian university classroom. 
Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of Science, Technology and 
Medicine, 18(1), 3-21. doi:10.7202/800372ar 
Mills, E. L. (2011). The Fluid Envelope of our Planet: How the Study of Ocean Currents 
Became a Science. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. 
Moody, J. (2004). The Structure of a Social Science Collaboration Network: Disciplinary 
Cohesion from 1963 to 1999. American Sociological Review, 69(2), 213-238. 
doi:10.1177/000312240406900204 
Morley, J. (1968). Launching a new product. London, UK: Business Books. 
Mowery, D. C. (2009). National security and national innovation systems. Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 34(5), 455-473. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10961-008-
9100-4 
Mowery, D. C. (2012). Defense-related R&D as a model for “Grand Challenges” 
technology policies. Research Policy, 41(10), 1703-1715. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.027 
Myers, S., & Marquis, D. G. (1969). Successful industrial innovations: a study of factors 
underlying innovation in selected firms. Washington, DC: National Science 
Foundation. 
Narin, F., Hamilton, K. S., & Olivastro, D. (1997). The increasing linkage between US 
technology and public science. Research Policy, 26(3), 317-330.  
Naylor, C. D., Birgeneau, R. J., Crago, M., Lazaridis, M., Malacrida, C., McDonald, A. 
B., . . . Wilson, A. (2017). Investing in Canada's Future: Strengthening the 
Foundations of Canadian Research. Ottawa, ON: Advisory Panel for the Review 
of Federal Support for Fundamental Science. 
Nelson, R. R. (1993). National innovation systems: a comparative analysis. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nemet, G. F. (2009). Demand-pull, technology-push, and government-led incentives for 
non-incremental technical change. Research Policy, 38(5), 700-709. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.01.004 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  227 
Nilsson, A. S., Rickne, A., & Bengtsson, L. (2010). Transfer of academic research: 
uncovering the grey zone. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 35(6), 617-636.  
Niosi, J. (2000). Canada's National System of Innovation. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's 
University Press. 
Niosi, J., & Zhegu, M. (2005). Aircraft systems of innovation. In J. Niosi (Ed.), Canada’s 
Regional Innovation Systems (pp. 61-86). Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's 
University Press. 
Niosi, J., & Zhegu, M. (2010). Anchor tenants and regional innovation systems: the 
aircraft industry. International Journal of Technology Management, 50(3/4), 263-
282.  
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: How Japanese 
companies create the dynamics of innovation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2003). ‘Mode 2’ revisited: The new production 
of knowledge. Minerva: A Review of Science, Learning & Policy, 41(3), 179.  
Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2013). Re-Thinking Science Knowledge and the 
Public in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
NSRF. (1946-1995). Annual Reports of the Nova Scotia Research Foundation. Nova 
Scotia Public Archives: Call Number J 104 .K3 . R29 R432. 
NSRFC. (1979). Marine Manufacturing, an Atlantic opportunity. Dartmouth, NS: 
Council of Maritime Premiers. 
O’Dor, R. K., & Stokesbury, M. J. (2009). The Ocean Tracking Network–Adding Marine 
Animal Movements to the Global Ocean Observing System. In J. L. Nielsen, H. 
Arrizabalaga, N. Fragoso, A. Hobday, M. Lutcavage, & J. Sibert (Eds.), Tagging 
and tracking of marine animals with electronic devices (pp. 91-100). New York, 
NY: Springer. 
Ocean Technology Council of Nova Scotia. (2014). Ocean Technology Capabilities 
Guide. Retrieved from http://www.adians.ca/news/otcns-ocean-technology-
capabilities-guide 
OceansAdvance. (2014). Technology Sectors. Retrieved from 
http://www.oceansadvance.net/technology-sectors 
O'Dor, R. K., Andrade, Y., Webber, D. M., Sauer, W. H. H., Roberts, M. J., Smale, M. J., 
& Voegeli, F. M. (1998). Applications and performance of Radio-Acoustic 
Positioning and Telemetry (RAPT) systems. Hydrobiologia, 371-372(0), 1-8. 
doi:10.1023/a:1017006701496 
OECD. (1992). The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. Paris: 
OECD. Retrieved from 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=514749. 
OECD. (2005). The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities, Oslo 
Manual Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data. (3rd. ed.). 
Paris: OECD. Retrieved from 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=514749 
OECD. (2016). The Ocean Economy in 2030. Paris: OECD. 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  228 
Oliver, N., & Blakeborough, M. (1998). Innovation Networks: The View from the Inside. 
In J. Michie & J. G. Smith (Eds.), Globalization, Growth, and Governance: 
Creating an Innovative Economy (pp. 146-160). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
O'Neil, R. M. (1969). Private universities and public law. Buff. L. Rev., 19, 155.  
Osborne, S. P., & Brown, L. (2011). Innovation, public policy and public services 
delivery in the UK. The word that would be king? Public Administration, 89(4), 
1335-1350.  
Osborne, S. P., & Brown, L. (2013). Introduction: innovation in public services. In S. P. 
Osborne & L. Brown (Eds.), Handbook of Innovation in Public Services. 
Cheltenham, UK: Elgar. 
Othman, M. R., Bruce, G. J., & Hamid, S. A. (2011). The strength of Malaysian maritime 
cluster: The development of maritime policy. Ocean & Coastal Management, 
54(8), 557-568. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2011.02.004 
Pavitt, K. (1984). Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a 
theory. Research Policy, 13(6), 343-343.  
Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., Autio, E., Broström, A., D’Este, P., . . . 
Hughes, A. (2013). Academic engagement and commercialisation: A review of 
the literature on university–industry relations. Research Policy, 42(2), 423-442.  
Perri, A., Scalera, V. G., & Mudambi, R. (2017). What are the most promising conduits 
for foreign knowledge inflows? innovation networks in the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry. Industrial and Corporate Change, 26(2), 333-355. 
doi:10.1093/icc/dtx004 
Perry, J. L., & Rainey, H. G. (1988). The public-private distinction in organization 
theory: A critique and research strategy. Academy of Management Review, 13(2), 
182-201.  
Pinto, P. E., Vallone, A., Honores, G., & González, H. (2017). The dynamics of 
patentability and collaborativeness in Chile: An analysis of patenting activity 
between 1989 and 2013. World Patent Information, 49, 52-65. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wpi.2017.05.004 
Popp, D. (2017). From science to technology: The value of knowledge from different 
energy research institutions. Research Policy, 46(9), 1580-1594. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.07.011 
Powell, W. W., Packalen, K., & Whittington, K. (2012). Organizational and institutional 
genesis. In J. F. Padgett & W. W. Powell (Eds.), The emergence of organizations 
and markets (pp. 434-465). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rank, C., Rank, O., & Wald, A. (2006). Integrated versus core-periphery structures in 
regional biotechnology networks. European Management Journal, 24(1), 73-85. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2005.12.009 
Riggs, W., & von Hippel, E. (1994). Incentives to innovate and the sources of innovation: 
the case of scientific instruments. Research Policy, 23(4), 459-469.  
Robins, G., Pattison, P., & Woolcock, J. (2004). Missing data in networks: exponential 
random graph (p∗) models for networks with non-respondents. Social Networks, 
26(3), 257-283. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2004.05.001 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  229 
Roesler, C., & Broekel, T. (2017). The role of universities in a network of subsidized 
R&D collaboration: The case of the biotechnology-industry in Germany. Review 
of Regional Research, 37(2), 135-160. doi:10.1007/s10037-017-0118-7 
Rosenberg, N. (1969). The direction of technological change: inducement mechanisms 
and focusing devices. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18(1), 1-24.  
Rosenberg, N. (1982). Inside the Black Box. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rosenberg, N. (1992). Scientific instrumentation and university research. Research 
Policy, 21(4), 381-390. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(92)90035-3 




Rothaermel, F. T., Agung, S. D., & Jiang, L. (2007). University entrepreneurship: a 
taxonomy of the literature. Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(4), 691-791.  
Rothgang, M., Cantner, U., Dehio, J., Engel, D., Fertig, M., Graf, H., . . . Töpfer, S. 
(2017). Cluster policy: insights from the German leading edge cluster competition. 
Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity, 3(1), 18. 
doi:10.1186/s40852-017-0064-1 
Rothwell, R. (1994). Towards the fifth‐generation innovation process. International 
Marketing Review, 11(1), 7-31. doi:doi:10.1108/02651339410057491 
Rousseau, D. M. (1985). Issues of level in organizational research: Multi-level and cross-
level perspectives. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7(1), 1-37.  
Sá, C. M. (2010). Canadian provinces and public policies for university research. Higher 
Education Policy, 23(3), 335-357.  
Sá, C. M., & Litwin, J. (2011). University-industry research collaborations in Canada: the 
role of federal policy instruments. Science and Public Policy, 38(6), 425-435. 
doi:10.3152/030234211X12960315267732 
Salazar, M., & Holbrook, J. A. (2007). Canadian science, technology and innovation 
policy: The product of regional networking? Regional Studies, 41(8), 1129-1141. 
doi:10.1080/00343400701530865 
Salman, N., & Saives, A. L. (2005). Indirect networks: an intangible resource for 
biotechnology innovation. R&D Management, 35(2), 203-215.  
Santoro, M. D., & Chakrabarti, A. K. (2002). Firm size and technology centrality in 
industry–university interactions. Research Policy, 31(7), 1163-1180.  
Schmookler, J. (1966). Invention and economic growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Schubert, T. (2009). Empirical observations on New Public Management to increase 
efficiency in public research—Boon or bane? Research Policy, 38(8), 1225-1234. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.06.007 
Scott, J. (2000). Social network analysis: a handbook (2nd ed.). Thousands Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Shinohara, M. (2010). Maritime cluster of Japan: implications for the cluster formation 
policies. Maritime Policy & Management, 37(4), 377-399. 
doi:10.1080/03088839.2010.486648 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  230 
Smith, D. (2004). A decade of doing things differently: Universities and public‐sector 
reform in Manitoba. Canadian Public Administration, 47(3), 280-303. 
doi:10.1111/j.1754-7121.2004.tb01867.x 
Soltis, S. M. (2012). Who you are and who you know: The influence of person-
environment fit and social network centrality on individual performance. 
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Kentucky).    
Sorenson, O., Rivkin, J. W., & Fleming, L. (2006). Complexity, networks and knowledge 
flow. Research Policy, 35(7), 994-1017. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2006.05.002 
Spellman, B. A. (2012). Introduction to the special section. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 7(1), 58-59. doi:10.1177/1745691611432124 
Spital, F. C. (1979). An analysis of the role of users in the total R&D portfolios of 
scientific instrument firms. Research Policy, 8(3), 284-296. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(79)90039-8 
Statistics Canada. (2012). North American Industry Classification System. Ottawa, ON: 
Government of Canada. Retrieved from 
http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3VD.pl?Function=getVD&TVD=118464. 
Statistics Canada. (2017). Table  358-0160 - Provincial distribution of personnel engaged 
in research and development, by performing sector and occupational category, 
annual (number). Retrieved from: http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a47 
Stokesbury, M. J., Logan-Chesney, L. M., McLean, M. F., Buhariwalla, C. F., Redden, A. 
M., Beardsall, J. W., . . . Dadswell, M. J. (2016). Atlantic sturgeon spatial and 
temporal distribution in Minas Passage, Nova Scotia, Canada, a region of future 
tidal energy extraction. PLoS One, 11(7), e0158387.  
Stork, D., & Richards, W. D. (1992). Nonrespondents in communication network studies. 
Group & Organization Management, 17(2), 193-209. 
doi:10.1177/1059601192172006 
Taalbi, J. (2017). Development blocks in innovation networks. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, 27(3), 461-501. doi:10.1007/s00191-017-0491-y 
Tahmooresnejad, L., & Beaudry, C. (2017). Collaboration or funding: lessons from a 
study of nanotechnology patenting in Canada and the United States. The Journal 
of Technology Transfer. doi:10.1007/s10961-017-9615-7 
Takeda, Y., Kajikawa, Y., Sakata, I., & Matsushima, K. (2008). An analysis of 
geographical agglomeration and modularized industrial networks in a regional 
cluster: A case study at Yamagata prefecture in Japan. Technovation, 28(8), 531-
539. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2007.12.006 
Tang, X., Wang, L., & Kishore, R. (2014). Why do IS scholars cite other scholars? An 
empirical analysis of the direct and moderating effects of cooperation and 
competition among IS scholars on individual citation behavior. Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Information Systems, Aukland, New Zealand.  
Töpfer, S., Cantner, U., & Graf, H. (2017). Structural dynamics of innovation networks in 
German Leading-Edge Clusters. The Journal of Technology Transfer. 
doi:10.1007/s10961-017-9642-4 
Torres, A., Dutrénit, G., Becerra, N., & Sampedro, J. L. (2011). What are the factors 
driving university-industry linkages in latecomer firms: evidence from Mexico. 
Science and Public Policy, 38(1), 31-42.  
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  231 
Tory, H. M. (1944). Report on a Research and Development Board. In R. M. Dawson 
(Ed.), Report of the Royal Commission on Provincial Development and 
Rehabilitation (Vol. 1). Halifax, NS: King's Printer. 
Trenbirth, D. (1960, 6 August). Canada Becomes Base for Big Sea Study. The Chronicle 
Herald.  
Turner, C. (2013). The War on Science: Muzzled Scientists and Wilful Blindness in 
Stephen Harper's Canada. Vancouver, BC: Greystone Books. 
Urban, G. L., & Von Hippel, E. (1988). Lead user analyses for the development of new 
industrial products. Management Science, 34(5), 569-582.  
van der Valk, T., & Gijsbers, G. (2010). The use of social network analysis in innovation 
studies: Mapping actors and technologies. Innovation: Management, Policy & 
Practice, 12(1), 5-17.  
van Steenburgh, W. E. (1962). Address at the Special Convocation at Dalhousie 
University on The Occasion of the Official Opening of the Bedford Institute of 
Oceanography. Dalhousie University. Halifax, NS. Retrieved from 
http://www.bio2012.ca/docs/VanSteenburg-address1962.pdf 
Vargo, S. L., & Lusch, R. F. (2004). Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing. 
Journal of Marketing, 68(1), 1-17.  
Vargo, S. L., & Lusch, R. F. (2008). Service-dominant logic: continuing the evolution. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(1), 1-10.  
Vermeulen, N. (2013). From Darwin to the Census of Marine Life: Marine biology as big 
science. PLoS One, 8(1), e54284. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054284 
von Hippel, E. (1975). The dominant role of users in the scientific instrument innovation 
process. MIT.  Retrieved from 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1889/SWP-0764-
14547009.pdf?sequence=1 
von Hippel, E. (1976). The dominant role of users in the scientific instrument innovation 
process. Research Policy, 5(3), 212-239.  
von Hippel, E. (1986). Lead users: a source of novel product concepts. Management 
Science, 32(7), 791-805.  
von Hippel, E. (1988). The sources of innovation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
von Hippel, E. (2005). Democratizing innovation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
von Hippel, E., & Krogh, G. V. (2003). Open source software and the “private-collective” 
innovation model: Issues for organization science. Organization Science, 14(2), 
209-223. doi:10.1287/orsc.14.2.209.14992 
Waite, P. B. (1994). The lives of Dalhousie University (Vol. 2). Montreal, QC: McGill-
Queen's University Press. 
Walker, G., Kogut, B., & Shan, W. (1997). Social capital, structural holes and the 
formation of an industry network. Organization Science, 8(2), 109-125.  
Walker, R. M. (2014). Internal and external antecedents of process innovation: A review 
and extension. Public Management Review, 16(1), 21-44. 
doi:10.1080/14719037.2013.771698 
Walker, R. M., Jeanes, E., & Rowlands, R. (2002). Measuring innovation – Applying the 
literature-based innovation output indicator to public services. Public 
Administration, 80(1), 201-214. doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00300 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  232 
Walsh, J. P., Baba, Y., Goto, A., & Yasaki, Y. (2008). Promoting university–industry 
linkages in Japan: Faculty responses to a changing policy environment. 
Prometheus, 26(1), 39-54. doi:10.1080/08109020701846025 
Wang, D. J., Shi, X., McFarland, D. A., & Leskovec, J. (2012). Measurement error in 
network data: A re-classification. Social Networks, 34(4), 396-409. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2012.01.003 
Ward, M. D., Hoff, P. D., & Lofdahl, C. L. (2003). Identifying international networks: 
Latent spaces and imputation. In R. Breiger, K. Carley, & P. Pattison (Eds.), 
Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and 
Papers. (pp. 345–360). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
Watkins, L. (1980). Halifax-Dartmouth Area: one of the three biggest marine science 
centres in Western Hemisphere. Canadian Geographic, Oct/Nov 1980, 12-23. 
Weir, G. E. (2001). An ocean in common: American naval officers, scientists, and the 
ocean environment. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. 
Whetten, D. A. (1989). What constitutes a theoretical contribution? Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 490-495.  
Whittington, K. B. (2018). “A tie is a tie? Gender and network positioning in life science 
inventor collaboration”. Research Policy, 47(2), 511-526. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.12.006 
Windrum, P., & Koch, P. M. (2008). Innovation in public sector services: 
entrepreneurship, creativity and management. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Wolfe, D. A. (2014). Innovating in urban economics: economic transformation in 
Canadian city-regions. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. 
Woods, H. D. (1946). The Dawson Report on Nova Scotia. The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science 
politique, 12(4), 496-505. doi:10.2307/137352 
Xu, G., Wu, Y., Minshall, T., & Zhou, Y. (2017). Exploring innovation ecosystems 
across science, technology, and business: A case of 3D printing in China. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.06.030 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. 
Ziman, J. M. (1996). "Post-academic science": Constructing knowledge with networks 
and norms. Science Studies, 9(1), 67-80.  
Žnidaršič, A., Ferligoj, A., & Doreian, P. (2012). Non-response in social networks: The 
impact of different non-response treatments on the stability of blockmodels. 
Social Networks, 34(4), 438-450. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2012.02.002 
 
 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  233 
Appendix A 
Recently published network analyses that consider science-industry interaction 
Table A1. Recently published network analyses that consider science-industry interaction (January 2017 to April 2018). 
Authors 
Context 













− Data collected through 
interviews with university 
researchers. 
− Constructed new measure 
for tie strength. 
− Econometric modelling. 
− For universities, “the bi-
directional channel derives 
primarily knowledge benefits, the 
service channel derives mainly 
financial benefits” (p, 829). 
− Strong ties were related to the 
bidirectional channel, weak ties 












− Assembled a dataset from 
project records. 
− Developed a measure for 
“bridging centrality” that 
approximates for the 
aggregation of individual-
level ties (e.g., co-
authorships) to the 
organizational-level. 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics. 
− “The bridging centrality ranking 
is clearly dominated by non-
university public research 
organizations” (p., 1036). 
− Technical universities are 
“important ‘bridges’ between 
science and industry” (p. 1038). 
− For studies like this, bridging 
centrality is a better measure than 
degree centrality. 
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Authors 
Context 
















− Assembled a dataset from 
project records.  
− Developed a measure for 
“bridging centrality” (i.e., 
“critical links”) that is an 
adaptation of betweenness 
centrality. 
− Rare events logistic 
regression to predict 
critical links. 
− “Critical links particularly bridge 
institutional boundaries between 
public (basic) research and 
(application-oriented) R&D in the 





















− Collected 2 time-periods of 
data in one cross-sectional 
interview (76% response). 
− Incorporated self-reported 
edge weights. 
− Employed SNA descriptive 
statistics and techniques, 
plus QAP simple matching. 
− Uses QAP simple matching to 
show that partnership relations 
persist from T1 to T2. 























− Collected 2 time-periods of 
data in one cross-sectional 
interview (65% response). 
− Imputation of missing ties. 
− Incorporated self-reported 
edge weights. 
− Employed SNA descriptive 
statistics and techniques, 
plus QAP simple matching. 
− The cluster association is 
identified as the critical node. 
− The network is fragmented 
(medium to high whole network 
fragmentation). 
− Densest network was “informal 
contacts” with densities of 17% in 
T1 and 22% in T2. 
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Authors 
Context 













Patents − Assembled a dataset from 
patent records. 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics. 
− The IPC code with the greatest 
betweenness centrality was G01N 
– measuring/testing instruments. 
− “…the focus of [university-
industry collaboration] 
technology development is 
largely in the fields of 
measurement and chemistry 
…[which are] basic sciences, and 
are often applied in cross-











− Assembled a dataset from 
databases. 
− Negative binomial 
regression model to predict 
scientific performance 
based on collaboration 
networks. 
− “…research institutes’ network 
positions have a significant effect 
on their scientific performance, 
but this effect is inconsistent in 


















− Mixed method approach 
that included assembly of 
network data from public 
sources (3 time-periods 
from 2000 to 2012) and 7 
interviews to collect 
qualitative data from 
university tech. transfer 
offices. 
− Presentation of network 
analysis descriptive 
statistics. 
− The importance of universities 
and research institutes increased 
over time. 
− “Many firms of a smaller size and 
with lower budgets for R&D 
relied on academia-industry R&D 
collaboration” (p. 295). 
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Authors 
Context 
Nodes Edges Notes on Method Relevant Findings 
Region(s) Sector(s) 








− Assembled a longitudinal 
dataset from databases (2 
year intervals from 1999-
2007). 
− Block modelling of firms 
by industry domain. 
− Large firms and gov’t research 
institutes led in the network 
development phase while small 
firms joined in the second phase. 























− Collected data from 55 
research and tech. orgs 
(RTOs) via survey (19% 
response from a population 
of 293). 
− Developed an OLS 
regression model to predict 
centrality of orgs from a 
range of independent 
variables, including the 
performance of contract 
research for firms and 
participation in a 
collaborative venture. 
− “…a business orientation towards 
firms and a high involvement in 
collaborations apparently drive 
the centrality of North Italian 














5 or more 
scientific co-
publications 
− Assembled data for 2-time 
periods from databases 
(2004-2008 and 2009-
2013). 
− Presentation of network 
descriptive statistics. 
− Econometric modelling to 
predict intensity of 
collaboration with industry. 
− The best predictors of industry 
co-authorship are degree and 
betweenness centralities in the 
scientific co-authorship network. 
− 70% of research departments did 
not co-publish with industry in 
T1, 78% in T2. 
− “…in general, collaborations 
between science and industry, 
measured as co-publications, are 
scarce” (p. 23). 
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Authors 
Context 







Italy Patentable Inventors 
(academic and 
business) 
Co-patenting. − Assembled 2 ten-year time-
periods of data from patent 
records. 
− Measured various distances 
between pairs 
(institutional, geographic, 
organization and social). 
− Econometric modelling to 
predict collaboration. 
− Due to institutional distance, U-I 
collaborations are “more difficult 
to establish,” and “qualitatively 
less productive,” but result in 
better quality patents (i.e., higher 
forward citations) (p. 747). 
− Patents in basic science tend to 
include only academics with U-I 
collaboration in applied 
disciplines. 






















− Collected data via survey 
(96% response). 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics to 
investigate individual node 
positions. 
− Universities are the “fundamental 
actors” (p. 1271). 
− No analysis of interaction 













Co-patenting. − Assembled 6 waves of 
longitudinal data (1995-
2014) from patent records. 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics. 
− “During the early growth period 
(early 1990s), university–industry 
linkages were the pivotal 
connections of the network, [...] 
Such effect started to wear off 
towards the late 1990s” (p. 10). 
− The key nodes were large state-
owned enterprises. The 
importance of universities 
increased over time (degree 
centrality). 
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Authors 
Context 


















− Collected data via in-
person interviews with 
firms (roster recall). 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics. 
− Employed t-tests to 
compare groups of firms 
(content providers and 
technology providers) for 
each type of relation. 
− Captured relations that 
extend beyond the region. 
− Technology providers more 
actively collaborated with 
universities and research 






China Pharmaceuticals Patents Co-patenting  − Assembled data from 
patent records. 
− Observations were 
individual patents and 
variables capture relational 
data for each patent. 
− Econometric modelling to 
predict geographic 
dispersion of patent co-
authors. 
− “…the involvement of academic 
inventors drives knowledge 
networks linked to emerging 
economies to be more 
internationally dispersed 
compared to those orchestrated by 
MNEs” (p. 345). This is 
particularly true for academic 
investors from advanced 
countries. 
− “…our findings confirm the 
critical role universities play as 
growth engines” (p. 349). 
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Authors 
Context 














− Assembled dataset from 
patent records. 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics, plus 
some statistical testing of 
residency/non-residency in 
Chile versus technology 
classes. 
− “The results of our study reveal a 
lack of collaboration between 
companies and also between 
science and industry” (p. 64). 







Citations − Assembled dataset from 
scientific publication and 
patent records. 
− Focal independent variable 
was org. type: uni., private, 
gov’t research, other. 
− Multivariate regression to 
predict citations. 
− “…research performed at 
government institutions appears 
to play an important translational 
role linking basic and applied 










− Assembled a longitudinal 
dataset (4 annual periods 
2007-2010) from project 
records.  
− Employed stochastic actor-
based modelling to predict 
tie formation using 
organizational proximities 
and org. types. 
− Only 16% of edges were public-
private. 
− Universities were more active 
collaborators than firms and 
research institutes and thereby 
shaped the network over time. 
− There was an observed 
preferential attachment effect 
(based on degree centrality). 
− Institutional proximity was not a 
significant predictor of tie 
formation. 
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Authors 
Context 










including a network graph. 
− No discussion of 
methodology. 
− Since the formation of Germany’s 
leading-edge cluster program, 
“the number of cooperations that 
bridge the gap between science 
and business has increased. 
However, the relative importance 
of cooperation among public 
research organizations or between 
public research organizations and 
businesses has remained almost 















− Collected longitudinal data 
using surveys at 2 time-
points (free recall, limited 
to 10 alters). 
− Developed a network 
autocorrelation regression 
model to predict changes in 
in-degree over time. 
− Captured relations that 
extend beyond the clusters. 
 
− Public funding of cluster projects 
had differential effects across 5 
different networks. 
− In some sectors, public 
organizations became more 
connected, in others they became 
less connected. 
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Authors 
Context 


















− Mixed methods: assembled 
a network dataset from 
scientific publications, 
patent records, expert 
interviews, and secondary 
industry sources. 
− Presentation and discussion 
of network analysis 
descriptive statistics. 
− Analyzed 3 types of 
networks separately and 
then in a “cross-layer” 
analysis. 
− Based on a qualitative assessment 
of degree centrality and 
betweenness centrality, the 
authors conclude that “…local 
universities and research institutes 
are the anchor players in a dense 
network that provides a strong 
base of scientific knowledge for 
China’s 3D printing industry. 
Surprisingly, they are also the 
anchor players in the technology 
ecosystem” (p. 12).  
 
Notes: This table was compiled based on a search (“network analysis” AND (“science” or “science-industry”) since 2017) within the top 10 journals that 
reference innovation studies (Fagerberg, Fosaas, & Sapprasert, 2012). This initial search yielded eight relevant articles in six journals. Articles were not deemed 
relevant if they only included data on firms (e.g., Capone & Lazzeretti, 2018) or scientists/PROs (e.g., Tahmooresnejad & Beaudry, 2017) or if there were no 
relevant organizational-level findings because the analysis was focused on relations between individuals (e.g., Whittington, 2018), product classes (e.g., Taalbi, 
2017), or regions (e.g., Lim & Kidokoro, 2017). The search was then expanded to major scholarly databases, yielding 14 additional articles in eight journals. (1) 
Employs econometric analysis of relational data, not network analysis. (2) Uses an innovation systems approach; (3) Uses an industrial district framework; (4) 
Uses a clusters framework; (5) Uses a triple-helix framework. 
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Appendix B 
Historiographic Method 
To collect the data used in Chapter 3, I began by searching for secondary sources in 
the digital and card file indexing systems at the Nova Scotia Archives. This led to a total 
of 70 documents dating from 1944 to 1995, including official and unofficial government 
reports as well as newspaper and magazine articles. Four PROs figured prominently in 
these documents: the Naval Research Establishment (NRE), later renamed to Defence 
Research Establishment Atlantic and now known as Defence Research and Development 
Canada (DRDC) Atlantic; the federal government’s Bedford Institute of Oceanography 
(BIO); the Nova Scotia Research Foundation (NSRF), which was replaced by the Nova 
Scotia Innovation Corporation or “InNovaCorp” in 1994; and Dalhousie University’s 
Oceanography Institute, which is now a department. Archival materials were limited for 
the latter two of these organizations, so I also consulted published histories relating to 
Dalhousie University (Mills, 1994, 2011; Waite, 1994), a published history of the BIO 
(Nettleship, Gordon, Lewis, & Latremouille, 2014), and reports from the BIO’s online 
publication archive.1 I recorded my findings in the form of notes (58 pages) and 
annotated document images (60 pages). These notes and images emphasized details of 
interactions between organizations, particularly between the PROs and private 
companies. 
  
                                                 
1 For the BIO publication archive, visit http://www.bio.gc.ca/info/publications-eng.php 
(accessed August 2013). 
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Appendix C 
Expert Interview Screenshots 
 
Figure C1. System experts interview — screen 1. 
 
 
Figure C2. System experts interview — screen 2. 
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Figure C3. System experts interview — screen 3. 
 
 
Figure C4. System experts interview — screen 4. 
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Figure C5. System experts interview — screen 5. 
 
 
Figure C6. System experts interview — screen 6. 
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Figure C7. System experts interview — screen 7. 
 
 
Figure C8. System experts interview — screen 8. 
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Figure C9. System experts interview — screen 9. 
 
 
Figure C10. System experts interview — screen 10. 
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Figure C11. System experts interview — screen 11. 
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Appendix D 
 
Organizational Key Informant Interview Screenshots 
 
Figure D1. Organizational key informants interview — screen 1. 
 
 
Figure D2. Organizational key informants interview — screen 2. 
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Figure D3. Organizational key informants interview — screen 3. 
 
 
Figure D4. Organizational key informants interview — screen 4. 
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Figure D5. Organizational key informants interview — screen 5. 
 
 
Figure D6. Organizational key informants interview — screen 6. 
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Figure D7. Organizational key informants interview — screen 7. 
 
 
Figure D8. Organizational key informants interview — screen 8. 
 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INNOVATION  253 
 
Figure D9. Organizational key informants interview — screen 9. 
 
 
Figure D10. Organizational key informants interview — screen 10. 
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Figure D11. Organizational key informants interview — screen 11. 
 
 
Figure D12. Organizational key informants interview — screen 12. 
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Figure D13. Organizational key informants interview — screen 13. 
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Figure D14. Organizational key informants interview — screen 14. 
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Figure D15. Organizational key informants interview — screen 15. 
 
 
Figure D16. Organizational key informants interview — screen 16. 
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Appendix E 
Informed Consent Agreement 1 – System-Level Experts 
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Appendix F 
Informed Consent Agreement 1 – Organizational Key Informants
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